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7ABSTRACT
In our thesis we examine the conflicts in Georgia from the beginning of the country’s 
independence in 1991 until 2009 and the conflict resolution efforts provided by both domestic 
and international actors. In the thesis we explore the conflicts in all their complexity, study the 
domestic and external actors involved in Georgia, and their interests and involvement in the 
conflicts. Therefore, the main aim of the thesis is to find out to what extent the Georgian 
efforts towards the conflict resolution of Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts are 
affected by the Russian, EU and US policies and actions. Moreover, we examine the 
dynamics and nature of the conflict, which was transformed from an intra-state to an inter-
state war. In order to accomplish our research we apply both qualitative and quantitative 
methods and base our empirical analysis on a case-study on the conflict resolution in Georgia. 
The research is conducted in three analytical steps, where the first level concerns the 
Georgian domestic political realm and the way it affected the dynamics of the conflicts and 
their resolution. The theory applied in the first level is the state-based approach developed by 
B. Buzan, complemented by concepts of ethno-federalism and de facto states. The dependent 
variable at the domestic level – changes between center and the peripiheries have been 
induced by the transformations at the centre rather than at the periphery - is examined 
through the following independent variables - ethno-federalism, state-building and sub-state 
actors, Georgia’s national project and Georgia’s foreign policy. The second level of the 
research addresses the international actors’ change in foreign policy and how this affects the 
Georgian domestic political behavior and the conflict resolution. The dependent variable at 
this level - international actors’ change in foreign policy has an impact on Georgia’s political 
behavior and on the conflict resolution processes – is addressed through the following 
independent variables: international actors’ change in foreign policy and geopolitics. The 
third level aims at examining the dynamics of the conflict in Georgia, through the conflict 
analysis approach. The research has its main theoretical background in realism and 
geopolitical thinking, which is pronounced through center-periphery model. The center-
periphery model helps to explain the relationship dynamics at the domestic and international 
level and interaction between the domestic and international levels. 
The main conclusion of the thesis is that the changes in the foreign policy of 
international actors had a profound impact on the Georgian domestic political realm and the 
process of conflict resolution. The center-periphery relations are dynamic relations and the 
8peripheries on both domestic and international levels move from one center to another. In our 
case these movements have happened in two separate but parallel paths. On the international 
level, Tbilisi has moved from Russia as a center to USA and the EU, while on the domestic 
level Sukhumi and Tskhinvali were fighting to free themselves from Tbilisi as a center and 
moving towards the Russian center.
9RESUMÉ PÅ DANSK
I specialet undersøger vi konflikterne i Georgien, i perioden fra landets uafhængighed i 1991 
frem til 2009, samt både indenlandske og internationale aktørers konfliktløsningsindsats. 
Endvidere udforsker vi konflikterne i al deres kompleksitet, undersøger de indenlandske og 
eksterne aktører, der var involveret i konflikterne i Georgien, og afdækker deres interesser og 
involvering i konflikterne. Specialets hovedformål er derfor, at undersøge i hvilket omfang 
den georgiske konfliktløsnings-indsats i Abkhasien og Sydossetien var påvirket af Ruslands, 
EU’s og USA’s politik. Derudover undersøger vi dynamikken i og naturen af den georgiske 
konflikt, der skiftede karakter fra en intra-statstlig konflikt til en inter-statslig konflikt. I vores 
undersøgelse bruger vi både kvalitative og kvantitative metoder, mens vores empiriske 
analyse bygger på en case-undersøgelse af konfliktløsningen i Georgien.
Vores analyse er opdelt i tre trin, hvor det første trin omhandler den georgiske politik 
på det nationale niveau, og hvorledes den påvirkede konfliktens dynamik og selve 
konfliktløsningen. I analysens første trin anvender vi den statsbaserede teori udarbejdet af B. 
Buzan, suppleret med begreberne om etno-føderalisme og de-facto stater. Den afhængige 
variabel på det nationale niveau - forandringer mellem center og periferierne har været 
forårsaget af skift i centret i stedet for periferierne - er undersøgt gennem følgende 
uafhængige variable: etno-føderalisme, statsopbygning, de facto stater, Georgiens nationale 
projekt og Georgiens udenrigspolitik. Analysens andet trin omhandler ændringen af de 
internationale aktørers udenrigspolitik, og hvordan dette havde indflydelse på Georgiens 
politiske adfærd og konfliktløsningen. Her undersøger vi den ”eksterne” afhængige variabel -
internationale aktørers ændring i udenrigspolitik har effekt på Georgiens politiske adfærd og 
konfliktløsningsprocesser – som er undersøgt gennem følgende uafhængige variable: 
international aktørers ændring i udenrigspolitik og geopolitik. Analysens tredje trin 
undersøger Georgien-konfliktens dynamik gennem konfliktanalyse. Hele analysens teoretiske 
grundlag er realisme og geopolitisk tænkning, udtrykt gennem en centrum-periferisk model. 
Centrum-periferi modellen bidrager til specialet med at forklare dynamikken i relationerne
mellem aktørerne på nationalt og internationalt niveau, og samspillet mellem det nationale og 
internationale niveau.
Specialets hovedkonklusion er, at ændringerne i internationale aktørers udenrigspolitik 
har haft en betydelig indvirkning på den georgiske nationale politiske scene og 
konfliktløsningsprocessen. Centrum-periferi relationer er dynamiske relationer, og periferier 
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på både nationalt og internationalt niveau flytter fra et center til et andet. I Georgiens tilfælde 
er disse bevægelser sket i to separate, men parallelle baner. På det internationale niveau har
Tbilisi flyttet sig fra det russiske center mod både USA og EU, mens Sukhumi og Tskhinvali 
kæmpede på det nationale niveau for at frigøre sig fra Tbilisi som centrum, og bevægede sig 
mod det russiske center.
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INTRODUCTION 
Since its independence in 1991, Georgia - a small country in the South Caucasus with little 
more than 5 million inhabitants - began its thorny way of state-building. From the very 
beginning the newly established state has been encountering different problems not only 
related to the state-building and its transition to democratic governance but was also 
challenged by the major conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which demanded 
secession from Georgia. These conflicts, which took the lives of many people and forced 
many to leave their homes, questioned the territorial integrity of Georgia and shattered the 
state economically and politically, remained frozen until the summer of 2008. 
In August 2008 the situation deteriorated and the conflict, which was an intra-state 
affair escalated to an inter-state war, involving not only domestic actors in Georgia but 
directly an external actor – the Russian Federation. This so-called five-day war completed 
with the defeat of Georgia, where the two secessionist entities declared their independence, 
which was later recognized by Russia. This conflict put Georgia in the spotlight of the 
international community. Today the situation remains tense between the conflict parties and 
some predict outbreak of a new war. 
Despite the fact that the country suffered from the earlier conflicts, the August 2008 
events have shed more attention of the international community to Georgia and the conflict 
resolution. One can ask why all of a sudden Georgia became an object of such intense interest 
from the international community. The explanation is that Georgia matters on the world 
scene. The geographical position of the country is one of the reasons for that. Not only does 
Georgia lie in a region connecting the East and West, Europe and Middle East, but the 
country is situated on the transport routes of the natural resources of the Caspian Sea region. 
Since the end of the Cold War, considering the instability in the Middle East, the attention of 
the international oil and gas companies was shifted to the region, which was unthinkable 
during the Cold War period. The Caspian Sea region became a new Middle East, with its 
virgin resources untouched because of prioritization of resources in the other regions of 
USSR. The natural resources of the region attract the business interests, not because the 
resources are huge but mostly because of the relatively open and stable political situation in 
the area. Georgia as such doesn’t have the rich resources of gas and oil, however, its position 
is strategically important, since it is a wish of the international oil and gas companies to use 
the country as a transport route for the natural resources exploited from the region. It was a 
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priority of these companies to find routes that lay outside the borders of Russia and Iran. 
Therefore Georgia occupies an important position in relation to the transporting of natural 
resources from the region. 
It is not only the big global powers such as Russia and USA which have interest in the 
region, but also other international actors, such as Turkey, China and India directed their 
attention to the region because of natural resources. The interests of the international actors 
are associated not only to the natural resources, which are transported through Georgia, but 
also related to the security and international relations issues. Russia as the major security actor 
in the region has interests related to national security as well as economic and political 
interest. As for the EU, Georgia is a direct neighbor by sea, and if Turkey joins the EU, 
Georgia will be the direct EU neighbor by land. USA has interests in the country related to 
security and economic and political issues. There is a whole political play between the actors 
adding up to the complexity around Georgia and its conflicts. Moreover, Georgia, with its 
diversity and existence of numerous minority groups and soviet legacy, is an interesting 
country to study in itself. 
These external factors alongside with the Georgian domestic factors, which affect the 
conflicts, make an interesting research subject. Therefore in this thesis we explore the 
conflicts in all their complexity, look at the domestic and external actors involved in Georgia, 
their interests and involvement in the conflicts. 
Therefore in the current study we will investigate the following: 
To what extent the Georgian efforts towards the resolution of Abkhazian and South 
Ossetian conflicts are affected by the Russian, EU and US policies and actions? 
In order to answer this question, we will look at the following sub-questions: 
1. How the Georgian domestic political realm affected the dynamics of the conflicts 
and their resolution?
2. How changes in the Russian, EU and USA’s foreign policies impacted the 
Georgian political behavior?
3. How did the dynamics of the conflict in Georgia evolve?
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CHAPTER I. METHODOLOGY
This study aims to fulfill various objectives on empirical, methodological and theoretical 
levels. The first objective is to contribute to the existing empirical research on the conflicts in 
the post-Soviet space. More specifically, by a detailed case study analysis of both domestic 
and external factors that determine the resolution of the Georgian-Abkhazian/ South Ossetian
conflict we want to contribute to the ongoing discussions about the role of the international 
actors in conflict resolution and the state-building projects launched by the metropolitan state. 
Secondly, the study aims to contribute to the conflict studies and international 
relations. Furthermore, our goal is to develop an analytical framework which can supply the 
theoretical discussions about the interdependency between domestic and international factors 
that can explain the dynamics of the conflict and the main challenges for conflict resolution. 
We want to stress that the analysis of a conflict has to be conducted not only by applying 
conflict analysis, but it has to be complemented with other analytical tools which can give a 
broader explanation of the conflicts and their dynamics. 
Thirdly, on the methodological level our goal is to use a mixed methodology, both 
quantitative and qualitative tools. We also want to strengthen the advantages of the case study 
in the social sciences research in general and conflict/ international studies in particular. 
1.1 Scientific tradition 
The current thesis takes its methodological starting point in critical rationalism. In critical 
rationalist perspective, as formulated by Karl Popper, we don't have ultimate answers and 
scientists must try to approach scientific truths through critical and rational questions to the 
existing (Popper, 1968). What Popper pointed out is that you can never justify any scientific 
theory, but you can falsify it. For the purpose of this study it is not important whether a theory 
is false or not when evaluating existing theories and is not our intention to emphasize on it. As 
King, Keohane and Verba rightly stress, the question is more “how much of the world the 
theory can help us explain” (King et al, 1994: 101). The advantage of critical rationalism is 
that it assumes that even in a situation where the empirical results do not concur with the 
expectations, the produced knowledge can contribute to correct future research.
With regard to this thesis, modified critical rationalism is used to structure the analysis 
in a way that the thesis starts by stating a research problem and then through analysis a 
solution to it is suggested and confronted with the empirical evidence. In the end the problem 
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is restated based on the analysis and the basic procedure is repeated but from a better starting 
point.
1.2 The case study approach: advantages and problems
The thesis is designed as an empirical, qualitative case study analysis of Georgian-Abkhazian 
/South Ossetia conflict and the efforts to its resolution. As Yin wrote “The case study is but 
one of several ways of doing social science research” (Yin, 2003: 1). The case study is a 
useful analytical tool for research that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin, 2003: 23). 
The case study as a method is defined in the literature as “the intensive study of a 
single case where the purpose of the study is - at least in part - to shed light on a larger class 
of cases” (Gerring, 2006: 20). Thus the case study is a well-suited approach to study 
phenomena that cannot be understood in separation from the contextual conditions. Case 
study analysis was chosen in order to examine and explain the conflict between Georgia and 
Abkhazia/South Ossetia within a broader geopolitical context. Furthermore “how” questions 
are well suited in conducting an explanatory case study and therefore used by us when trying 
to explain how the dynamics of Georgia-Abkhazia/South Ossetian conflict can be explained 
and how international actors are affecting Georgian’s efforts towards conflict resolution. 
A primary distinction in designing case studies is between single and multiple-case 
designs. The choice of a single case study for our research can be criticized by not having a 
strong external validity as one cannot generalize and apply it to other conflicts all over the 
world (Evera, 1997). The aim of this study is to get into depth with the case in question and 
for this reason case study research is the most appropriate method. The conclusions reached 
do not pretend universal validity but as the case study is aimed at examining case-specific 
facts and outcomes, this research might be useful in understanding general outcomes of 
similar cases, for example territorial conflicts in other ex-Soviet countries (Transnistria in 
Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan) which have had similar conditions and are facing
the same challenges.
Having the chosen theory as a starting point, we also emphasize on the variables that 
are essential for the purpose of analysis and will investigate how these variables have changed 
during the period of research and decide which ones had an impact on Georgia’s efforts 
towards conflict resolution. The choice of theory, on the other hand, depends on the chosen 
research question. As such, the chosen method is both inductive and deductive, in the way 
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that the theory is chosen on the basis of what is relevant for the case – induction - while the 
case afterwards is analyzed from the perspective of the chosen theory - deduction (Bryman,
2004). 
One can criticize the choice of some independent variables rather than others and the 
effect of those on the analysis. We find this critique relevant. However, for the purpose of this 
thesis, it is more significant to choose few variables which can be qualitatively analyzed in 
details. This means that there can be other factors that can have influence but there are always 
some variables that are more important than others. 
In order to comply with critics of using a case study, two concrete methodological 
tools are used: congruence and process-tracing. Van Evera states that these methods are 
suitable for testing theories, but as the purpose of this thesis is not to test the theory, it will be 
drawn on them as systematic analyzing tools that can be used to explain the empirical 
research problem (Van Evera, 1997).
The congruence method can be used to explore if a chosen theory has enough 
explanatory power. In this way it is the theory that helps to see if there is “congruence or 
incongruence between values observed on the independent and dependent variables” (Van 
Evera, 1997: 58). In the case of the Georgian and Abkhazian/South Ossetian conflict through 
the realism and centre-periphery model we will be able to show that Georgia’s efforts towards 
resolution are not only dependent on its domestic political realm but also on international 
actors foreign policy as well. 
This method has some disadvantages though. One important problem is whether the 
independent variable really explains the dependent one or if there is a randomly coincidence 
or a third variable on which both variables are dependent. To avoid these problems another 
method, which is used in this study, is process-tracing. 
In process-tracing the investigator explores the chain of events by which initial case 
conditions are translated into case outcomes (Van Evera, 1997). In order to demonstrate that 
an explanatory variable causes a dependent variable, a list of causal links between the two 
variables should be identified, meaning that process-tracing can help demonstrate if the 
independent variables explain the dependent one. By process-tracing the course of action is 
followed towards a certain decision. In the case of Georgia, the tracing will help us to analyze
how foreign policies of the most important actors, such as the EU, USA and Russia have an 
impact on Georgian political behavior and on conflict resolution. All in all, a thorough 
description will be made through the theoretical lenses in order to determine the most relevant 
factors. 
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1.3 Discussing the dependent and independent variables 
In addressing our dependent variables 
- changes between center and the peripiheries have been induced by the transformations 
at the centre rather than at the periphery,  
- international actors’ change in foreign policy has an impact on Georgia’s political 
behavior and on the conflict resolution processes 
we examine how the independent variables, based on key domestic and international factors, 
determine the transformation of the relationship between centre and periphery, where Georgia 
is both a centre (at the domestic level) and a periphery (vis-à-vis international actors EU, USA 
and Russia).
Thus, in order to explain our “domestic” dependent variable - changes between 
center and the peripiheries have been induced by the transformations at the centre 
rather than at the periphery - the following independent variables, based on domestic 
factors, determine the transformation at the center:
1) Ethno-federalism 
2) The state-building and sub-state actors 
3) Georgia’s national project
4) Georgia’s foreign policy
The first factor – ethno-federalism explains the impact of the Soviet past arrangements on the 
Georgian territorial basis. The other independent variables, the state-building, sub-state actors, 
Georgia’s national project and Georgia’s foreign policy are examined in a dynamic 
perspective throughout time. In addition they are considered with regard to political elites in 
Georgia and the way they approached and carried out the abovementioned “variables”. When 
we examine the second domestic factor - the state-building - we will explore the reasons of 
the weaknesses of the Georgian state and how this affected the resolution of the conflict. 
Furthermore, when the sub-state actors are concerned, we argue that the Georgian centre was 
challenged by the claims of the autonomous entities for independence. These claims were 
raised as a result of unmet needs for political representation, minority rights and federal 
arrangements. 
Regarding Georgia’s national project variable, we argue that the attempts to integrate 
the peripheries into the state and nation building efforts of the centre (Georgia) were 
dependent on how the national projects strategies were carried out by Gamsakhurdia, 
Shevardnadze and Saakashvili. When the last domestic independent variable is concerned, the 
17
way in which Georgia’s foreign policy was conducted has affected the resolution of the 
conflict. All these domestic factors are interconnected. However, it is important to examine 
them one by one because separate and in-depth examination provides different insights in the 
analysis. 
In addressing our “external” dependent variable - international actors’ change in 
foreign policy has an impact on Georgia’s political behavior and on the conflict 
resolution processes - the following independent variables are addressed: 
1) International actors’ change in foreign policy,
2) Geopolitics. 
When examining the above independent variables we argue that the changes in the foreign 
policy of the centre (EU, Russia and USA) have a greater impact on the periphery than 
changes at the periphery have on the centre. Thus in this context we argue that the changes in 
USA’s foreign policy after the 9/11 events, the consequences of EU enlargement for the EU’s 
South Caucasus policies and changes in Russian foreign policy after Putin’s ascent to the 
presidency have influenced Georgian political behavior and the resolution of the conflicts.  
1.4 Clarifications of key concepts
For methodological considerations the following concepts applied in our research need to be 
presented and defined: conflict, conflict resolution and de facto states.   
Conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change. The term conflict has 
many meanings in everyday life and in the research landscape as well. Some theorists defined 
the conflict as the “pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups” (Ramsbotham et al, 
2005: 27). To some the conflict refers to a certain behavior or action and thus the conflict 
would end once this behavior is ended. In other approaches the conflict refers to a “severe 
disagreement between at least two sides, where their demands can not be met by the same 
resources at the same time” (Wallensteen, 2007: 14). In this context the incompatibility 
appears to be the key to the existence of the conflict. Furthermore, the existence of the 
conflict is determined by the actors or parties involved. Thus the actors’ understanding of 
their own role and their resources are important elements in conflict analysis. From the 
abovementioned perspectives the conflict consists of three components: incompatibility, 
action and actors. A complete definition of a conflict was given by Wallensteen who defined 
conflict as “a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at 
the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources” (Wallensteen, 2007: 15). As 
this definition includes essential elements for explaining a conflict, we use it in our research. 
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It is important that the definition includes the term “actors” as this element is integral to the 
conflict analysis as such. Although Wallensteen in his definition emphasizes on the 
importance of actors, he does not give a definition on the nature of the actors. The word 
“strive” in the definition refers to a wide range of activities of “doing something” to acquire 
the desired resources. The term “available set of scarce resources” does not include only 
economic resources; it covers all kind of positions that are of interest to an actor. Such 
resources can be money, demands for recognition or power etc. 
Depending on the identity of the actors and their primary goals and motivations, the 
conflicts can take many different forms. There are plenty of conflict categories ranging from 
intra-state to inter-state, regional to international, symmetric to asymmetric, low-intensity to 
high-intensity. For the purpose of this research the conflict is described in term of its nature 
and type. Wallensteen gives three categories of the conflict for consideration: the first 
category consists of the inter-state conflicts around territory and government, next are intra-
state conflicts over government and a third category containing the intra-state conflict over 
territory (Wallensteen, 2007: 69). Thus, inter-state negotiations between the sovereign states 
are similar no matter what incompatibility is in place. This is not the case in intra-state 
conflicts where the solution depends on the incompatibility, which led to the conflict. In this 
case the solution to a conflict over government may lead to some form of restoration and 
normalcy, while a negotiation settlement for a conflict over territory is not likely to have such 
an outcome. It is not going to be a return to the conditions that prevailed before the conflict, 
but rather can imply different forms of separation, even to the point where new states are 
created. 
By clarifying the concept of “conflict” we can move further to the conflict resolution
terminology. It is important to delimit the conflict resolution concept from other terms 
frequently used in conflict studies. Thus, the concept of conflict resolution is not necessarily 
identical with the concept of peace. Conflict resolution is more than what definition of peace 
implies - the ending or the absence of war. Conflict resolution is also distinct from conflict 
management concept. According to Wallensteen, conflict management “can help in reducing 
the dangers of crisis, creating some confidence and lessening (potential or actual) suffering” 
(Wallensteen, 2007: 5). In this context it is argued that conflict resolution is more ambitious 
as attempts to affect the basic issues - the incompatibilities that exist among the conflict 
parties. According to Ramsbotham et al the conflict resolution is “a comprehensive term 
which implies that the deep rooted sources of conflict are addressed and transformed” 
(Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 29). In Wallensteen’s perspective the conflict resolution is “a social 
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situation where the armed conflicting parties in a (voluntary) agreement resolve to peacefully 
leave with – and/or dissolve – their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms 
against one another” (Wallensteen, 2007: 47).
Both definitions need to be carefully explained. The first definition developed by 
Ramsbotham et al emphasizes mostly on addressing the roots of the conflict without 
indicating the mechanisms of doing so and it does not emphasize on parties involved in the 
conflict either. The second definition given by Wallensteen focuses only on the parties 
involved directly in the conflict, as he states that the conflict is transformed by the parties 
themselves. The argument for emphasizing on the role of the parties in the conflict resolution 
is that they are the ones who know the conflict most intimately. This makes them the most 
legitimate actors to decide when the conflict is over and thus all other actors will have less 
power to decide on the resolution of the conflict. 
When the de facto states concept is concerned we adhere to the definition given by 
Pegg to secessionist entities. According to Pegg entities that control a more or less well-
defined territory, population and have a set of state-like institutions can be termed as “de facto 
states” (Pegg, 1998). A de facto state is not recognized by other states or by international 
community, therefore it has no judicial status on the international arena. However, in our 
empirical case it is important to point out that the de facto terminology might be relative. And 
this is because Abkhazia, South Ossetia have outsourced a large part of their de facto 
independence to Russia: their borders have been de facto guarded by Russian peacekeepers, 
the Russian rouble is the official currency of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, some functions in 
the de facto governments (especially in South Ossetia) have been outsourced to Russia etc. 
Therefore there was always a large degree of “de facto integration” of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia into Russia which was limiting their claims of being “de facto independent”. The de 
facto states definition became even more questioned after Russian recognition of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia as independent states, which accelerated the loss of their “de facto 
independence” and instead made them more dependent on Russia. In spite of the ongoing 
debate on the de facto states terminology in this research we see South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
as de facto states as there is neither recognition from the international community of their 
independence nor recognition as parts of Russia. 
The discussion on de facto states concept is based on the background of two important 
principles that dominate the international relations: right to self-determination versus 
territorial integrity. 
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De facto states emerged from what Robert Jackson called the “new sovereignty game” 
(Lynch, 2004: 16). Thus the sovereignty game started with the process of decolonization 
during the Cold War, when a number of states became independent and called for 
international recognition. In this context, the UN General Assembly stated that “All peoples 
have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (UN General 
Assembly Resolution 1514, Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and peoples of December 14, 1960: 67). Thereby, by this declaration the self-
determination became a legal and moral right to all non-self-governing territories that are 
distinct from the country that administers them. It is, however, important to distinguish 
between the principle of right to self-determination and the rules for its application, which 
were limited to colonies. The UN declaration denounced any attempt aimed at the partial or 
total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of the country (UN General 
Assembly Resolution 1514, Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and peoples of December 14, 1960: 67). 
On the background of these principles Pegg defined the de facto states as follows: “A 
de facto state exists where there is an organized political leadership, which has risen to power 
through some degree of indigenous capacity; receives popular support; and has achieved 
sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific 
territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for a significant period of time” 
(Pegg, 1998: 26). In legal terms, a de facto state does not have the right to claim a certain 
territory, as this land is already part of a recognized state. However, as Lynch mentions “it 
may have an empirically defined claim to statehood” (Lynch, 2004: 15). The classic definition 
of an entity that may be regarded as a sovereign state was established in the Montevideo 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933. According to Article 1 of the Convention 
a state as an international law subject should posses the following qualifications:
“(a) a permanent population;
(b) a defined territory;
(c) a government;
(d) and the capacity to enter into relations with other states” (Montevideo Convention on 
Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933, Article 1). 
The de facto states fulfill the first three of these qualifications and claim to pursue the 
forth. Thus, in spite of the fact that the de facto states fulfill the first three criteria this doesn’t 
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make them legal or legitimate in the international society. As Pegg stated, it is “illegitimate no 
matter how effective it is” (Pegg, 1998: 5). 
From the sovereignty perspective the de facto states enjoy internal sovereignty, which 
refers to the supreme authority of a body within a given territory. Thus, the de facto states are 
sovereign over their territories and population. However, the de facto states don’t have 
recognized external sovereignty which is defined as “being constitutionally apart and, of not 
being contained, however loosely, within a wider constitutional scheme” (James, 1984: 16). 
1.5 Delimitations
Firstly we limit our research thematically. When using all theoretical approaches and 
instruments our study is limited to conflict resolution. The background for conflict resolution 
is framed by conflict studies and international relations perspectives. In this research we do 
not intend to analyze the question of who is to blame in starting the war of 2008, since there is 
an extended amount of literature that exists in advance, thus instead we look at the dynamics 
of the conflicts and the actors involved. 
Geographically this research is limited to Georgia and the secessionist entities. 
However, in order to have a better understanding of the processes on the ground it is 
important to explain all these dynamics within a broader picture of the international order 
surrounding the Caucasus.  
Furthermore, when conceptualizing the center-periphery model, where Georgia is 
seen as a center towards its secessionist entities and as periphery vis-à-vis international actors 
(Russia, EU and USA), our aim is not to emphasize that the outcome of the secessionist 
conflicts should be conceived as the results of shifts in the balance of power between the main 
external actors in Georgia. Instead the research focuses on both the role of international 
centers on Georgia (as periphery) and the role of Georgia (as centre) on its peripheries. It is 
important to note here that the secessionist entities are considered by us as periphery to the
Georgian centre as according to the international law they constitute parts of Georgian state. 
Therefore we will not look at the self-perception of the elites of the two de facto states.
When international actors are concerned we limit our research to Russia, USA and 
EU. We are aware that other international actors such as UN, OSCE, Turkey are also 
important actors in the region, however in line with the rational calculation approach, we will 
emphasize only on actors “who count” and thus have a greater influence on Georgian foreign 
policy choices and developed mechanisms for the resolution of Georgian conflict. Moreover, 
this selection of the actors “who count” is made on the basis of their interests in the region. It 
22
is also important to mention that we are not analyzing the decision-making processes and 
mechanisms, through which foreign policy of the international actors is made. We emphasize 
only on the substance of the foreign policy and the directions embraced. 
In relation to timeframe, we analyze the Georgian conflicts since the fall of the Soviet 
Union until 2009. The advantage of a longer timeframe is that we get a detailed understanding 
of the conflict dynamics and the course of events. In the domestic level of analysis, we look at 
the Georgian domestic and foreign politics in a chronological way, through the presidential 
terms of three leaders: Z. Gamsakhurdia, E. Shevardnadze and M. Saakashvili. Taking into 
consideration, that Georgia is a semi-presidential country where the president has the 
determining voice in the political course, we decided to look at the evolution of the Georgian 
politics through its elites. 
1.6 Data and Sources 
The data material used in this thesis comes from many different sources like official 
documents, statistical data, speeches, Georgian, Russian and international newspapers, 
journals and books. The use of both quantitative and qualitative materials and different 
methods for gathering data is called triangulation and it is used in order to increase the 
validity of the analysis. The data material gathered is in Danish, Norwegian, English and 
Russian. We have the advantage of being able to read Russian, which gave us the possibility 
to get some angles of the research question which would not have been accessible otherwise. 
1.7 Research /theoretical design 
We conduct our analysis in three analytical steps. Firstly, we examine the dynamics of the 
Georgian relations with its secessionist entities - Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the end of 
1980’s until today. In this context Georgia is analyzed as center vis-à-vis its peripheries. Here 
we concentrate only on domestic level. Secondly, it is important to identify how international 
actors’ change in foreign policy had an impact on Georgia’s political behavior and 
consequently on the resolution of the conflicts. Thus, the emphasis at this stage is on external 
actors. Thirdly, we study mutual linkage between domestic and international levels through 
the lenses of conflict analysis studies.
1.8 Structure of the thesis
The thesis has a following structure:
Chapter II presents the empirical background of the Georgian conflicts. Here we address the 
evolution and dynamics of the conflicts since the 1990’s, the political situation in Georgia for 
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the given period and the conflict resolution mechanisms. The conflict resolution mechanisms 
are scrutinized from both the domestic and international perspectives, where the conflict 
settlement mechanisms provided by Georgia as well as international actors, such as Russia, 
USA, EU, UN and OSCE are discussed. 
In Chapter III the main theories applied to the empirical case are presented. The main 
theories applied in our research are: the state-based approach by B. Buzan, complemented 
among others by the ethno-federalism/Soviet legacy and existence of de facto states; conflict 
study approach consisting of three different approaches to conflict resolution; centre-
periphery model; and realism. 
The three-level analysis is conducted in Chapter IV, where we provide a discussion on 
the domestic level, international level and the conflict analysis. In the domestic level of the 
analysis, we present our findings in relation to how the Georgian domestic political realm 
affects the dynamics of the conflicts and their resolution. Thus here we look at the Georgian 
domestic politics since the independence of the country and through each president’s rule. On 
the international level the way the foreign policies of the external actors have affected 
Georgia and its conflicts is analyzed. The third level of the analysis is the conflict analysis, 
where we present our findings in relation to the dynamics and the nature of the Georgian 
conflict, on how the nature of the conflict has been transformed from an intra-state to an inter-
state conflict. 
The conclusions of the thesis are presented in Chapter V, followed by Chapter VI on 
perspectives. In the perspectives we look at the possible solutions to the conflict in Georgia, 
including a discussion on whether the successful resolution of the Ajara conflict can be 
applied elsewhere in the country. Moreover, in this chapter the international relations 
dilemmas between external actors around Georgian conflict are considered.  
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Research question
Theories
To what extent  Georgian efforts towards the resolution of Abkhazian and South Ossetian
conflict are affected by the Russian, EU and US policies and actions?
Independent variables
Internal:
Ethno-federalism 
The state-building 
Sub-state actors 
Georgia’s national project
Georgia’s foreign policy
External:
International actors change in 
foreign policy 
Geopolitics 
Dependent variables
Internal:
Changes between centre and 
the peripheries have been 
induced by the 
transformations at the centre 
rather than at the periphery
External: 
External actors’ change in 
foreign policy has an impact 
on Georgia’s political 
behaviour and on the conflict 
resolution processes 
Analysis
Domestic level
1. Georgian-Abkhazian/South Ossetia 
relations from 1988-2009
• Gamsakhurdia
• Shevardnadze 
• Saakashvili
International level
• Russia’s actions and policies towards  
Georgia and secessionist entities
• EU’s actions and  policies towards 
Georgia and secessionist entities 
• USA’s  actions and policies towards 
Georgia and secessionist entities
• Other international actors
• State based approach 
• Conflict analysis
• Conflict dynamic
• Needs-based conflict origins
• Rational strategic calculation
• Center-periphery Model
• Realism
Conclusion Perspectives
• Does any solution for 
Georgian-Abkhazian/South 
Ossetian conflict exist?
• Contribution to 
conflict/security studies 
From intra-state conflict to
Inter-state conflict
International actors change in foreign 
policy had a profound impact on the 
Georgian domestic realm and the 
conflict resolution process
Figure 1. Research design. 
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CHAPTER II. EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a historical background of Georgia 
and its secessionist entities, overview of the political situation in Georgia, background on the 
conflicts, taken place in the country since its independence in the early 1990’s, including both 
the secessionist conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the recent Russo-Georgian 
war of 2008. This chapter will demonstrate the complexity of these conflicts, by presenting 
the conflict history, parties to the conflicts, conflict resolution mechanisms and involvement 
of international actors.
Geographically Georgia is situated in the region of South Caucasus, and is a land of 
linguistic, cultural and ethnic diversity, accommodating a varied population of little over 5 
million, consisting of Georgians, and a minority of Abkhazians, Ossetes, Armenians and other 
ethnicities. Georgia is located in the centre of the essential energy routes transporting the 
natural resources of the Caspian Sea region. The Southern Caucasus came under the Tsarist 
Russian control in the beginning of the 19th century with a short period of independence in 
1917-1921 (Tocci, 2007; Herzig, 1999). During the Soviet Union period Georgia was a part 
of the USSR as a republic and gained its independence in 1991. Throughout the Soviet period 
Georgia encountered problems with its secessionist entities, which deteriorated since the fall 
of the Soviet Union.   
2.1 Georgian political situation before and after the Rose Revolution
The magazine The Economist described Georgia before 2003 as “not much a country as a 
loose association of fiefs” (in Lynch, 2006: 17). The country, which has been under the rule of 
an extreme nationalist Z. Gamsakhurdia, who marginalized the ethnic minorities and 
oppressed the opposition, and corrupt government of Shevardnadze, was considered to be a 
failing state. The rule of Gamsakhurdia marginalized the minorities and aggravated the ethnic 
tensions and secessionist conflicts. During the presidency of Shevardnadze, the state lost 
control over some of the Georgian territories, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the 
border control was virtually absent. The country accommodated international terrorists, who 
were freely crossing the Georgian borders. The state did not have a monopoly over its military 
forces, where Abkhazia and South Ossetia had their own armed forces, and in the western part 
of the country paramilitary groups were in charge. During this period the state did not take 
any significant steps to strengthen the state apparatus and fight the sky-high corruption. If 
some measures were taken, they were taken only because of the pressure from foreign 
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governments. The public sector was constantly underfinanced and the level of corruption was 
extremely high. According to Baramidze – minister of the interior right after the Rose 
Revolution, the ministry was 100 % driven by corruption “This ministry was involved in the 
drug business, weapons smuggling, extortion and kidnapping” (in Lynch, 2006: 21). The 
public administration was completely dysfunctional and corrupt, which led to popular distrust 
in the political system of the country. 
Meanwhile the economic situation in the country was worsening. By 2003, well over 
50 % of the Georgian population was living in poverty, unemployment was extremely high 
and the country was experiencing an acute lack of energy. The constant shortages of the state 
budget during the 1990’s, caused partly by mismanagement or lack of it and partly by 
corruption, led to failure in providing public goods to the citizens. This was seen by the 
minority groups as a deliberate attempt of the government to force them out of the country 
(Wheatley, 2006). After the independence a significant number of minorities migrated out of 
the country, back to their historical motherlands.   
In relation to restoring the territorial integrity, Shevardnadze conducted a “non-policy” 
towards the conflicts. He was never interested in going for compromise in order to solve the 
conflicts and instead he relied on the external facilitation in the conflict resolution. “His 
fixation on an external savior dampened any urgency in Tbilisi to accept compromise in order 
to settle the conflicts” (Lynch, 2006: 20). In relation to the security sector, Shevardnadze was 
never keen on conducting reforms in this sector. Furthermore, in his foreign policy he never 
fully chose a purely pro-Russian or pro-Western approach. While he relied on the external 
assistance on the conflict settlement, his preferences for these external actors were shifting 
throughout his rule. In the middle of the 1990’s his preference was with Russia, where he let 
the Russian military bases stay in Georgia and became a member of CIS, expecting in 
response assistance in restoring the Georgian territorial integrity (Lynch, 2006; Popescu, 
2006). In the end of the 1990’s however, Shevardnadze started giving priorities to USA and 
NATO. In order to isolate Abkhazia economically and put pressure on the secessionist 
authorities, Shevardnadze lobbied the CIS countries to impose restrictions on trade with 
Abkhazia. In addition in order to undermine the secessionist authorities, Shevardnadze chose
an alternative method of supporting the paramilitary groups, such as White Legion and Forest 
Brothers, by financial and other means, instead of strengthening the country’s security sector 
and a united Georgia military (Lynch, 2006). 
Due to the mismanagement of Shevardnadze’s government significant amount of 
foreign aid to the country was cut and in 2003 the international financial institutions decided 
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to suspend the Georgian access to credits and grants. The European Commission also warned 
the country that in the absence of positive changes it would cut the aid to Georgia (Lynch, 
2006). In 2003, a member of a Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe even 
suggested to expel Georgia from the Council if the country would not solve its issues with 
corruption and failure of conforming to the international treaties (Wheatley, 2006).    
In 2003, president Shevardnadze was ousted by the peaceful Rose Revolution, and the 
new government, with M. Saakashvili as the president, took upon itself a challenging task of 
putting the country on the right track. “In 2004, the new government inherited a failing state 
that hardly existed in the Weberian sense as a unified unit with control over its territory and a 
monopoly on the use of force, able to extract resources from society and redistribute these for 
public good” (Lynch, 2006: 17). The new government, consisting of highly educated young 
people with western education, set up five main priority areas, including building a state 
based on respect for rule of law, conducting institutional and political reforms, restoring the 
central control over the territory, economic and security reforms. The new government started 
impressively by implementing numerous radical policies. Within these priorities a significant 
number of people were arrested on a charge of corruption and non-payment of taxes. One 
remarkable reform with aim of fighting the corruption was the traffic police reform. In the 
frame of this reform, the entire traffic police was fired overnight and new officers were 
employed on the basis of entirely new criteria for recruitment. As a result of this reform, the 
traffic police got fewer but better educated and better paid road police officers, who were 
provided with education and better equipment, resulting in decreased corruption. 
In 2004 constitutional amendments were made, which gave more power to the 
executive branch and president - Saakashvili, and lessened the role of the parliament. The 
entire staff in the public administration was changed in Tbilisi; however, most of the staff in 
the regions remained unchanged. Saakashvili’s new policy towards the officials in the regions 
was to appoint people who were distinguished by their loyalty to him, rather than by their 
experience, professional qualifications or popularity in the regions. Furthermore, in order to 
strengthen the centralized control over the entire territory, infrastructure development projects 
were conducted. 
Moreover, Saakashvili succeeded in normalizing its conflicting situation with 
autonomous region of Ajara by peaceful means in 20041. The conflict with Ajara was 
                                               
1 It is important to note that several factors played role in preventing bloodshed and led to peaceful resolution. 1. 
The region of Ajara and its population never sought to have a full independence based on the principle of self-
determination. Historically there were no armed tensions with the central government. 2. The Ajaran population 
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resolved by economic sanctions and political means of the central government with little
involvement from external actors2.   
The new government also conducted large privatization activities, tax reforms, 
licensing, in the result of which tax revenues were significantly increased and economic 
situation was improved. In addition, in the framework of the security sector reforms, there 
were conducted structural changes, some ministries were merged. The defense budget was 
also significantly increased from 70 million lari in 2004 to 317 million in 2005 (Lynch, 2006: 
30). The increased budget allowed provision of salaries to the military staff and purchase of 
more military equipment. In 2005, two important documents were approved by the 
government: National Security Concept and National Military Strategy. The two papers 
stressed on the integration of Georgia into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures and thus 
clarified the Georgian future stakes. The documents also defined the security threats, 
including spillover from North Caucasus (Chechnya), organized crime, international 
terrorism, foreign intervention and Russian military bases on the territory of Georgia. The 
approval of these documents, which showed the orientation of the new government, resulted 
in an increase in European and US support.
Despite the positive changes brought by the new government, there were some 
shortfalls as well. The new government is often criticized for “revolutionary syndrome”, 
meaning that the government did not go beyond the revolutionary spirit. This “revolutionary 
syndrome” resulted in not only hasty and not-well thought decisions, but also constant 
changing of the government staff, especially in the security sector. Besides that, the new 
government is highly criticized for its intolerance for opposition and lack of accountability. 
                                                                                                                                                  
consists largely of ethnic Georgians with a small number of ethnic minorities. The only difference of the Ajaran 
Georgians is their Muslim religion. From the ancient times Ajara was a Georgian region with a short period of 
exception, where the region was a part of Ottoman Empire until its incorporation to Georgia in the beginning of 
the 19th century. Initially the Muslim religion was the main reason to give the region an autonomous status and 
with incorporation of Georgia into the Soviet Union, the religious practices were abolished. Since the fall of 
Soviet Union, the religious practices were re-established; however, many of the Ajarans converted to 
Christianity. 3. The self-declared president of Ajara, Aslan Abashidze lacked popular support. It was his 
ambitions to have more political and economic power that became a reason for conflict with the central 
government and the lack of popular support, with raising opposition and demonstrations against Abashidze, 
where even his supporters changed the sides to the central governments side, together with the economic 
sanctions and political measures of the central government led to his exile to Moscow, after which the new 
constitutional law on the status of Ajara was passed by Tbilisi. By this new law, however, the autonomy of the 
region was significantly delimited, where the president of Georgia received a significant power over the region 
(International Crisis Group, August 2004). 
2 Due to its economic interests in Georgia and its unwillingness to risk its investments in the country by playing 
on the side of Abashidze, the Russian involvement to the conflict resolution was limited to use of diplomatic 
means. Russia has persuaded Abashidze to resign and has provided exile to him. Moreover, “support for 
Abashidze in the region was so low that propping him up would have been too costly politically” (International 
Crisis Group, August 2004: 9).
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The executive power and the parliament are dominated by one political party – United 
National Movement, and there is an under-representation of the minorities at all levels3. The 
constitutional changes in favor of a president, which has weakened the parliament, have been 
a target for wide disapproval. Moreover, Saakashvili’s rhetoric about achieving the territorial 
integrity of Georgia for the Georgians and lack of stress on the multi-ethnic nature of the 
country sent wrong signals to the minorities. Furthermore, the critics point at the failure of the
new government to conduct real economic reforms, since the unemployment and poverty 
weren’t reduced, and that the only thing that the government was capable of was privatization. 
The human rights situation, especially the minority issues and the prison conditions, 
the torture of prisoners among others, was not improved. The minority issues, which did not 
receive sufficient attention before the Rose Revolution, remained problematic. The new 
government made attempts to integrate the minorities through teaching them the Georgian 
language4, because Georgian is the only official language in the country5. Lack of knowledge 
of the official language by the minorities largely contributed to their marginalization, since 
they don’t have access to information and administration. On the other hand, the integration 
attempts of the government are seen with suspicion and mistrust by the ethnic minorities, 
because the term “integration” has a negative connotation for them, reminding more of 
assimilation (Svanidze, 2006). Besides that the Georgian laws and regulations prohibited 
existence of political parties representing the ethnic minorities, resulting in a lack of political 
representation of the minorities. The minorities associate themselves more with their 
historical motherland than with Georgia (Wheatley, 2006).  
2.2 Evolution and dynamics of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
Despite the existence of secessionist movements within the Georgian republic during the 
Soviet period, these conflicting interests were never under the threat of deterioration due to 
the Soviet umbrella that prevented open confrontations. The conflicts turned into full scaled 
wars after the fall of the Soviet Union. This subchapter provides the reader with the 
background on the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts, their evolution and dynamics as 
                                               
3 By 2006, only one out of 17 ministers was of different ethnic origin than Georgian, and in the parliament 
elected in 2004 – only nine parliamentarians from the ethnic minority – five Armenians, three Azeri and one 
Ossete, compared with 14 in the 1999-2004 parliament (Wheatley, 2006).  
4 According to statistical data in 2002 only 31 % of the minority population of Georgia spoke Georgian. This is 
because during the Soviet times the Russian language was the main communication language between the 
minorities, and today after the independence it is not widely accepted anymore to communicate in Russian. 
Moreover, the younger generation are mostly interested in learning English instead of Russian (Wheatley, 2006).    
5 Abkhazia and South Ossetia constitute exception and are allowed to have their own languages as administrative 
language in the regions.  However, these two regions are not considered minority according to Georgian 
regulations. 
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well as a brief introduction to the peace building efforts. This is followed by more detailed 
subchapter presenting the conflict resolution efforts of internal and external actors.  
2.2.1 Abkhazia 
Abkhazia is situated in the north western part of Georgia and has an important strategic 
position for Georgia with the railway connecting the country with Russia, and most 
importantly Abkhazia has most of the coastline of the country. The conflicts between Georgia 
and Abkhazia have deep roots in the history, however, the relations worsened after the 
incorporation of Abkhazia into Georgia in 1938. Abkhazia first came under the Tsarist rule in 
the beginning of the 19th century and after 1917 it preserved a relationship of treaty 
association with Georgia. In 1922 it was given a status of Soviet Socialist Republic for a 
decade until Stalin decided to integrate Abkhazia into the Transcaucasian Federation in 1931, 
which after the dissolution of the federation became an autonomous republic within the 
Georgian Soviet Republic (Hunter, 1994: 125).
During the period of rule of Stalin and Beria6 an assimilation policy was conducted 
towards the Abkhazians. A lot of non-Abkhaz ethnics were brought into Abkhazia, which 
made the Abkhazians a minority in their own land. Thus by 1989 the Abkhaz ethnics 
represented only 17.8 % of the autonomous republic’s population (Lynch, 2004: 27). In this 
period systematic policies of keeping Abkhazia culturally and economically undermined were 
conducted and the Abkhazians felt that their cultural heritage, language and ethnicity were on 
the verge of disappearance. The feelings of being mistreated and exploited led to a range of 
protests in the 1960-1970’s and numerous attempts to get assistance from Kremlin to re-
establish their 1921 status-quo were made. First after Gorbachev’s perestroika the Abkhazians 
got an opportunity to claim their rights, however, it was in this period that the Georgians and 
Abkhazians developed as Hunter wrote “a mentality of mutual victimization” (Hunter, 1994:
125).
Chronologically, it is important to mention that the conflict intensified more and more 
by the separatist campaign launched with a letter signed by 58 Abkhaz Communists and 
addressed to the 19th All Union Party Conference, held in June 1988. This led to the 
formation of an Abkhazian Popular forum that in March 1989 approved the so-called Lykhny 
Declaration, calling on Moscow to recognize Abkhazia as a Union republic. Later on, in a 
petition to Gorbachev, the Abkhaz Communist party proclaimed that “Abkhaz nation was on 
the verge of ‘ethnic catastrophe’” and called for secession from Georgia (Hunter, 1994: 126). 
                                               
6 Both Stalin and Beria were ethnically Georgians. 
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In 1990 Abkhazia declared its sovereignty and by a referendum on the future Soviet Union, 
the majority voted for being a part of the Soviet Union as an independent republic.
The ethnic tensions exacerbated even more under the first Georgian president 
Gamsakhurdia due to his excessive nationalism and dictatorial tendencies, which further 
marginalized the ethnic minorities in Georgia. Between 1990-1992 the Georgian Parliament 
unilaterally approved a range of documents which invalidated the structures of Georgia 
created over the period from February 25, 1921, thus, declaring all the legal acts passed by 
these structures as having no judicial force. Consequently, Georgia readopted its Constitution 
from 1921, which did not recognize Abkhazian Autonomous republic as a legal subject 
(Høiris and Yurukel, 1998: 189). The replacement of the Georgian Constitution from 1978 
with the one from 1921 was followed by the bloody coup that removed the legitimately
elected president, Gamsakhurdia. As a response to Georgian replacement of the Constitution, 
on 23 July 1992 Abkhazia abrogated its own 1978 Constitution and returned to the one of 
1925, which stated that Abkhazia coexists with Georgia on the basis of treaty relations. 
Soon the war of words was transformed into war of guns. The conflict broke out in 
1992, when Georgian troops entered Abkhazia and occupied the Gali region (International 
Crisis Group, September 2006). In the period of 1992-1993 the main part of Abkhazia came 
under the Georgian control and great civilian hardship was caused. The outcomes of 
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict were partly determined by Russian involvement. When the conflict 
broke out, Moscow joined the Abkhazian cause and the Russian military bases in Gudauta 
and Bombora - both locations situated on territory occupied by Abkhazian forces – were used 
to channel support to Abkhazians (Aves, 1996: 28). In July 1993, Russia mediated a ceasefire 
agreement in Sochi, which also stressed on the demilitarization of Abkhazia. However, in 
September 1993 the Abkhazians with the support of volunteers from the North Caucasus and 
some Russian forces broke the ceasefire agreement, and succeeded to expel all Georgian 
forces from Abkhazia. During the 13 months war thousands of people were killed and 
hundreds of thousands were forced to leave their homes.
The disputes between Georgia and Abkhazia did not change until 1994. In May 1994 a 
new ceasefire agreement was signed, the so-called Moscow Agreement, which formally ended 
the military conflict. The agreement was signed under the UN auspices and with the Russian 
facilitation. According to the agreement, it was decided that 3000 CIS peacekeeping forces 
should be deployed along the Inguri River separating Abkhazia from metropolitan Georgia. 
The agreement also provided for the UN monitoring. Thus, the UN deployed the United 
32
Nation Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in 1994 to observe the activities of the CIS 
peacekeeping forces and developments in the security zone. 
The negotiations made little progress towards the peace settlement. This was mainly 
due to “entrenched and fundamentally opposed positions of the Georgian and Abkhazian 
negotiating parties and also because of the roles played by the two mediating parties, the UN 
and Russia” (Aves, 1996: 30). Thus, no settlement on the status of Abkhazia has been 
achieved, the internally displaced persons (IDP) have not returned to their homes and 
Abkhazia remained under trade restrictions imposed by Georgia and the CIS. In 1994 the 
Abkhazian parliament introduced a new constitution, which defined Abkhazia as a sovereign 
state. 
Under UN negotiations the Abkhazian authorities first reintroduced the prewar 
proposal on confederal relation between Georgia and Abkhazia. However, in 1999 the 
Abkhazian parliament stepped back from its proposal and declared its independence. Thus, 
any negotiations on the creation of a federation with Georgia were refused and instead it was 
proposed that it be granted the status of a free associated state within the Russian Federation. 
The Abkhazian authorities also rejected a massive return of Georgian refugees until the 
international community recognizes their independence. The Russian authorities refused to 
accept this proposal, but also were unwilling to put pressure on the Abkhazian authorities to 
resume the negotiations on the status issues.  
In May 1995, Georgia signed a memorandum with Russia, which proposed 
asymmetrical federation within Georgia as a clear solution for the Abkhazian-Georgian 
problem. According to this model, Abkhazia would have been granted wider prerogatives 
because of its particular history and ethnic composition. This proposal was strongly supported 
by the UN. The proposed model, however, failed to conceive a concrete model of a 
functioning federation. The Abkhazians refused to sign this memorandum and suggested 
instead confederal relations with Georgia (Aves, 1996: 33).
Another mechanism was proposed by the UN to both parties, the so-called Boden 
document, which refers to the respect of the principles of territorial integrity of Georgia and 
the right of Abkhazians to national self-determination (International Crisis Group, January 
2007). The balance of these principles is articulated by the use of a formula that recognizes 
Abkhazia as a sovereign entity within the federal constitution of Georgia. This federal 
agreement would have had a force of a constitutional law. Any amendments would be 
possible only with the endorsement of both levels of this federal structure. Despite the 
Georgian approval of the document, all the attempts to further discuss it with the Abkhazian 
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leadership failed. Since the Moscow Agreement, the peace negotiations led by the UN and 
Russia have failed to achieve a comprehensive conflict settlement. Since 1994 until August 
2008, when the war broke out, the Abkhazian-Georgian relations remained frozen. 
2.2.2 South Ossetia 
South Ossetia is located along Georgia’s northern frontier bordering the Ossetian 
Autonomous Republic of the Russian Federation. In 1922 South Ossetia was separated from 
the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia and became an Autonomous Region (Oblast)
within the Georgian Republic (Lynch, 2004). During the Soviet times the Georgians 
considered South Ossetia as an artificial entity and many Georgians thought that the Ossetes 
living in South Ossetia had benefits not granted to them. Some sources indicate that the top 
positions in South Ossetia were occupied by ethnic Ossetes7. On the other hand, Ossetes felt 
that they are discriminated compared to their kin in the North and Abkhazia, as both of these 
were Autonomous Republics (in the Russian Federation and Georgia respectively).  
In 1989 South Ossetia voted for upgrading its status to an Autonomous Republic but
still within the Georgian Republic. However, Georgia revoked the Ossetian decision and 
annulled the South Ossetia’s status to Autonomous Region in 1990. Later Tbilisi annulled the 
status of South Ossetia as the Autonomous Region, which led to an armed conflict between 
the Georgian forces and militias. At that time South Ossetia consisted of four districts with 
Tskhinvali as the capital and a population of approximately one hundred thousand in 19898
(Lynch, 2004: 30). 
The relationship between South Ossetia and Georgia worsened in 1990 before the 
parliamentary elections in Georgia, when the Georgian Supreme Soviet adopted an election 
law, according to which the regional parties were excluded from participating in the election. 
As a consequence the Ossetes boycotted the elections that brought the Gamsakhurdia’s Round 
Table coalition to power and organized their own parliamentary election in December. Being 
under pressure the Georgian government declared a state of emergency in the region and 
appointed the commander of Georgian interior troops as the mayor of Tskhinvali. Later the 
authorities of the region organized a referendum in the region, which with a vast majority 
supported the secession and integration with Russia. On November 1992, the South Ossetian 
                                               
7 Crisis Group interview with Gori Region government official in September 2004 cited in “Georgia: Avoiding 
war in South Ossetia”, 26 November 2004, European Report no. 159
8 The South Ossetian population consisting of 66% Ossetes, 29% Georgians, and the rests are a mixture of 
Russians, Armenians and Greeks. 
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Supreme Council votes confirmed the results of the referendum (International Crisis Group, 
November 2004). 
Direct military confrontation started in 1991, when thousands of Georgian forces 
entered Tskhinvali resulting in significant civilian damages and displacements of around 
60.000 South Ossetes, who crossed border to North Ossetia. In 1992 fighting escalated with 
sporadic Russian involvement. In June 1992, Yeltsin and Shevardnadze signed an agreement 
in Sochi that brought about a ceasefire and a withdrawal of all the armed forces from South 
Ossetia. It was agreed to deploy a multinational peacekeeping force in the region made up of 
equally sized battalions of Russians, Georgians and Ossetes. However, on the ground the 
Russian contingent was the most numerous - 700, in comparison with 469 Ossetian and 320 
Georgian peacekeeping troops (Aves, 1996: 34). 
After the Rose Revolution of 2003 Saakashvili came with a new peace plan for 
Georgia, which included providing a broader autonomy to South Ossetia as well as to 
Abkhazia, provision of dual citizenship to the Ossetes, free economic zone, economic 
rehabilitation and demilitarization. However, some of the initiatives were clearly 
miscalculated and, as a component of an anti-smuggling operation, in 2004 the Ministry of 
Interior Special (MIA) forces were deployed to the villages outside Tskhinvali to confiscate 
smuggled goods. As a result of this campaign the presence of the Georgian MIA troops grew. 
Even though the Georgian government justified the increase in troops in the conflict zone as 
necessary for the anti-smuggling campaign and for protection of the ethnic Georgian villages, 
the Ossetes interpreted this as a preparation for military action against Tskhinvali. In reality 
the anti-smuggling operation had, as it is mentioned in some sources, “a direct effect on the 
on the security environment as the Georgian checkpoints and increasing of armed men in the 
zone shattered the peaceful environment and co-existence” (International Crisis Group, 
November 2004: 13). 
In June-July 2004 Georgia accused Russia for supplying weapons to South Ossetia. 
Soon the war of words changed to a full scale war with exchanges of gun and mortar fire 
between villages in the conflict zone. Even though the ceasefire agreement was signed, it did 
not last for long as it was quickly violated by a new exchange of fire on the 18-19 August 
killing several peacekeepers. After the August operations Georgia withdrew its forces from 
the conflicting zone and admitted that “at this stage it is impossible for Georgia to restore its 
territorial integrity militarily”9.
                                               
9 International Crisis Group interview with senior analysts, Georgian defence and security ministries, August 
2004 in European Report no. 159, “Georgia: Avoiding war in South Ossetia”, 26 November 2004: 14
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Chronology of main events
1801 Annexation of Georgia into the Russian Empire
1922 Abkhazia declared as Soviet Socialist Republic
1922 South Ossetia is separated from North Ossetia and 
given an autonomous republic status within 
the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic 
1931 Incorporation of Abkhazia into the Transcaucasus Federation 
1938 Incorporation of Abkhazia into Georgian Socialist Republic 
1990 Declaration of Abkhazian sovereignty 
1990 Annulment of South Ossetian autonomous status by Georgia 
May 1991 Independence of Georgia and beginning of presidency of Z. Gamsakhurdia
January 1992 Ousting of Z. Gamsakhurdia 
May 1992-
November 2003
Rule of E. Shevardnadze 
1991-1992 Conflict with South Ossetia 
1992-1993 Conflict with Abkhazia
1999 Declaration of Abkhaz independence 
November 2003 Rose Revolution 
January 2004 Presidency of M. Saakashvili 
August 2008 Five-day war between Russia and Georgia
2.3 Conflict resolution efforts
In this subsection we present the solutions proposed by the international actors as well as the 
domestic actors’ position vis-à-vis the settlement of the conflicts. From 1990 and onwards 
varieties of solutions have been discussed, including common state, confederation and 
federation. In spite of all the efforts and mechanisms proposed, in 2009 the Georgian-
Abkhaz/South Ossetian conflicts remain unresolved.
2.3.1 Georgia 
Regarding the Georgian position towards the Abkhazian status, it is unquestionable that 
Georgia supported a solution, which involves substantial autonomy to Abkhazia, however 
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with no right to successive secession. In this context in the Road Map for a Comprehensive, 
Peaceful, Political Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhazia it was stated that any settlement 
“should be based on the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia on its 
internationally recognized borders” (Road Map for a Comprehensive, Peaceful, Political 
Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhazia cited in International Crisis Group, January 2007: 10). 
Furthermore, in the Georgian constitution it is stipulated that the internal territorial 
organization will be decided “after the complete restoration of the jurisdiction of Georgia over 
the whole territory of the country” and that a two chamber parliament will be created with 
members from Abkhazia and Ajara as autonomous republic (The Constitution of Georgia, 24 
August 1995). Later on the Georgian experts launched a concept paper on Abkhazia’s future 
status, which argued that “the historical, political, legal, cultural and economic distinctiveness 
of Abkhazia needs to be explicitly acknowledged and expressed” (Kublashvili et al cited in
International Crisis Group, January 2007: 10). According to this document Abkhazia would 
be recognized as an equal and independent partner, having state qualities and characteristics. 
Thus, only Georgia would be the subject of international law, while Abkhazia would just have 
domestic sovereignty. Consequently the secession would not be possible. In spite of these 
efforts neither Sukhumi nor Tbilisi took them as a starting point for discussions. 
When talking about Georgian peace efforts towards the settlement of the conflict in 
South Ossetia the following are of importance. From the 1990’s and onwards Tbilisi offered 
several plans. First of all, Georgia offered South Ossetia the widest possible autonomy within 
Georgia, however, with no detailed explanation about how this would work in practice. 
Tbilisi’s plans also concerned the demilitarization and rehabilitation of the conflict zone. 
From the very beginning Georgia mentioned that it was willing to settle the conflict step-by-
step, starting with confidence-building and ending with the status issue. Saakashvili revealed 
a peace plan after the 2004 escalations and in January 2005 he launched a three-stage plan 
focusing on confidence-building, demilitarization, law enforcement, a greater international 
role and autonomy. Some time later he offered South Ossetia “a distinctly broader form of 
autonomy than it had in Soviet times and than North Ossetia has in the Russian Federation” 
(International Crisis Group, June 2007: 11). In making this proposal, the Georgian 
government had claimed for a change of the format, in which negotiations were held with 
wider international participation, particularly for US and EU. 
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2.3.2 Position of Abkhazia and South Ossetia  
From the 1990’s and onwards Abkhazia denied any arrangements with Georgia that did not 
include the recognition of Abkhazia’s independence. Abkhazia’s confidence about their 
prospects for international recognition was enhanced by Putin’s statements about the need to 
determine the universal principle of self-determination and his explicit linkages to the Kosovo 
precedence. In this regard, Putin stated explicitly “One can’t apply one rule to Kosovo and 
other rules in other situations...”.10 However, most of the Georgian partners have denied any 
Kosovo precedent. Furthermore, Georgia’s president stated that “Any hint of a precedent for 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia is, therefore, both inappropriate and reckless … If the Russian 
Federation persists in attempting to make these dangerous linkage and undermine that 
fundamental order, its impact will be far reaching, and the Pandora’s box of violent 
separatism and conflict will be unleashed not in the Caucasus but across many parts of the 
globe” (President M. Saakashvili’s speech at the UN General Assembly on 22 September 
2006 cited in International Crisis Group, Europe report No. 179, 18 January 2007: 11). 
When the Sukhumi’s position is concerned, it is important to mention that even though 
the Abkhazians rejected any federal arrangement with Georgia, they firmly expressed their 
interest in an associate relationship with Russia after the recognition of independence. 
Concerning South Ossetia, on the other hand, in the period of 1990-2008, the South Ossetian 
authorities denied any proposals made by the Georgian government on the status issue. The 
only solution accepted by them was either independence or unification with North Ossetia and 
thus becoming an autonomous republic under Russia. 
2.3.3 Russia 
The Russian involvement in the conflicts in Georgia is of a very complex nature. Looking at 
the two conflicts of the 1990’s Russia has been playing a role of a negotiator and mediator 
between the parties, peacekeeper and protector of the Georgian territorial integrity on one 
hand and of supporter of the secessionist entities’ authorities on the other. The pattern of
Russian involvement in the conflicts depended on different internal and external factors. In 
the beginning of the 1990’s Russia was a great supporter of Georgian territorial integrity in an 
effort to avoid setting of a negative precedent for Russia itself in relation to their own 
secessionist entities, especially towards Chechnya. Therefore at that time Moscow was 
mediating the ceasefire agreements between the parties in order to protect the territorial 
integrity of Georgia. 
                                               
10 “Putin: No Difference Between Kosovo and Abkhazia or South Ossetia”, 12.09.2006,
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13529 - Retrieved on 04.04.2009 
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On the other hand, Russia was supportive of the secessionist entities. Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia have been widely supported by Russia on the political scene. Russia has been 
acting as a bridge between the secessionist authorities and in most cases even hosted their 
meetings in Moscow. The Moscow leaders were also keen on meeting the secessionist 
authorities and were supporting them in electoral campaigns (Popescu, 2006). Moreover, 
Russia provides support to the institution building and some of the institutional functions are 
transferred to Russia, as Popescu wrote “outsourced” (Popescu, 2006). In many cases Russian 
retired officials occupy important positions, mostly in the security sector (Lynch, 2006; 
Popescu, 2006). Besides that Russia has granted citizenship to a majority of the citizens in 
both regions and they were allowed to travel to Russia without visa restrictions, while 
imposing restrictions on the Georgian citizens. 
Furthermore, Russia has been providing economic support to both entities, paying 
pensions (which are significantly higher than the Georgian pensions). Both Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia are heavily dependent on Russian economic aid and this dependency was 
increasing during the last years, since most of Abkhazian and South Ossetian tax revenues are 
allocated to the maintenance of the army forces. Most of the tax revenues of the breakaway 
regions are gained from the trade with Russia, due to the Russian preferential trade regimes 
with both entities. Russia has been heavily investing in Abkhazia, rehabilitating the tourist 
bases, resorts and provides subsidies on energy to both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The 
Abkhazian tourist industry benefits from around 50 million US dollars per year from Russian 
tourists only (Lynch, 2006: 49). It is also interesting to note that both entities use Russian 
roubles as their official money currency. Along with the support to the secessionists, the 
Russian policies towards Georgia were becoming more and more pressuring. While providing 
favorable trade conditions to the secessionist entities, Russia has been putting export ban on 
the Georgian products, mainly meat, vegetables, wine and mineral water. Moreover, while 
providing the entities with subsidized energy resources, Russia increased the prices for 
Georgia. 
The main type of Russian support was framed through conflict settlement 
mechanisms. Russia was deeply involved in the conflict. Not only has Russia been trying to 
mediate the conflict resolution between the parties, but it has also deployed a large amount of 
peacekeeping. Russia has been always interested in finding a solution suitable for the interests 
of Russia, including giving the breakaway regions’ authorities more decision-making power 
in Georgian state affairs, and itself acting “as a main power-broker in any possible power-
sharing arrangements”, meaning that Russia would have to become the main external conflict 
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settlement guarantor and in addition to maintain their military presence in the country 
(Popescu, 2006: 5). Russian-led peacekeeping operations have de facto protected the borders 
of the secessionist entities thereby supporting maintenance of the status quo that was 
favorable to the breakaway regions. Peacekeepers allowed the secessionist elites to pursue 
state-building projects while deterring the metropolitan state from attempting to regain control 
of the regions (Lynch, 2004).
In the period of 1992-1997, Russia led the peace process in parallel, in cooperation 
and competition with the UN. It brought about ceasefires and its major political success in this 
context was the agreement signed by the Georgians and Abkhazians in Sochi on 27 July 1993. 
The agreement was concerning reaching ceasefire and demilitarization of Abkhazia. In the 
context of the Sochi agreement, Georgia withdrew its forces and some IDP’s were able to 
return to their homes. However, the agreement has been violated by the Abkhazian forces, 
which recaptured Sukhumi from the Georgian troops. Another peace settlement mechanism 
was the Moscow agreement, signed in May 1994 under the UN auspices with Russian 
facilitation. The Agreement provided for a ceasefire, separation of forces and the deployment 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ Peacekeeping Forces (CISPKF) (Agreement on 
a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, Moscow, 14 May 1994). Between 1994 and 2004 over 
30.000 Russian forces were included in the CISPKF. The mandate of Russian peacekeeping 
forces remained unmodified since 1994, despite criticism from the Georgian side. However, 
the peacekeeping forces did not have a direct mandate to carry out police operations in the 
Gali region where they were deployed. 
In 1994, Russia pressed the Abkhazian side to agree on the Georgian IDP's return to 
Abkhazia, while the peacekeeping missions would guarantee their security. Abkhazians stated 
that this was outside of the peacekeeping mandate and insisted on a gradual return, 
threatening to contest Russian peacekeeping forces’ assistance to return of the IDPs. 
Furthermore, in September 1994 the Abkhazian forces entered the security zone and forced 
the Russian forces to retreat (Antonenko, 2005: 221). This case demonstrated that Moscow 
had limited power to change the Abkhazian policy. In addition the Georgian government 
realized that Russia will not put pressure on the Abkhazian side to comply with the agreement 
on the return of the IDPs. 
Russia also tried to institute an economic and arms embargo against Abkhazia 
believing that by this it would push the Abkhazian leaders to practical concession. However, 
the blockade did not make Sukhumi to seek closer links with Georgia or change its position 
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on the issue of the political status, on the contrary, it contributed to the consolidation of the 
Abkhazian position. 
During 1992-1997 Russia regularly supported the sides of the conflict to address the 
status issue and drafted protocol agreements. In this context, Yeltsin met several times with 
the Georgian president Shevardnadze and de facto Abkhazian President Ardzinba. In 1996-
1997 the Russian foreign minister Primakov personally tried to push the sides towards a 
political solution, however, with no success. 
The main models proposed by Russia in the 1990’s on the Abkhazian status were 
confederation or common state options. In this context, in 1994 a Declaration on Measures for 
a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict has been signed. According to this 
document Abkhazia was to have the right to its own constitution, legislation and state symbols 
(Article 6, “Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict”, 4 
April 1994). It is also important to point out that this document did not mention recognition of 
Georgia’s territorial integrity. Furthermore, in April 1995 Abkhazia rejected a Russian protocol, which 
would have recognized Georgia’s territorial integrity. The disagreements continued as Georgia 
requested a draft that stated that Georgia is a single federal state, within which Abkhazia had certain 
power and rights. On the other side, Abkhazia insisted on a union of two equal subjects, both 
recognized as subjects of international law with full legal personality, sovereignty and right to 
secession (Report of the Secretary General “Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia”, 
S/1996/284, 15 April 1996, para. 45, p. 10). 
An opportunity to conflict resolution was missed in 1997, when Russia intensified its 
engagement and supported the high-level direct meetings between Shevardnadze and 
Ardzinba, where a protocol on resolution of the conflict was expected to be signed. According 
to the protocol Abkhazia and Georgia would “live in a common state, in the borders of the 
former Georgian SSR of 21 December 1991” (in International Crisis Group, January 2007: 8). 
Thus, each part would maintain its Constitution and the relations among them would be 
legalized by a special agreement that will have the weight of Constitutional Law and be 
obligatory for both sides. This proposal was rejected by Georgia at the last minute, due to its 
claim that the agreement did not recognize Georgian territorial integrity and left open the right 
to secession.
The Russian policies towards the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict in the 1990’s didn’t 
have an impact on the status quo that allowed the de facto entity Abkhazia to carry on its 
existence. With such a complex situation on its backyard, Russia has started to change its 
approach towards the conflict, mainly due to its internal developments determined by the 
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Putin’s appointment as president. Following the years of limited engagement, Putin worked 
on improving Russia’s relation with Abkhazia. Moscow tacitly supported the presidential 
elections in Abkhazia and the referendum that led to declaration of Abkhazian independence 
in October 1999. The declaration of independence closed the possibilities of negotiations 
between Georgia and Abkhazia on establishing a federative model. In spite of the fact that 
Russia did not recognize the results of the 1999 referendum and officially continued to 
support Georgia’s territorial integrity, it also expanded its relations with Abkhazia and lifted 
its earlier blockage against the de facto entity. Furthermore, in 2003 Putin and Shevardnadze 
agreed in Sochi on creation of working groups on return of the refugees and IDPs, restoration 
of the Sochi-Tbilisi railway traffic and energy projects, including the renovation of the Inguri 
power station. Interestingly, no working groups addressed security or political issues. 
In December 2003, Putin declared that “Until recently the task of perceiving Russia’s 
territorial integrity represented one of the most important tasks, but now the problem is 
mostly solved. Following these principles, we cannot deny our neighbors the right to preserve 
their territorial integrity. The two sides should come to an agreement and Russia will 
guarantee these agreements. We follow with great interest the situation in the separatist 
republics. We support the territorial integrity of Georgia. We will take decision that will not 
negatively affect the interests of people living in these territories.”11 From these statements 
three sets of Russians objectives can be outlined. Firstly, Moscow bases its policies towards 
Abkhazia on its own security interests. Secondly, Russia will continue to support officially 
Georgian territorial integrity, and thus will play a key role in brokering the Georgian-Abkhaz 
dialogue. Finally, Russia doesn’t see, as it is mentioned by Coppieters and Legvold, “a 
contradiction between its support for the principle of Georgia’s territorial integrity and 
Russia’s increasing economic engagement and political involvement with the de facto 
authorities in Abkhazia” (Coppieters and Legvold, 2005: 232).
In the middle of 2004 the relations between Russia and Georgia deteriorated 
significantly and this negatively affected the peace process. Georgia accused Russia for 
distribution of its pensions and passports to the Abkhazian citizens, which, in Georgians eyes, 
                                               
11 ”В.Путин озвучил главную угрозу для России в XXI веке”, 18.12.2003, “Сохранение территориальной 
целостности Российского государства совсем недавно являлось одной из самых главных, острых и 
приоритетных задач, однако сейчас эта задача, в целом, решена… Следуя этим принципам, мы не можем 
распространять на себя и отказывать нашим соседям в сохранении территориальной целостности… 
Заинтересованные в разрешении территориальных конфликтов стороны должны договориться между 
собой, а Россия выступит в роли гаранта этих договоренностей… Мы внимательно следим за ситуациями 
в этих республиках, выступаем за территориальную целостность Грузии, будем ее поддерживать и 
принимать решения, чтобы не пострадали интересы людей, проживающих на этих территориях”,
http://top.rbc.ru/politics/18/12/2003/51114.shtml - Retrieved on 30.05.2009
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was perceived as de facto annexation of its territory. Furthermore, Georgia blamed Russia for 
supporting Abkhazians financially and militarily, thus sustaining the Abkhazian 
independence. After declaration of Kosovo’s independence, Russia started to talk about 
Kosovo as a precedent for international recognition of Abkhazia. In this context Georgia left 
the Russian led peace process with the last Sochi meeting held in May 2006. 
Regarding Russia’s position vis-à-vis the South Ossetian conflict, it is important to 
mention that Russia is a co-signatory to the Sochi Agreement of 1992, which established a 
ceasefire and played an active role in the Joint Control Commission (JCC) and Joint Peacekeeping 
Forces (JPKF). The JCC is a quadrilateral body with Georgian, Russian, North and South 
Ossetian representatives plus participation from the OSCE. The aim of creating this body was to 
supervise the implementation of Sochi Agreement, draft and implement conflict settlement 
measures, promote dialogue and political settlement. Its mandate included facilitation of the
refugee and IDPs return and rehabilitation of the conflict zone as well. Russia also played an 
important role in JPKF, which was a trilateral body with Georgian, Russian and Ossetian units. 
The main role of JPKF was to restore peace and maintain law and order in the conflict zone and 
security corridor. In spite of these peace mechanisms the negotiation process has been slow and 
with long periods of inactivity. Thus, negotiations on full scale resolution of the conflict 
encountered significant obstacles.  
2.3.4 European Union 
It is important to mention that the EU was not involved in any ways in the negotiation
processes in Abkhazia or South Ossetia. However, the EU launched a range of policies 
towards secessionist conflicts. In this sense we can distinguish two level policies launched by 
the EU. On the first level the EU supported Georgia’s transformation and reforms and on the 
second level the EU policies were directed towards the secessionist entities.  
In order to support the consolidation of the Georgian state, the EU launched the
European Neighborhood Programme Action Plan (ENP AP) for Georgia, deployed a rule of 
law mission EUJUST Themis under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and 
assisted Georgia’s border management reform through the European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR) Border Support Team (BST). On the second level, the EU policies
were oriented towards the secessionist entities. In this context, the EUSR South Caucasus was 
aimed to explore ways for the EU to contribute to resolution of the Georgian-Abkhazian 
conflict. EU also financed rehabilitation of the conflict zones and from 2006 became the 
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biggest international donor to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is of relevance to mention that 
the EU prioritized the conflict in South Ossetia over the Abkhazian conflict.
In the 1990’s the EU policies and instruments towards Georgia started with the 
signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1996, which entered into 
force in 1999. The PCA included an institutionalized mechanism for political dialogue and 
also incorporated provisions on trade, economic cooperation, culture and technology. Beyond 
the PCA, the EU provided financial assistance to Georgia through Technical Assistance for 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). This instrument, from which Georgia 
benefited until 2007, focused mainly on supporting the rule of law, good governance, human 
rights, democracy, poverty reduction and conflict prevention and rehabilitation (Tocci, 2007). 
Georgia was also included in the EU regional programme called Traceca (Transport Corridor 
Europe-Caucasus –Asia) and Inogate (Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) to support 
cooperation in the oil and gas infrastructure systems (Lynch, 2006). 
In the period of 1992-1994, the EU has also provided humanitarian financial 
assistance through ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Office) and food aid through 
the FSP (Food Security Programme) (Lynch, 2006). More than that Georgia was one of the 29 
countries, benefiting from the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) since 2002. In addition, in the late 1990’s the EU also agreed on a number of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Joint actions towards Georgia within the scope 
of rehabilitation of the conflict zone in South Ossetia (Tocci, 2007). 
Since its involvement in Georgia the EU has primarily been an aid provider rather than 
a political actor. Regarding the conflict resolution in the region, Popescu argues that “it is 
relatively difficult to talk of an EU policy towards the conflicts in the South Caucasus in the 
1990’s. There was virtually none.” (Popescu, 2007: 4). However, the nature of the EU policies 
towards Georgia gradually changed since 2003. As Popescu wrote “In some respects the 
1990’s-style of the EU policy towards Georgia ended in 2003” (Popescu, 2007: 4). What was 
changed after 2003 was a new sense of urgency for the EU to start engaging in this country. 
The above changes in the EU policy style were a direct result of launching the ENP and the 
adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, where the EU’s attention in the 
South Caucasus was underlined. Even though by 2003 Georgia was not yet included in the 
ENP12, the ESS clearly stated that the EU “should now take a stronger and more active 
interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus” (European Security Strategy, 2003: 8). 
                                               
12 Georgia was included in the ENP in 2004.
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Moreover, the EU policies towards Georgia after 2003 were emphasizing more on the conflict 
resolution area as a condition for sustainable economic and social development. The 
Commission declared “The EU wants Georgia to develop in the context of a politically stable 
and economically prosperous Southern Caucasus. In this respect, the conflicts in Abkhazia 
(Georgia) and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia remain a major impediment.” (European 
Commission, Country Strategy Paper 2003-2006: Georgia, September 2003: 4). Under the 
ENP Georgia agreed on a joint Action Plan for reforms and cooperation in November 2006. 
According to the ENP AP, “Georgia is invited to enter into intensified political, security, 
economic and cultural relations with the EU, enhanced regional and cross border co-operation 
and shared responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict resolution.” (EU/Georgia ENP 
Action Plan, 2006: 1). 
The Action Plan designed towards Georgia also emphasized that the EU is taking into 
consideration Georgia’s expressed European aspirations and thus “The EU welcomes 
Georgia’s readiness to enhance cooperation in all domains covered by the Action Plan. The 
level of ambition of the relationship will depend on the degree of Georgia’s commitment to 
common values as well as its capacity to implement jointly agreed priorities, in compliance 
with international and European norms and principles13.” (EU/Georgia ENP Action Plan,
2006: 1). The conflict resolution provisions were mentioned in the Action Plan as Sixth 
Priority Area (despite the demands of Tbilisi to give the “peaceful resolution of internal 
conflicts” the first priority in the Action Plan). In this respect, the EU mentioned that it is 
ready to “contribute to the conflicts settlement in Abkhazia, Georgia and Tskhinvali
Region/South Ossetia, Georgia, based on respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Georgia within its internationally recognized borders” (EU/Georgia ENP Action Plan, 2006: 
10). The ENP Action Plan also mentioned that the EU needs to “contribute actively, and in 
any relevant forum, to accelerating the process of demilitarization and of conflict resolution” 
and “to increase the effectiveness of the negotiating mechanisms” (EU/Georgia ENP Action 
Plan, 2006: 10). 
In 2003 the Council appointed the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for South 
Caucasus (which is one of the only five EU Special Representatives operating outside the 
Balkans) (International Crisis Group, March 2006). The EUSR’s broad mandate included 
support to the political and economic reforms, conflict prevention and resolution. In the 
beginning the EUSR task vis-à-vis conflict resolution was to “assist14 in conflict resolution, in 
                                               
13 stress added
14 stress added 
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particular to enable the EU to better support the United Nations … the OSCE” (Council Joint 
Action 2003/496/CFSP, Article 3(d), 2003: 74). Later on the mandate was strengthened in the 
new Joint Action from 2006 were it is stated that EUSR can “contribute15 to the settlement of 
conflicts and…. facilitate the implementation of such settlement in close coordination with the 
UN” (Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP, Article 3(d), 2003: 15).  
In July 2004 a Rule of law mission (EUJUST THEMIS) under the CFSP/ESDP was 
launched for the period of one year. The aim of this mission was to support the Georgian 
authorities in tackling the criminal justice issues and provide assistance to the reform process. 
The EUSR Border Support Team was established after the EU’s failure to deploy a 
full border mission. When the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) in Georgia16
terminated its mandate in early 2005 and Russia vetoed its continuation, Georgian officials 
asked the EU to take over the ended OSCE BMO and conduct a similar operation under the 
EU ruling (Lynch, 2006). In response to it and after months of bargaining, the EU sent three 
EU border experts to advise Georgia on border reform.17 Failing to deploy a full ESDP border 
mission, the new team of experts was deployed under the EUSR. The number of experts was 
increased in September 2005 and consequently in February 2006 (Popescu, 2007). The 
purpose of EUSR Border Support Team, as mentioned in the Council Joint Action, was to 
“provide the European Union with reporting and a continued assessment of the border 
situation and to facilitate confidence-building between Georgia and the Russian Federation, 
thereby ensuring efficient cooperation and liaison with all relevant actors…” (Council Joint 
Action 2006/121/CFSP, Article 3(g), 2006). 
Moreover, the EU’s efforts to tackle the conflicts in Georgia have been done through 
rehabilitation assistance, which were financed by the Commission since 1997. In this context 
EU’s objectives of providing assistance were “to build greater trust between the conflict-
affected populations,… improving living conditions of the population affected by the conflict 
and creating conditions for the return of internally displaced persons, as well as facilitating 
progress in a constructive dialogue between the conflict parties”18.
Since 2006 the EU has become the largest international donor to both secessionist 
regions. The EU funded projects were technical in nature and have been as depoliticized as 
possible. These projects have not been conditional on progress of the conflict resolution 
                                               
15 stress added
16 The OSCE BMO was monitoring the Russian-Georgian border. 
17 Member states did not agree on a follow-up operational mission. The lack of political consensus was caused 
particularly by France, Greece and Italy’s hesitance.
18 “Overview of EC assistance to people affected by conflict in Georgia”, 
www.delgeo.cec.eu.int/en/programmes/rehabilitation.html - Retrieved on 13.06.2009
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process (Popescu, 2007). These projects in Abkhazia focused on economic rehabilitation and 
humanitarian assistance. The EU also supported civil society development and confidence-
building measures. In the case of South Ossetia, the EU financed projects concerning the 
rehabilitation of drinkable water supply networks, rehabilitation of schools, electricity and gas 
networks, railways, and support for agricultural development. Moreover, in this region the 
projects were tied to the political process dialogue within the JCC, with implementation 
dependent on an agreement of its four parties.19
2.3.5 United States
As Georgia started to perceive its conflict with South Ossetia as a confrontation with 
Moscow, it began asking for US support. Initially USA strongly warned Saakashvili against 
Georgia fighting with Russia, in which case Georgia would be left on its own. However, 
Washington was supporting the democratization process in the country, especially after the 
Rose Revolution and provided different kind of assistance to Georgia. In the period of 2002-
2004 USA implemented the Georgian Train and Equip Program (GTEP), which facilitated the 
stabilization of the Russian-Georgian borders and provided training to 2.000 Georgian troops 
engaged in the conflict zones20. The Russian observers expressed their concern regarding the 
involvement of the GTEP troops in the conflict despite the pledge of the US that these troops 
would not take part in the conflict in South Ossetia. Nevertheless, by September 2004 the US 
position appeared to coincide with statements coming from Russia and other European 
capitals that the US visibly supports Georgia. In this context a US diplomat stated that USA
supports a step-by-step approach in resolving the conflict, including increasing of the OSCE 
staff in South Ossetia (International Crisis Group, November 2004). The US government 
supported Georgia’s position regarding South Ossetia and agreed with Tbilisi that the status 
quo cannot be allowed to continue. The support provided to Georgia on this issue meant 
different things at different time. First of all, the US government called for expansion of the 
OSCE’s mandate in South Ossetia. Furthermore, in 2005 USA “backed Georgia’s proposal 
for settling the conflict in South Ossetia, and the new Secretary of State has consistently 
raised the issue with her Russian counterparts” (Lynch, 2006: 53). It is also relevant to 
mention that Georgia became a recipient of the US governments Millennium Challenge 
project. The Millennium Challenge account provided Georgia with access to 500 million USD 
                                               
19 This included Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia and Russia.
20 Moreover, in 2005 USA conducted the Georgia Security and Stability Operation (Georgia SSOP) by 60 
million dollars financial support.    
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over three years with a focus on regional infrastructure rehabilitation and enterprise 
developing (Helly & Gogia, 2005: 297). 
2.3.6 International organizations
In this subsection we present the conflict resolution mechanisms provided by two 
international organizations: United Nations and Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe. 
United Nations 
Concerning Abkhazia the UN involvement implied both soft and military actions. One 
important mission was the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), 
launched in August 1993 with the aim of monitoring the ceasefire agreement between Georgia 
and Abkhazia. Within the UNOMIG 100 military observers were deployed with the main 
function of monitoring the implementation of the Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of 
Forces. The mandate included: “(1) overseeing the “security zone” in which no military 
presence is permitted and the “restricted zone”, where no heavy weapons may be deployed, 
on both sides of the ceasefire line along the Inguri River, (2) patrolling the Kodori, and (3) 
observing the operation of the Commonwealth of Independent states peacekeeping force 
within the framework of the implementation of the Moscow agreement”.21
The UNOMIG also developed a complex mechanism for peace talks, the so-called 
Geneva peace process. The Geneva process was chaired by the UN, with Russia as a 
facilitator, while the OSCE and the Group friends of the Secretary General (Unites States, 
Germany, United Kingdom and France) had observer status in this process. Within the 
broader Geneva framework in 1997 a mechanism consisting of a Coordinating Council and 
three working groups dealing with non-resumption of violence, the return of refuges and IDPs 
and economic issues were established. It is also of importance to mention that the Group of 
Friends is linked to the UN peacekeeping operations and the UN Geneva process. In the 
Abkhazian perception this group is a biased actor intending to protect the economic and 
geostrategic interests of Western powers. This group became very influential in the period of 
2003-2006, when direct talks between Georgia and Abkhazia were largely suspended. 
Through its high level meetings in Geneva the Group of Friends offered recommendations to 
maintain a sense of momentum and the Group drafted all Security Council resolutions and 
presidential statements on Georgia (International Crisis Group, January 2007). In 2003, 
                                               
21 www.unomig.org – Retrieved on 30.05.2009 
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aiming to build confidence with the Abkhazians, the Group of Friends went to Sukhumi for 
the first time and has since held periodic meetings.
Another peace mechanism from the UN side was the Boden Paper, which elaborated 
on the Basic Principle on the distribution of the Competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi. 
This paper resulted from negotiations between Russia and Western countries and not from a 
compromise between the parties to the conflict. The Boden Paper mentioned the inviolability 
of Georgia’s borders and offered Abkhazia broad power in a federation. The document stated 
that “Abkhazia is a sovereign entity, based on the rule of law, within the State of Georgia, 
which is established by a Federal Agreement, providing for broad powers and defining the 
spheres of common competences and delegated powers, as well as guarantees for the rights 
and interests of the multiethnic population of Abkhazia” (Basic Principles for the Distribution 
of Competences Between Tbilisi and Sukhumi, para.2 draft of 20 November 2001). The 
document aimed at balancing the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination by 
maintaining Georgia’s territory and offering Abkhazia sovereignty inside it. The document 
and “its letter of transmittal, finalized by, and with all support of, all members of the Group of 
Friends” were strongly supported by the Security Council resolutions (International Crisis 
Group, January 2007: 9). Georgia approved the document, while all attempts to transmit it 
officially to Sukhumi and initiate discussions on it failed. The Boden Paper is a clear example 
that externally imposed resolution on the Abkhazian status is hardly to be accepted. This also 
failed because Western members of the Friends of the Security-General did not succeed to 
convince Russia to exert sufficient pressure on the Abkhazian authorities to start negotiations 
on this basis.   
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
The OSCE had limited mandate in the Georgian-Abkhazian peace process. Its main activities 
were complementary to the UN actions in the conflict area. In Abkhazia OSCE suffered from 
a bad image because it accused Abkhazians of ethnic cleansing in several OSCE summit 
declarations.
The OSCE has been involved in the South Ossetian conflict since 1992, “when it set 
up a mission to encourage dialogue and identify and eliminate sources of tensions” 
(International Crisis Group, November 2004: 19). In March 2004, the OSCE mandate was 
extended to monitor the functioning of JPKF. The main OSCE mechanisms in the settlement 
of the South Ossetian conflict were exercised trough the Needs Assessment Study (NAS) that 
identified proposals for infrastructure rehabilitation and economic development. Thus through 
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a Steering Committee mechanism chaired by the OSCE, Georgian and Ossetian engineers and 
economists worked with international experts, supervised by the JCC and NAS donors.22 In 
spite of the fact that the OSCE sponsored a number of confidence-building programs, these 
did not have any effect on the settlement of the question of the South Ossetia’s status, and it 
faced growing criticism from all sides. For years Georgians claimed that the OSCE’s failure 
to resolve the conflict added more legitimacy to independent South Ossetia.
Before August 2008, the OSCE mission to Georgia consisted of headquarters in 
Tbilisi and a smaller, subordinated field representation in South Ossetia’s capital Tskhinvali, 
which served as a base for eight unarmed OSCE military monitoring officers (MMOs) 
mandated to verify the implementation of the 1992 Georgian-South Ossetian ceasefire 
agreement. After the war additional 20 OSCE MMOs were deployed to areas adjacent to 
South Ossetia with a distinct mandate. Claiming that new realities on the ground required a 
reassessment of the OSCE’s presence in the region, in 2008 Russia blocked the extension of 
the mandate of the OSCE mission to Georgia for another 12 months, and suggested instead 
that the Tskhinvali office be separated from the Tbilisi headquarters and that its status be 
upgraded to that of a fully-fledged mission. Other OSCE participating states rejected Russia’s 
proposal. Talks entered a deadlock and, in the late December of 2008, Finland - which then 
held the rotating chairmanship of the OSCE - announced the imminent termination of the 
organization’s mission to Georgia. At present, the OSCE mission in Georgia officially 
remains in a state of "technical closure”.23
2.4 Russo-Georgian War of August 2008. Chronology of events  
The Georgian conflict took a new turn in 2008, when the so-called five-day war between 
Russia and Georgia broke out in August. A series of incidents prior to August 2008 added to
the deterioration of the frozen conflict and led to war. Despite restoration of the diplomatic 
relations between Russia and Georgia in April 200824, the relations between the two countries 
were still tense. Both sides took measures that aggravated the tensions even further. In April 
Georgia used unmanned reconnaissance drones in the airspace of the secessionist regions, 
which were shot down by a Russian airplane (Human Rights Watch, 2009: 20). In July the 
tensions between the Georgian and South Ossetian sides increased. Four Georgian 
                                               
22 The donors were the USA Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Commission, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and France. 
23 “Georgia: OSCE calls timeout while wrestling with Ossetia Conundrum”, 15.05.2009,  
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav051509.shtml - Retrieved on 13.06.09
24 The diplomatic ties were cut in 2006 when Georgia arrested four Russians in charge of spying. This has 
resulted in that Russia has halted the air, land and sea traffic with Georgia and expelled the Georgians from 
Russia. Estimated 2300 Georgian nationals were expelled during this period (Human Rights Watch, 2009: 20)
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peacekeepers were detained by the de facto South Ossetian authorities and were released after 
the ultimatum from the president M. Saakashvili. A week later, Georgia recalled its 
ambassador in Russia, as a response to the violation of Georgian airspace by Russia, where 
four Russian air jets flew over Tskhinvali. The Russian side stated that by this it intended to 
prevent Georgian use of military in the conflict resolution. The Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs stated that “aircraft of the Russian Air Force carried out a brief flight over the territory 
of South Ossetia” and that this was done in order to “cool hot heads in Tbilisi and to prevent a 
military scenario from unfolding, the likelihood of which was more than real” (Russian MFA 
Information and Press Department Commentary Concerning the Situation in South Ossetia25). 
Both Georgia and South Ossetia reinforced their military and weaponry in the conflict zone
thus breaching the ceasefire agreements of 1992. For instance, Georgia had 500 peacekeepers 
besides military police and irregular forces on 30 % of the South Ossetian territory controlled 
by Georgia (International Crisis Group, August 2008: 1). The situation escalated when the 
sides began exchanging fire, and in July the Georgian forces hit nine residential homes in 
Tskhinvali, which was, according to the Georgian side, a forced response to the attacks from 
South Ossetia. This was followed by the ceasefire from the Georgian side (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009; International Crisis Group, August 2008).  
In late July the Russian military officers were sent to South Ossetia in order to build 
military constructions, and the local Ossetes were hired for this purpose for a large salary. 
Meanwhile, the Russian presence in Abkhazia was increasing. In April more Russian 
peacekeepers were sent to Abkhazia. Army railway units were sent in late May with the 
purpose of repairing the railroad between Sukhumi and Ochamchire. Later this railway was 
used to transport 9000 Russian troops to Georgia through Abkhazia. Military exercises 
conducted by the Russian as well as Georgian sides have also contributed to the existing 
tensions. According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Russian 
military trainings “Caucasus 2008” were motivated not only by the terrorist threats in the 
southern part of Russia, but also by unstable situations in the conflict zones. As a result of the 
Georgian military training, almost its entire artillery was concentrated in the city of Gori, only 
30 km from Tskhinvali. 
By the end of July the firing between Georgia and South Ossetia intensified and on 1 
August a bomb attack in South Ossetia injured five Georgian police officers (Human Rights 
                                               
25 “Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary Concerning the Situation in South Ossetia”, 
10.07.2008, http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/off_news/100708/newen3.htm, Retrieved on 
27.04.2009
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Watch, 2009; International Crisis Group, August 2008). The fighting intensified and as a 
result of this six South Ossetian police officers were killed by snipers, 15 Ossetes wounded in 
Tskhinvali and 17 dead in ethnic Georgian villages. The tensions continued the next day 
where around 800 civilians had to flee to North Ossetia escaping from the violence. 
Meanwhile the Georgian military was approaching closer to the South Ossetian borders 
(International Crisis Group, August 2008). 
On the evening of 6 August and early morning of 7 August the shooting intensified. 
Georgian side claimed that they opened fire in response to the South Ossetian attack on ethnic 
Georgian villages. On the evening of 7 August president Saakashvili declared ceasefire, which 
continued only few hours, and was cancelled due to, according to Tbilisi, persistent attacks 
from South Ossetia on ethnic Georgian villages. During the late evening of 7 August – early 
morning of 8 August the war broke out. The Georgian military started shelling Tskhinvali and 
surrounding villages, and took control over several ethnic Ossetian villages on the ground that 
the South Ossetian militias attacked the Georgian peacekeepers, but also, according to Tbilisi, 
mostly due to information on the movement of Russian troops through the Roki tunnel on the 
early morning. The Russian tanks moving through the Roki tunnel also came under Georgian 
bombardment. Tbilisi explained that they acted so in order to prevent Russian invasion of 
Georgian territory26. Despite the attempt of Georgia to slow down the Russian tanks, by the 
morning of 8 August the Russian tanks were near Tskhinvali.  
By the afternoon of 8 August Georgia withdrew its forces from Tskhinvali, however, 
the fights continued between Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia. Tskhinvali was still under
Georgian shelling. Early in the morning at 05.00 on 11 August Tbilisi withdrew its forces 
from South Ossetia completely. Meanwhile the Abkhaz forces assisted by Russia joined the 
fighting on 8 August by bombing its Georgian controlled territory, Kodori Gorge for three 
days (International Crisis Group, August 2008). 
According to Tbilisi, around 20.000 Russian troops entered South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia during the war. Thousands of Russian troops entered the western part of Georgia 
through Abkhazia and occupied Georgian military bases. According to the Georgian officials, 
the Georgian airspace was violated by Russia 22 times on the day of 8 August alone. Besides 
that, the Russian air forces bombed police and residential homes in Gori, several of Georgian 
                                               
26 However, the initial explanation to the Georgian actions was provided by the commander of the Georgian 
contingent to the JPKF, M. Kurashvili who stated that the operation was aimed at restoring the constitutional 
order in South Ossetia. This reason, however, was refuted later on. Russia explained the movement of the troops 
in Roki tunnel as a normal manoeuvre of peacekeeping troops, when the Russian peacekeeping on the territory 
of the South Ossetia got under Georgian attack.    
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naval vessels in the port of Poti and most importantly, destroyed the railway bridge 
connecting Tbilisi with the western part of the country. Lootings of ethnic Georgian villages 
by Russian forces and South Ossetian militias were reported. (International Crisis Group, 
August 2008). Moreover, the Georgian military bases and equipment constituted a strategic 
target for the destruction by Russian forces.
On 12 August a ceasefire agreement was mediated by the French president N. Sarkozy 
and signed on 15-16 August in Tbilisi and Moscow. This so-called Six-points agreement, 
which urged both sides to withdraw their forces and establish a status quo ante, pointed out 
the following: “(1) no resort to the use of force; (2) cessation of military action for good; (3) 
free access to humanitarian aid; (4) return of Georgian military forces to their places of 
permanent deployment; (5) return of Russian military to their pre-conflict positions; awaiting 
an international mechanism, Russian peacekeeping forces will undertake additional security 
measures; and (6) opening of international discussion on the modalities of security and 
stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia” (quoted in International Crisis Group August 2008: 
4). This agreement officially put a temporary stop on the fighting between the parties. The 
Georgian side complied with the agreement by pulling its troops to their initial position before 
the war; however, the Russian side didn’t comply with it, as its troops remained in the towns 
of western and central Georgia. This led Sarkozy to travel to Moscow in order to sign a 
second ceasefire agreement on 8 September, which provided a more detailed description to 
the ceasefire implementation and deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) 
consisting of 200 international observers to the bordering areas with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia27. Although by 10 October 2008 Russia withdrew its forces from the “buffer zones”, 
in accordance with the deadline set by the ceasefire agreement, it informed that Russia keeps 
its combat forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to the ceasefire agreement Russia 
was allowed only a few thousand non-combat, peacekeeping troops in the two breakaway 
regions. Moreover, when pulling their forces, Russia left some troops in the village of Perevi, 
which according to EU Monitoring Mission, is situated on the Georgian side of the 
                                               
27 On September 8 an agreement on commitment of the parties to implementation of the six-point plan of August 
12 was concluded between the parties. This agreement encompasses the measures of withdrawal of the armed
forces, international monitoring mechanisms and the holding of international discussions. According to this 
agreement international observers, including minimum 200 from EU, had to be positioned in the areas close to 
the South Ossetian and Abkhazian borders by 1 October 2008. Therefore, the Russian troops had to withdraw 
from the area within 10 days. The Georgian forces as well had to return to the initial bases by 1 October 2008. 
According to the agreement the UNOMIG for Abkhazia and the OSCE for South Ossetia had to remain in the 
areas of their mandate before August 2008.
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administrative border28 (International Crisis Group, November 2008). In November the 
Russian forces in Perevi were replaced by South Ossetian militia, however, not for long: in 
the mid-November the shift was reversed. Moreover, Russian troops remained in Kodori 
Gorge of Abkhazia and Akhalgori district of South Ossetia, where Russia didn’t have troops 
prior to August, thus violating the ceasefire agreement conditions. Besides, Russia blocked 
the return of a separate mission of OSCE to South Ossetia, thus violating the implementation 
agreement concluded between Russian president D. Medvedev and French president N. 
Sarkozy on 8 September 2008. Despite the ceasefire agreement, the violent events continued 
to occur and regular shootings were reported.
On November 23, 2008 South Ossetian forces have fired warning shots to the air when 
the Polish and Georgian presidents drove in the contested Akhalgori area29. Russia was 
accused for standing behind this act by Georgia and Poland; however, Russian Foreign 
Minister S. Lavrov categorically denied it. He stated that it is not for the first time that the 
Georgians staged this kind of scene themselves, in order to give blame to Russia and its South 
Ossetian allies, and added that anyone will be provoked by the Georgian act – when Georgian 
president invites other president in order to have a car ride on another country’s territory30. On 
the other hand, the presence of South Ossetian and Russian troops in the Akhalgori area is 
viewed by Georgian side as breach of ceasefire agreement.
The situation in Abkhazia, especially in Gali district31 remains tense as well. Although 
there is no open fighting, shootings, bombings and mine explosions occur here and there 
killing military and civilians on both sides. In one of these shootings an Abkhaz military 
intelligence chef was killed in October 2008, for which Georgia was accused by Abkhazia. 
Few months after the end of war the situation remains tense in both separatist regions. 
The August war took lives of many hundreds of people, both military and civilian and 
resulted in the displacement of thousands of people. On 19 August the Georgian government 
reported 215 killed, including 69 civilians, 1.500 wounded and 70 soldiers missing. Russia 
reported 64 casualties and 323 wounded on the Russian side, and the South Ossetian de facto
authorities reported 2.000 dead, although this number was decreased on the later account. The 
                                               
28 The South Ossetian side claims that Perevi was a part of South Ossetia during the Soviet times (International 
Crisis Group, November 2008). 
29 -“Shots Fired Near Convoy Of Georgia, Polish Presidents”, 23.11.2008 -
http://www.rferl.org/content/Shots_Fired_Near_Convoy_Of_Georgia_Polish_Presidents_/1352088.html -
Retrieved on 04.05.2009
30 “Alleged Shooting Fuels Tensions Between Moscow And Tbilisi”, 24.11.2008 -
http://www.rferl.org/content/Alleged_Shooting_Fuels_Tensions_Between_Moscow_And_Tbilisi/1352339.html
- Retrieved on 04.05.2009 
31 Gali - ethnic Georgian district in Abkhazia which is under the Russian and Abkhazian control.   
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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that by the end of 
August 2008 around 192.000 persons were internally displaced (International Crisis Group, 
June 2009: 3). Although some of the IDPs were able to return home by June 2009 25.000 
persons remain internally displaced (International Crisis Group, June 2009). As a result of the 
war civilian infrastructure estimated of 400 million USD was damaged in Georgia alone. 
Besides, the Georgian economy, which is largely dependent on direct foreign investment, was 
seriously damaged due to decline in direct foreign investment (International Crisis Group, 
August 2008: 14).    
The war has seriously challenged the territorial integrity of Georgia. Initially Russia 
avoided recognizing the independence of the two entities, in fear for reactions from its own 
secessionist entities. However, on a number of occasions Moscow expressed its willingness to 
help the de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in whatever they decide to do.
Finally on 26 August Russia formally recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. The Russian president D. Medvedev explained this decision that the war has 
destroyed all hope for peaceful coexistence. Besides Russia, only Nicaragua and Venezuela 
recognized the independence of the two entities and the western countries have condemned 
both countries for this recognition. 
The August 2008 events had serious consequences on the conflict solving. The 
Abkhaz and South Ossetian de facto authorities under Russian wings have no motivation for 
negotiating on the conflict resolution. There is a lack of confidence in USA and EU, since 
these are regarded as warm supporters of Tbilisi and Georgian territorial integrity. The war 
increased the gap and hatred between the Abkhaz, South Ossetian and Georgian people 
diminishing further possibilities of conflict resolution. 
One of the main priorities of the present Georgian government is to enter the NATO in 
order to protect itself from its powerful neighbor - Russia. Since his coming to power, 
Saakashvili launched policies to facilitate the accession process, to strengthen its military and 
increase the number of weapons. However, after the August war, the prospects of Georgia’s 
NATO accession diminished, since many NATO member states were rather irritated with 
Georgia for provoking Russia in this way and thus they don’t see Georgia as a member of 
NATO in the near future. The way Georgia provoked Russia and got itself into the war came 
as a validation of the decision made at the Bucharest summit that Georgia is not yet ready to 
enter the NATO, and even more states got convinced that Georgian accession to NATO will 
not take place in the near future. 
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The war strengthened Saakashvili’s position, especially after Russian recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, however, temporarily. Since the end of 2008 the opposition 
began challenging the government and posing questions in relation to the necessity of the 
triggering of the August war and calling for Saakashvili’s resignation. In the end tens of 
thousands of opposition supporters demonstrated in Tbilisi for months in April-May 2009 in 
an attempt to oust Saakashvili. The humiliating defeat of Georgia in 2008 war, as well as the 
failure of Saakashvili to conduct the promised reforms was the main motivations behind the 
demonstrations. Besides that the opposition claims that Saakashvili’s regime is becoming 
increasingly autocratic and is getting close to a dictatorship. 
2.5 The political situation in Georgia after the August war
Today, over a year after the end of war, the security and political situation remains tense in 
the country. Although president Saakashvili still enjoys some mass support, his image as a 
progressive democrat committed to democratic reforms, suffered as a result of the 2008 war 
with Russia. This was triggered not only by the war in 2008, where the country suffered a 
humiliating defeat and lost some territories formerly controlled by Georgia, to the breakaway 
regions, but also by the events of November 2007, where the peaceful demonstrations have 
been violently stopped on the order from the president. After this event the trust of the 
Georgian people in the integrity of Saakashvili has been widely shattered and his popularity 
decreased, which is proven by the fact that he won the elections in 2007 with only 52 % (from 
turnout of 56 %) in comparison with 96 % (from turnout of 90 %) of votes he received at the 
elections in 200432. Moreover, the violent handling of demonstrations in 2007 diminished the 
enthusiasm of Saakashvili’s western supporters. In March 2008 nine representatives of 
opposition were arrested on a charge of illegal weapon possession, which triggered tensions 
on the political arena in the country. The opposition started protests on 9 April 2008 which 
continued for months involving thousands of people, supporters of the opposition consisting 
of 13 parties. Main demonstrations took place in Tbilisi, however, smaller protests were held 
also in other cities of the country. The opposition promised to continue the protests until 
president Saakashvili resigns33. In July the opposition temporarily ceased its protests, stating 
that the demonstrations will resume in the autumn of 2009. 
On 31 May 2009, the parliamentary elections took place in South Ossetia, where the 
pro-Russian leader Eduard Kokoity won the elections. These elections, which were the first 
                                               
32 “Fuller: Despite Apparent Reelection, Saakashvili’s Popularity Not High”, 07.01.2009,  
http://www.cfr.org/publication/15185/ - Retrieved on 05.05.2009
33 www.crisisgroup.org – Retrieved on 05.05.2009 
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ones since the August war, were widely despised by Georgia as well as the international 
community. Both of the de facto states remain heavily dependent on Russian assistance. After 
the recognition of both entities Russia promised a financial aid of 81 million USD to both 
entities over some years and an additional 245 million USD for South Ossetian rehabilitation. 
When in the beginning of 2009 Russia suspended its aid to South Ossetia due to concerns of 
misallocation, the South Ossetia significantly suffered from it, since it could not provide 
salaries and pensions to its citizens, demonstrating the deep dependency of the de facto state 
on the Russian assistance. In case of Abkhazia, it benefits from Russian aid of 68 million 
USD provided since the end of August war (International Crisis Group, June 2009). In 
September, Russia has signed defense pacts with validity of 49 years (with possibility of 5 
years prolongation) with the two secessionist regions with the aim of protecting the two 
regions. According to the pacts the Russian military will be present in the two de facto states, 
including defense of Abkhazian territorial waters34.  
The tensions between Georgia and the two secessionist entities are in danger of 
widening, as in the summer of 2009 Georgia drafted a planned constitutional amendment, 
which, if approved, may create even more tensions. According to the proposed amendment 
Abkhazia and Ajara are given autonomous status with the right to have own constitution. 
South Ossetia, however, is not involved in this arrangement and instead is called for 
“Tskhinvali region” with special status. 
In August 2009 Georgia detained a Turkish trade ship35, which was carrying the 
gasoline and oil to Abkhazia and in September sentenced the captain for 24 years of prison36. 
Since the end of the August war, the Georgian authorities banned all the economic activities 
with the two de facto states. In response to this incident the Abkhazian leader, S. Bagapsh has 
threatened to destroy all the Georgian ships, which will violate the sea borders of Abkhazia. 
He stated that “this step has been motivated by unending acts of piracy by Georgia."37 Russia 
backed up the Abkhazian statement by sending patrols to the Abkhazian territorial waters in 
September.   
In June 2009, Georgia held its first bilateral meeting with USA on the United States-
Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, signed in January 2009. This document 
                                               
34 These pacts will allow presence of 1700 Russian troops in each of the de facto states’ territories. 
35 It was fourth ship, which was detained by Georgia since the economic blockade. 
36 After official talks between Georgia and Turkey, it was agreed to find suitable solution if Turkey will pay 
18.000 USD fine. 
37 “Tensions Rise Over Georgia's Sea Blockade Of Abkhazia”, 02.09.2009, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Tensions_Rise_Over_Georgias_Sea_Blockade_Of_Abkhazia/1813300.html -
Retrieved on 05.09.2009 
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demonstrated the US support to the Georgian territorial integrity and emphasized on the 
cooperation between the two states based on common values and interests, including
“expanding democracy and economic freedom, protecting security and territorial integrity, 
strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights … secure and voluntary return of 
all internally displaced persons and refugees … and bolstering Eurasian energy security” as 
well as Georgian accession to NATO (Preamble, United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic 
Partnership, January 2009) 38. This was followed by an official visit of the US vice president 
J. Biden to Georgia in July 2009. 
Meanwhile, the tensions between Russia and Georgia are growing again. It was 
reported that the Russian troops entered Abkhaz Gali region on 7 April 2009, and extra 
Russian troops were deployed in South Ossetian and Abkhaz border areas as a “precautionary 
measure”. On 30 April 2009 Russia signed a border defense agreement with the breakaway 
regions, thus getting direct control over borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia – an act 
widely despised by the NATO39. Besides that Abkhaz authorities gave full control over the 
airport and railway system to Russia40. At the same time, NATO made a decision to conduct 
military exercises near Tbilisi starting on May throughout June 2009 including some 1.000 
troops from 19 nations, to which Russia objected categorically41. Meanwhile, on 5 May 2009 
a military mutiny took place in a base near Gori, which according to the Georgian officials, 
was intended to create a bigger military coup and was directed towards the NATO exercises. 
Tbilisi claimed that Russia stands behind this mutiny, which is firmly denied by Russian 
officials42. At the same time, Russia persistently denies any possibility to restore the 
diplomatic relations with Georgia. President Medvedev stated that “We would like to have 
good relations with Georgia; we love and respect the Georgian people,”, however, “I do not 
want to have any relations with President Saakashvili and I do not want to communicate 
with him.”43 Moreover, Russia launched a large military operation “Kavkaz-2009” near the 
Georgian borders in June 2009, which was condemned by the Georgian authorities. 
                                               
38 “United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership”, 09.01.2009, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-
english/2009/January/20090109145313eaifas0.2139093.html - Retrieved on 24.06.2009
39 www.crisisgroup.org; www.bbc.com – Retrieved on 05.05.2009 
40 “Abkhazia And The Perils Of 'Independence'”, 19.06.2009,  
http://www.rferl.org/content/Abkhazia_The_Perils_Of_Independence/1758008.html - Retrieved on 24.06.2009
41 “NATO Plans Military Exercise in Georgia in May; Russia Objects”, 16.04.2009,
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11142&Itemid=65 – Retrieved on 
05.05.2009 
42 “Georgia Claims Military Coup Thwarted; Tank Battalion Mutinies”, 05.05.2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ahCOu3Zd7Uxc# - Retrieved on 05.05.2009 
43 “Medvedev: ‘I don’t Want to Have Relations with Saakashvili’”, 03.04.2009, 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20655 – Retrieved on 24.06.2009
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After seven rounds of peace talks under the auspices of OSCE, the so-called Geneva 
talks, with participation of the parties to the August 2008 war, including the representatives 
of the two secessionist entities, no agreement was achieved. Despite the engagement of the 
sides in regular meetings, on a number of occasions the Abkhazian, South Ossetian and 
Georgian sides accused each other for firing mortars and shelling. In one such incident, in 
August, South Ossetia accused Georgia for firing mortars to South Ossetia, which was not 
supported by any evidence. In response to this the Russian defense ministry declared that in 
the case of continuing provocations from Georgia, the Russian forces in the breakaway region 
will exercise their right to use force44.       
On 15 June 2009, the UNOMIG mandate was formally expired after nearly 16-years 
of operating in Abkhazia. The Security Council resolution to extend the UNOMIG mandate 
was vetoed by Russia, which led to shutting down the only international observer body in the 
breakaway region. The official explanation on the veto provided by Russia was that the 
resolution was unacceptable since it committed itself to the Georgian territorial integrity and 
demanded that the resolution text reflects the new realities on the ground after the August 
war. The Abkhazian leadership on the other hand, expressed their interest in continuing 
cooperation with the UN and stated that Abkhazia didn’t want the UNOMIG mission to 
terminate. The western states together with Georgia consider the shutting down of the 
UNOMIG mission as a dangerous step, which can lead to more conflict between Georgia and 
Russia, while the Russian side denies that this will deteriorate any conflict. 
The situation of the refugees and internally displaced persons remains critical. By 
April 2009 estimated 25.000 persons remained internally displaced, living in devastating 
conditions and many of them were not expected to return to their homes in the near future 
(Transparency International Georgia, 03.04.2009). Efforts to return them to their homes are 
taken by the Georgian government; however, much remains to be done.    
                                               
44 “Russia ‘Reserves Right To Use Force’ Against Georgia” 01.08.2009, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Reserves_Right_To_Use_Force_Against_Georgia/1790389.html -
Retrieved on 25.09.2009
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CHAPTER III. THEORIES  
In this section we present and explain the theories and the way we apply them in our research. 
The main theories, which are applied to our empirical case, are state-based approach, conflict 
theories and center-periphery model. Due to the fact that all these approaches present some 
elements of realist and neorealist thinking, we have the realism in international relation as the 
main background for these theories and thus for our research. 
3.1 State-based approach 
According to Buzan the state is a relationship between the territory, government and 
society and the systemic dynamics of the ways these relate to each other. State “both provides 
the major binding holding the territorial – polity – society package together, and defines much 
of its character and power as an actor in the international system” (Buzan, 2007: 70). The 
state is composed of three interlinked elements, which are essential for the security of the 
state: the idea of the state, the physical base of the state and the institutional expression of the 
state. Consequently the state must have a physical base of the state, consisting of a territory, 
population including also the natural and human-made resources, the institutions to govern 
this physical base and the idea of state, which establishes its legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population.
The idea of the state is the most central to the notion of the state. The distinctive 
feature of the idea of the state is that it represents the notion of purpose. The idea of the state 
is connected to the issues such as why the state exists, what are its functions in relation to the 
society, and therefore it is an essential component of the state, which provides legitimate 
mechanisms for state authority over its citizens. Two main sources of idea of state are the 
nation and organizing ideologies. The nation is a “large group of people sharing the same
cultural, and possibly the same ethnic or racial, heritage” and since “nations are products of a 
closely shared history, they normally constitute the majority population of some core 
territory” (Buzan, 2007: 74). The nation and state are strongly interlinked, which can be 
drawn in four models: nation-state, state-nation, part nation-state and multination state. Most 
of the states have a combination of these, although one model is more dominant than others. 
According to Buzan, “unless the idea of the state is firmly planted in the “minds” of 
other states, the state has no secure environment” (Buzan, 2007: 79). Similarly, these ideas 
should be implanted in the minds of the people; otherwise, there cannot be a secure 
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foundation. Thus the firm connection between the state and the nation is essential for the 
security of the state. 
Another source of idea of the state - the organizing ideology - is less powerful than the 
nation, and implies identification with a general principle, e.g. democracy, communism, Islam
etc. Economic, social and religious issues can serve as an idea of the state as well. In some 
cases these ideas are deeply rooted in the state, when the change of these will be a 
transformation process for the state. If the ideas of organizing ideology are weak, the state has 
an insecure political foundation. If these ideas are not widely held, it will not be considered as 
a state idea, but merely as idea of a particular group in the society. Moreover, if these ideas 
are strongly held but contested within the society, then the state will also experience 
vulnerabilities. Thus, it is a precondition for the security that the ideas of the state are strong 
and widely accepted by the society. This is true even if the institutions of the state are 
relatively weak. “If the idea of the state is strong and widely held, then the state can endure 
periods of weak institutions…without a serious threats to its overall integrity” (Buzan, 2007: 
83). Likewise, if the idea of the state is weak and lacks popular support, a small slip off of the 
institutions can have a devastating effect and lead to a collapse of the whole system by 
different means.   
The institutions of the state is the machinery of the government, e.g. the laws, norms, 
executive, administrative, legislative branches. The institutions enforce the ideas and 
legitimacy of the state. The stability of the institutions and the popular support of the 
government are important factors in the security of the state. The threat to the institutions may 
come from internal factors, such as internal opposing groups, militias etc, as well as from 
external sources, such as other states. In international relations, the government is inseparable 
from the state, since it is the government that represents the state in the international arena. 
Therefore changes in the government can have an impact on the behavior of the other states. 
The physical base of the state consists of the population, territory, natural and human-
made resources. A state with a long history usually has an attachment to the territory. 
Territory can be endangered by the external factors, i.e. other states or by internal factors, 
such as secessionist movements. The threat to the territory is closely related to the threat to 
the population of the state. 
Although Buzan’s approach provides valuable explanation to the weakness of the 
states, we find it appropriate to strengthen it with additional factors, such as time availability, 
ethno-federalism/Soviet legacy and existence of de facto states. These factors allow us to 
explain the weakness of the post-Soviet states, in our case, Georgia. Lack of sufficient time in 
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the state-building process can be one of the roots of the state weaknesses. Whereas the strong 
western states had enough time to build and strengthen their states, many other countries did 
not have sufficient time, and still are in the process of state-building. Thus time is a 
precondition for building a strong state. 
A factor which played a major role in the state-building process in the Newly 
Independent States is their Soviet past. This Soviet past had a heavy legacy on the affairs of 
the newly built states. First of all, the Soviet Union had a complex four-tier structure, each tier 
with a differing degree of autonomy. The highest on this hierarchy were the 15 republics, 
consisting mostly of a dominant ethnic group. Although, theoretically, these republics were 
given a relatively high degree of discretion in relation to the foreign affairs, managing of its 
own territory and resources and even had a right to secession, in practice, however, it was the 
centralized authorities in Moscow who sharply controlled all the affairs of the republics. In 
other words, the republics didn’t exercise independent decision-making and instead were 
under close scrutiny of the center (Brubaker, 1994). Moreover, the division of the republics 
was made, in many cases, around one titular ethnic group and in many cases the minority 
ethnic groups with their own territorial affiliation were incorporated into a republic (for 
example as autonomous region - oblast), because these were physically too small to constitute 
a republic. Thus “the constituent republics were organized around a titular nationality, and 
representatives of other ethno-national origins were considered minorities” (Svanidze, 2006: 
14). The autonomous oblast incorporated into a Union republic had often not much in 
common with the republic, historically, culturally and ethnically. In addition, the state 
strongly encouraged internal migration, which in numerous cases created a mismatch between 
the territory and nationality. “Personal nationality was an autonomous classification scheme, 
based on descent, not residence” (Brubaker, 1994: 55). Due to the state-sponsored migration 
activities, the majority of the population in some republics was of non-titular origin and the 
ethnics of titular origin resided in the places outside their territory. Moreover, the Soviet 
division of territorial units further into autonomous republics and oblast allowed these units to 
have their own structures and institutions, which, after the breakdown of Soviet Union 
facilitated the secessionist movements. “Whereas elsewhere in Europe the delimitation of 
autonomous structures within states has helped to assuage conflicts, the result was the 
opposite in the former Soviet Union: the existence of autonomous structures exacerbated 
conflicts” (Lynch, 2004: 24-25). 
Although Buzan identifies the secessionist movements as possible threat to the 
institutional expression and physical base of the state, we find it necessary in our case to 
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deepen this viewpoint further. The de facto states constitute a challenge to the state security. 
However, it is not true that existence of de facto states alone can constitute a substantial threat 
to the state. De facto states only contribute to the abovementioned factors that lead to the
weakening of the state. At the same time, the secessionist movements have far larger 
implications on the weak states than in relatively well-functioning states. It is obvious that the 
conflicts for secession have devastating consequences for the population of the entities, where 
they have to live in an uncertainty. The economic sanctions, blockades or isolation policies 
usually hit hardest on the people. Moreover, during the conflicts number of the internally 
displaced person’s increases on both sides, this cuts people’s opportunities. This leads to the 
second point - economic implications. High numbers of IDPs in a state exhausts the scarce 
resources of the state and thus have negative economic implications for the state, especially 
for the new and young state as Georgia. Moreover, depending on the value of the territory of 
the de facto states, it is possible to say that the metropolitan state might encounter some 
economic losses, when previously attached to the metropolitan state territories become de 
facto. Another implication the de facto states can have on the state is related to state security. 
Not only is there a danger for increased criminal activities due to trade restrictions but also the 
shattered domestic political and security structures, can attract threats from the outside to the 
state.   
Summing up the state-based approach, it can be concluded that the state is considered 
to be strong if the idea of the state is strong and widely held, the institutional expression of the 
state is stable and has popular support and the physical base of the state is stable and not 
vulnerable to threats. Moreover, it has to have sufficient time for the state-building process. In 
the case of Georgia the ethno-federalism played an important role in explaining the relations 
between Georgia and the secessionist entities. Additionally, the existence of de facto states 
contributes to the security challenges of the state, especially if the state encounters various 
different types of weaknesses in advance.   
3.2 Conflict resolution: Three different approached of conflict analysis 
For the purpose of this research we build a synergy from three different perspectives 
for conflict analysis: conflict dynamics, needs based approach and rational strategic 
calculations. Although these approaches carry different understandings of why conflicts 
emerge, dynamics of the conflicts and solutions for the conflict, we apply them 
complementarily as we argue that they can be integrated in one framework for conflict 
analysis. 
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From the conflict dynamic perspective a conflict escalates, when one actor is reacting 
to the actions of another. The conflict, as a social phenomenon, is invoked by parties, when 
they say that they do not have any alternatives to the existing dispute. In order to make an 
analysis of such dynamics, we present the conflict triangle tool, developed by Galtung. 
According to this tool a conflict moves among triangle’s corners (Figure 2). Thus, corner A 
refers to conflict attitudes; corner B to conflict behavior and C to incompatibility itself. The 
conflict can start in any of these corners. Later on, Galtung argued that C is a more frequent 
and logical starting point for the conflict. Therefore the emphasis is on conflict dynamics and 
consequently it follows that the resolution of the conflict is a “never ending process” 
(Galtung, 1996: 72). In his view the conflict is transformed through transcendence (were the 
goals are met fully for the conflict parties), compromise (goals are met less than fully for the 
sides) and withdrawals (goals are given up). 
CONTRADICTION
ATTITUDE BEHAVIOUR
Figure 2. Galtung’s model of conflict (Source: Galtung 1996)
The central point in this approach is that the dynamics of the conflict are the most important 
aspect when a conflict is to be analyzed. The dynamics can be affected and maneuvered in 
ways that makes the conflict creative. This can be achieved by the parties themselves or by 
intervention from outsiders. Central is to understand how difficult it is to break the dynamics. 
The main objective of the conflict resolution is thus to change the course of events and 
transform the conflict escalation to de-escalation.
Particularly useful in this approach is how Galtung depicted on incompatibilities. The 
Figure 3 presents how the incompatibilities should be analyzed. If A and B, actors with 
contradictory goals, are disputing about a certain type of resource (territory etc) the following 
scenario can be built. If A gets 100% of available resources, there is nothing left to B and vice 
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versa. This means that one of actors has a complete victory and another one has a complete 
defeat for the other. It is an outcome that an actor is not likely to tolerate easily and 
voluntarily. However, anything beyond these points may be more acceptable and possible. 
For example, along the diagonal there are positions at which the parties may meet. C marks a 
classical point where the parties can divide the resources equally. The parties may also agree 
on going to point E, where neither A nor B takes anything. Instead the valuables are handed to 
another actor C - also an agreed solution. It is important to mention here that actor C may 
enter the conflict and take the valuables from the fighting parties. Furthermore, Galtung 
introduced the so-called point D (transcendence), where both parties can get what they want at 
the same time as different form of compromises can be found here. The mathematical 
formulation is impossible in this context as there can not be 200% of something. However, 
this scenario indicates the challenges of finding solutions beyond established rules and 
thinking. The dynamic approach to conflict analysis emphasizes on the significance of 
establishing a dialogue between the parties and suggests also the creation of independent
procedures in which the parties can have confidence.
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Figure 3. Analysis of incompatibility (source: Galtung 1996)
The dynamics approach is applied to explain the main incompatibilities among the 
actors around the Georgian conflicts. Taking into consideration that dynamic approach 
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strongly emphasizes on conflict resolution mechanisms and particularly on the creation of 
independent procedures, in which the parties can have confidence, this approach allows us to 
examine to what extent international actors, involved in the conflict, managed to launch 
conflict resolution mechanisms and have an impact on the ground. However, this perspective 
is weak in explaining why the conflicts start and how we should deal in conflicts, where the 
parties are highly unequal. Therefore we complement this approach with a needs based 
approach. 
In relation to the needs based approach it is of relevance to mention Edward Azar’s 
contribution with his work on “protracted social conflict”. According to Azar, conflicts take 
place, when the main needs of one actor, such as security, identity, recognition and 
participation, are not fulfilled. Furthermore, he underlines that “if the basis of a conflict is the 
denial of particular needs, then the resolution process must identify those needs and include 
ways of answering them” (Azar and Burton, 1986).  
It is also argued that negotiations have a tendency to give advantages to the elites and,
if the agreement does not touch upon the main needs, then they will not last. Thus, Azar 
suggests that conflict resolution requires decentralized structures and ways in which 
psychological, economic and relational needs can be satisfied. The critical question to this 
approach is how can it be possible to meet all the needs that humans and human groups may 
have? If that is not possible then the conflict resolution becomes but a way of managing 
conflict and not a way of ending it. Moreover, even if there are some needs that can be 
satisfied, how do we know that these are the ones, which are important to handle over to 
eliminate the conflict? 
The needs based perspective emphasizes on the actors’ needs and thus is an important 
tool for understanding whose needs were denied and how the unmet needs of the South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia led to a deeper intensification of the conflict. This approach has also 
explanatory power when it comes to the role of the elites in solving/ amplifying the relations 
among the actors.
Finally, in the third approach - rational calculation - the emphasis is on the idea that 
actors have their own rationality, from their own judgments, follow strategies and thus initiate 
the chain of the events that lead to war. Furthermore, ending the conflict and reaching 
agreements need to be seen in the same light. In this perspective it is argued that there is a 
need for the actors to make calculations that can terminate a conflict but at the same time 
ending the conflict is not the actor’s only interest. It is argued that the parties initiate wars to 
win them. Thus the initiator is making some calculations showing that the benefits are more 
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significant than the losses. In Zartman’s analysis, when one or both of the parties looking 
towards the future, can’t see a chance for victory but a continued stalemate, then the ceasefire 
can be an element of a ripe moment for resolution, where external actors can have a decisive 
role. However, if this momentum is not used, then a ceasefire may also slow down the move 
towards the resolution and instead prolong the fighting. This is because there is little 
empirical evidence on the merits of ceasefire for conflict resolution. Another important aspect 
in this approach is the role of the outside powers, which can suggest some alternatives for the 
settlement of the conflict. The fact that the outside world may have an impact on the conflicts 
involving smaller countries can lead to the following question: who are the parties who should 
settle a particular conflict? In the conflict dynamic perspective as many actors as possible 
should be involved. In the needs based approach the opposite is preferred. Finally, in the 
rational calculation approach it is mentioned that only those “who count” should be in. The 
rational calculation approach is applied to explain actors’ rationality and judgments, when 
initiating a conflict. The advantage of the rational calculation approach compared with the 
two other approaches is that it can explain how the outside world has a significant role, 
particularly concerning conflicts in smaller countries. 
When applied to our empirical case we use them interchangeably even though they 
cover distinct perspectives on conflict and carry out different understanding of why conflicts 
emerge and have certain dynamics. The main reason for integrating these three approaches 
into one scheme for analysis of our empirical case is that they point to different aspects and 
stages of the conflict phenomenon. The synthesis of these three approaches as one tool for 
analysis allows us to examine different aspects in Georgian conflicts and thus give a broader 
explanation and understanding towards conflict resolution.
3.3 Centre-periphery model 
In order to analyze the relations at the domestic and international level, we use the centre-
periphery model. In relation to Georgia the centre-periphery model is applied on two levels: 
Georgia as a centre and Georgia as periphery. On the first level, we look at Georgia’s 
domestic level, where Georgia in this perspective is considered as being “center”. In this 
context, Georgia, as a sovereign state, is expected to exercise its authority over its whole 
territory, and thus is may be seen as a center in relation to particular peripheries such as 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the second level, the model is applied in relation to 
Georgia’s place in the international order. In this context, Georgia is seen as periphery vis-à-
vis international actors, as it is a small state confronting stronger states active in the region 
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and struggles to be recognized on the international arena as an equal among others. Thus, this 
two-fold application of the centre-periphery model provides insights into the mutual linkage 
between domestic and international security threats that Georgia is exposed to.
Four different types of center-periphery relations can be identified. The term 
“periphery” in the centre-periphery relations first of all, denotes particular lines of
confrontation – to boundaries, where the centre has to defend itself or to fault lines where the 
centre has to confront external threats. Secondly, the terms “centre” and “periphery” are 
applied to express the process integration or assimilation of the periphery by the centre. 
Furthermore, the term “periphery” can be applied to denote something of marginal 
importance to the centre. The “centre” in this scenario maintains an attitude of indifference 
towards the periphery. In the fourth type of centre-periphery relationship, a periphery as a 
bridgehead, linking one micro region or one macro region to another micro or macro region
(Hofman, 1980). 
It is important to stress that these four types of centre-periphery relations do not reflect 
empirical realities but rather highlight particular empirical traits with the aim of developing a 
better understanding of social reality. Furthermore, these various types of relationships do not 
exclude each other. In this context “relationships of domination characterized by conflict, by 
integration, or by indifference may very well intermingle in domestic or international 
relations” (Coppieters, 2005: 345). Thus, if the centre generates values and norms that are 
assimilated by the periphery the centre-periphery relations are defined by integration. 
Alternatively, the periphery may formulate complaints and mobilize protest actions, entering 
in conflict relation with the centre. 
As mentioned before, the centre-periphery relations are asymmetrical and hierarchical; 
therefore it may be assumed that the transformation in relationship between both poles is 
determined by changes in each of the poles, but more fundamentally, by changes at the centre 
than at the periphery. Furthermore, the use of centre-periphery model assumes that the 
transformation of the relationship between both poles will more substantially affect the 
periphery than the centre. The center’s identity is defined at the periphery and the identity of 
the periphery by its relationship to the centre. The centre, as the main core, identifies itself 
through creation of one or more types of relationships indicated above, such as the 
assimilation of its periphery, the maintenance of its borders, or the use of its peripheries as a 
bridgehead to other areas. However, peripheries are also active creators of their own identities 
either through integration, through the reproduction of their dependency relations with a 
centre or by resisting integration through confrontation. 
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The centre-periphery relations should not be perceived as being static, as polarity 
reversals can occur at any stage. Thus, under certain circumstances, a periphery may start 
changing its position from one pole to another and acquire more crucial roles in the whole 
system. In a scenario like this “a reversal in polarity may come about as a consequence of a 
radical transformation in the relationship between centre and periphery that strengthens the 
latter to the point that it becomes the dominant centre” (Coppieters, 2005: 346).
It is important to mention that individuals within the political elite can also play a 
significant role in spatial relationships. Thus, the relations between periphery and centre can 
be determined by the political elites of both levels.  
The centre-periphery model is a spatial model and therefore spatial relations are 
crucial, when national movements are trying to remove specific territories and their 
populations from the authority of the government. The separation, which they are striving for, 
is not necessarily absolute, thus the peripheries may want just to diminish their dependency 
on a centre by seeking self-government through various forms of autonomy or federal 
relations. In order to decrease the dependency from the centre, a range of means can be 
applied. Thus the periphery might strive to be incorporated into the centre by obtaining a 
share in the central functions of decision making (through the creation of a federation) up to 
creation of an internationally recognized sovereign state on the same level as the centre.
The formation of the de facto states and the redrawing of the international boundaries 
can have both consequences for domestic relations and the external regional balance of 
power. Thus the secessionists movements can lead to “a re-centering of the international 
order, when dependency relations move from one centre to another, or to a realignment of 
dependency relations by creating a multiplicity of centers within a more pluralistic network” 
(Coppieters, 2005: 348).
By applying the center-periphery model to our empirical case, we examine the 
interaction and interdependency between international and domestic actors. For the purpose of 
this study we analyze the state to state relations, where Georgia represents an internationally 
recognized state and state and sub-state relations, where South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
constitute de facto states. It is necessary to mention here that we look at both de facto states as 
periphery to Georgia because the two secessionist entities are not internationally recognized 
and thus still constitute the part of the Georgian state. Due to dynamic nature of the centre-
periphery relations, the periphery can change its position towards the centre and thus replace 
the old centre with another new centre, which appears more attractive to the periphery.
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The main strength of this model is that it allows us to test some of the assumptions, 
which we raised in relation to Georgia’s domestic affairs and international security policies. 
Thus, when Georgia’s domestic polices are concerned, the model will let us testify if changes 
in the relations between centre and peripheries have been induced by the transformation at the 
centre or rather by the transformation at the periphery. When Georgia’s international security 
policies are concerned, the centre-periphery model allows us to see whether policy changes in 
Moscow, Washington and Brussels have a stronger impact on their relationship with Tbilisi 
than events in Georgia have on these relationships.
The abovementioned assumptions, raised in order to locate Georgian security, do not 
mean that the outcomes of its secessionist conflicts should be exclusively perceived as the 
results of shifts in the balance of power between the main external actors. By applying centre-
periphery model we want to demonstrate that the analysis of the Georgian secessionist 
conflicts needs to focus on both the role of the centre in international relations, with emphasis 
on those actors that have a significant impact on Georgia’s foreign policy choices and of the 
centre at the domestic level, referring to the Georgian policies towards secessionist entities.
By applying the centre-periphery model we want to examine how the Georgian centre 
is being challenged by its periphery, and how these challenges have been attempted to be 
solved by integrating these peripheries into the centre, through political representation, 
minority rights and federal arrangements. However, taking into consideration the last events, 
we also have to examine the possibility of addressing these challenges through a policy of 
confrontation, which can lead to a weaker center and the emergence of new centers-new 
sovereign states.
On the other side the same model is applied in order to investigate the conflicting 
relations between Russia and Georgia, which can be described as a movement of the 
periphery away from the center, as Georgia resist its peripheral status in relation to Moscow 
by claiming membership in Western organizations, NATO and EU. In this context, it is
interesting to explain to what extent the periphery’s movement from one centre and inclusion 
into a new one succeeds or not. Thus, the model helps to explain the peripheries’ attempts to 
change their relation with the centre, both at the national and international levels, and the 
extent to which these levels are interdependent, when the resolution of the Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia conflicts is concerned.
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3.4 Realism
While our main theories applied in this study have roots in realism, this section focuses
mainly on the logic of interaction and behavior of the actors in the conflict.  
The realist tradition takes departure on the assumption that the human being is egoistic 
by nature, which together with the absence of international government, make the 
international political arena to “largely a realm of power and interests” (Donnelly, 2000: 9). 
The realists largely make distinction between the domestic and international politics. One of 
the prominent realist scholars, K. Waltz stated that “National politics is the realm of authority, 
of administration, and law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of 
accommodation.” (Waltz, 1979 in Art & Jervis eds., 2007: 46) Thus in the domestic realm, 
the egoistic human nature can be suppressed by the hierarchical state structure, since the 
domestic political system is characterized by “relations of super and subordination”, where 
“some are entitled to command; others are required to obey” (Waltz, 1979 in Art & Jervis 
eds., 2007: 31), whereas the international relations takes place in the state of anarchy, that is, 
in the absence of the international government. In this state of international anarchy, the states 
are rational actors, which are driven by their national interests, mainly security and state 
survival. Although the states in the international relations are formally equal and even similar 
in their domestic functions, they differ in their capabilities, which makes them unequal in the 
international relations, and as Donnelly writes “historically, this means that international 
political structures are defined by the changing fates of great powers” (Donnelly, 2000: 17). 
According to the realists, the state of international anarchy is characterized by chaos 
and disorder. This does not, however, mean that there is a state of constant war and violence 
in the world, but that there is an enduring threat for the state to be attacked by the neighbors. 
The states in the international relations thus, unlike in the domestic structure, are self-
dependent and “self-helping”, which means that in the case of threat they must rely on 
themselves only. The states cannot depend on the good neighbors, because it is too costly for 
the state (Waltz, 1979 in Art & Jervis eds., 2007: 31). Therefore striving for more power is 
one of the main aims of the states. 
The greater states struggle for power and domination and hegemony is their final goal 
(Mearsheimer, 2001 in Art & Jervis eds., 2007: 31). According to J. Mearsheimer, the 
possibility of the other states to use the military force against other states is one of the factors 
that makes the great powers to treat other states with fear and suspicion and thus strive for 
more power and hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2001 in Art & Jervis eds., 2007: 31). 
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However, although it was said that the states cannot rely on others in pursuing their 
goals, they may create alliances with other states for the security purposes and in this case 
other states fearing the created alliance, may create their own counter-alliance, thus 
maintaining a balance in the international relations. This can happen when the relative gains 
from the alliance are greater than the losses. Contrary to the hierarchical structures, where 
some sides might join the winner’s side, in the international relations, without the hierarchical 
structures, it doesn’t pay off to join the rising power. This is so, because “to jump on the 
bandwagon of a rising power is to court becoming prey to that power not too far down the 
road” (Donnelly, 2000: 18). Therefore the states have to always be concerned with their own 
relative power, since the power of the other states is considered to be a threat, which creates a 
necessity for the states to maintain the balance of power. 
Realism is applied to explain the logic of interaction and behavior of the actors in the 
conflict. Furthermore, realism allows us to see how the power politics and strategic interests 
of the states have impact on the conflict in Georgia as well as on its resolution. Therefore by 
applying this approach we explain how geopolitics matters and why some territories are of 
particular interest for major power. The Georgian case serves as a test of the realist 
assumption that the states act entirely for the national interests and that they strive for more 
power.    
Conflict
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Realism
State-based
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Center-periphery
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Figure 4. Theoretical framework
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CHAPTER IV. ANALYSIS
4.1 Domestic level 
This section presents the domestic level of our study. In order to explain how the Georgian 
political realm affected the conflicts and their resolution, we look at the Georgian state, its 
idea, institutional expression, the physical base, the foreign policy and the sub-state actors, 
through the three presidents of the country since its independence: Z. Gamsakhurdia, E. 
Shevardnadze and M. Saakashvili. Moreover, we look at the Soviet past as one of the factors 
that has influenced the course of events. The centre-periphery analysis at the domestic level is 
also addressed. The abovementioned factors will help us explain the dynamics of the relations 
between the central government and the secessionist entities and in the end will contribute to 
the explanation on how the intra-state conflict became an inter-state one, which is analyzed 
further on.  
Z. Gamsakhurdia 
In 1991 Georgia acquired its independence from Soviet Union and the state-building process 
began. The idea of the state, which is one of the main components of the state, has the basis 
on the nation and organizing ideologies. In the Georgian case, from the beginning of its 
existence, the idea of the state had a weak and unsustainable basis, since it was first of all, 
based on the nationalistic sentiments, related to the newly acquired independence and 
secondly it was exclusionary towards the minorities by stressing on “Georgia for the 
Georgians” rhetoric45. Excluding the minority groups and conducting hostile policies towards 
them have had a harmful impact on the national unity, with the result being Abkhazian and 
South Ossetian secessionist movements. 
In regards to the nation, the existence of large minority groups in the country makes 
the Georgian state a state-nation and not the nation-state, where the people share the common 
history, language and cultural identity. Georgia began its existence as a state-nation, which 
was created on the basis of the old soviet division of territorial units and kept the old 
Georgian Soviet Republic territory with the diversity of ethnic minorities, collected around 
the titular nation. Building such type of a state-nation is a top-down process and therefore, the 
role of leaders in state-building is very important as it is the leaders, who play the 
instrumental role in generating and propagating the common cultural norms and in creating a 
                                               
45 Gamsakhurdia’s nationalism went as far as to suggest prohibition of inter-ethnic marriages (Cosman et al, 
1991). 
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common identity. In the case of Georgia, Gamsakhurdia’s ultra nationalistic tendencies not 
only divided the country and thus had a negative impact on establishing a state-nation, but 
also built a very weak and dangerous foundation for the Georgian state. 
Besides the nation, the organizing ideology is another source of idea of state, which is 
important for the security and stability of the state. In order for the state to be strong, it is 
important to have strong organizing ideologies, as these address the basics of relationship 
between the state and its society, and, as Buzan put it, “define the condition for both harmony 
and conflict in domestic politics” (Buzan, 2007: 80). Gamsakhurdia’s ideas didn’t get wide 
political support from the entire population and were widely contested, thus shattering the 
political foundation of the state. This had devastating consequences, which divided the 
country, instead of uniting it. Thus Gamsakhurdia, as a leader, failed to establish a solid idea 
of the state, which would have united the people and constituted a legitimate basis for a strong 
state.
Another important component of the state is its institutions, which implement the idea 
of the state and acts as a guarantor of the state legitimacy. During Gamsakhurdia’s rule the 
institutions of the Georgian state were not stable since they were at the very early stage of 
state-building process. Moreover, from the very beginning the rule of Gamsakhurdia was 
challenged by enormous opposition movements, due to his tyrannical policies and extreme 
nationalism. Furthermore, the dissatisfaction was caused by the fact that the president 
possessed enormous powers: he was given a right to veto any legislation passed by the 
parliament within certain period of time, he had a power to declare war, to nominate persons 
to the top positions, such as prime minister, chairman of the Supreme Court, state prosecutor 
or commander of the armed forces (Cosman et al, 1991). Moreover, the political 
imprisonment and violations of human rights were regular at the time. This discontent with 
the political situation was the basis of the widely held opposition to the institutional base of 
the state, which, in the absence of popular support and with high contestation, contributed to 
the insecurity of the state. 
The physical base of the state is another corner of the state triangle, which consists of 
population and the territory. It was mentioned before that Georgia has a significant number of 
ethnic minorities, which were largely marginalized. This directly contributed to deterioration 
of the problematic relations between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In regards to 
the territory, it was mentioned above that at its independence Georgian territory was based on 
the Georgian Socialist Republic, which incorporated the territories of the secessionist entities. 
The Soviet ethno-federal division of the territory was based largely on building republics 
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around a titular nation, with smaller ethnic groups incorporated in it. Therefore, the state of 
Georgia inherited the territory based on the Soviet ethno-federal division of the republics, and 
not on natural division, which took into the consideration the ethnic and cultural diversity. 
The Soviet division of the territorial units into autonomous republics and oblast has also 
contributed to the secessionist movements in Georgia. This allowed the autonomous units to 
have their own structures and institutions, which, after the fall of the Soviet Union, facilitated 
establishment of de facto states with their own institutions.   
The state during Gamsakhurdia’s rule was thus characterized by lack of national 
unity, absence of strong and widely held idea of the state, weak institutions with no wide 
popular support with threats from secessionist entities and unstable physical base. Taking into 
consideration the features characteristic to weak states, it is possible to say that the state was 
very weak, with high level of political violence, major political conflicts over state ideology, 
lack of national identity, high level of state control over the media and disproportional power 
of the president. 
The center-periphery relations under Gamsakhurdia can be described as 
confrontational. On one side Gamsakhurdia’s national project of integrating its periphery to 
the main core failed due to missed opportunities to include the secessionist entities in 
cooperative frameworks. Thus, Gamsakhurdia’s rule of excluding the regional parties from 
the Georgian election and by abolishing all the legal acts, which recognized the autonomous 
status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a legal subject, led to a greater fragmentation of 
Georgian statehood rather than integration. Consequently, the basic needs for political 
representation and minority rights protection were not met and thus reinforced the de facto 
states determination to resist to any integration towards the centre. 
On the other side the confrontational nature of the center-periphery relations under 
Gamsakhurdia was fueled by the national movements at the periphery, which, in many cases, 
took a form of unilateral declarations of sovereignty and independence. The issue of right to 
self-determination of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their right to unilateral secession from 
Georgia is another important factor of the conflict. Both South Ossetians and Abkhazians 
“consider their right to self-determination as the legal basis for their quest for sovereignty and 
independence of the respective territories” (Report of Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, September 2009: 17). Thus, the de facto states draw their 
claim for statehood on two legal and two historical moral sources of legitimacy. First, these 
authorities explicitly related to the empirical definition of the statehood and sovereignty along 
the lines of the Montevideo Convention. In this context the first Abkhaz president Vladislav 
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Ardzinba declared that “Statehood doesn’t need to be recognized by the international 
community. It is sufficient if it is declared by the people themselves.” (Interview with V. 
Ardzinba in Lynch, 2004: 43). The second source of legitimacy claimed by the de facto states 
is drawn on the right to self-determination as it is stated in Abkhaz Constitution “sovereign 
democratic state based on law, which historically has become established by the rights of 
nations to self-determination” (Constitution of Abkhazia, Art. 1, 1994). 
The two further claims on legitimacy are based on historical and moral grounds. Thus 
the de facto states, especially Abkhazia, claim a thousand years history of statehood and so 
rely on this historical interpretation to justify an exclusive status for the Abkhazian nation and 
its claim to international recognition. As well as claiming the historical legitimacy, the de 
facto states also see themselves as morally entitled to statehood. For instance, according to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia, Sergei Shamba, the Abkhazians “have right to self-
determination because of Georgian acts of genocide and aggression conducted against 
Abkhazia” (in Lynch, 2004: 50). 
In regards to foreign policy conducted by Gamsakhurdia it is important to mention 
that he failed to secure broad international support for Georgia among international actors. 
Thus his short exercise of power was a period of confrontation with Russia caused by the 
Russian direct and indirect intervention in the armed conflicts in South Ossetia. 
Gamsakhurdia, besides having a negative rhetoric about Russia, also challenged Moscow’s 
security interests by refusing to join the CIS. He also failed to establish diplomatic relations 
with Western actors, who were heavily criticizing Gamsakhurdia’s nationalism and repressive
tendencies. They refused to accept the country’s membership in any international security 
organizations. All these together led to Georgia’s international isolation, which lasted until 
Shevardnadze’s return to Tbilisi in March 1992.
E. Shevardnadze 
When Shevardnadze took power, he inherited a highly divided state with very weak basis, 
with mal-functioning state institutions and which had conflicts with secessionist entities. The 
idea of the state during the Shevardnadze era shifted from the ultra-nationalistic tendencies; 
however, there was a lack of clearly defined strategy as to which way the country should 
move on. Shevardnadze’s policies were neither pro-Western nor pro-Russian, which made it 
difficult to further develop strategies. Moreover, in addition to all the problems inherited from 
the previous government, the institutions of the country were weak and unable to provide 
public services to its citizens. Due to dysfunctional public administration and corrupt 
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government, the trust of people in the government was shattered. The government didn’t 
make much effort to strengthen the weak institutions or any steps to build up the security 
structures.   
In relation to the nation, the state didn’t have any constructive policies towards the 
secessionist entities and territorially, it didn’t have control over its whole territory or its 
borders, where Georgia became a nest for the international terrorists. The non-policy towards 
the secessionists, however, had a reverse effect, which in turn had created better relations 
between the people of South Ossetia and Georgians, where the trade between the two people 
was restored. However, no efforts were made on conciliation and confidence building 
between the conflicting parties.  
Thus the state during the Shevardnadze’s rule can be described as a weak or even 
failed state, which didn’t acquire a sense of national unity. The state didn’t have solid 
institutions to provide public goods to its people and were corrupt and criminal. There was no 
clearly defined state ideology, no security basis and the paramilitary groups operated freely in 
the country. The state lacked control over the territory and suffered from poor economy. Due 
to all the failures of the government, the foreign states and the international organizations also
lost motivation to assist Georgia. Thus the situation during the Shevardnadze’s rule didn’t 
improve much compared to the Gamsakhurdia’s rule. 
After the Shevardnadze’s ascent to power the center relations with periphery remained 
tense. Even though the Georgian multinational state became the Shevardnadze regime’s main 
priority, the state consolidation policies conducted by his government failed to establish a 
proper constitutional status for the regions or the principle of self-government. Interestingly, 
the unresolved secessionist conflicts were one of the regime’s main arguments against a clear 
and democratic division of powers between the central government and the regional 
authorities. Thus, the Georgian approach to reunification under Shevardnadze entailed an 
asymmetrical federal model, in which Abkhazia and South Ossetia would have received 
different degrees of autonomy. With this proposal the needs of de facto states were not met, as 
they considered that such federal ties would “perpetuate a relationship of dependency and 
confrontation between center and periphery” (Coppieters and Legvold, 2005: 358). In this 
regard the Abkhazian authorities claimed that they would prefer a confederation or the status 
of a free associated state with Georgia. By getting this status, Abkhazia would have gotten 
recognition as a subject of international law with legal personality, sovereignty and a 
unilateral right to secession. This could have led to a change in center-periphery relations with 
Georgia. But due to the fact that Tbilisi refused to accept this proposal, stating that this 
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position was incompatible with the country’s territorial integration strategy, the center-
periphery relations continued to be confrontational. Therefore Shevardnadze’s national 
project of integrating Georgia’s peripheries to the centre failed. Shevardnadze’s regime also 
failed to develop an inclusive civic concept of Georgian citizenship and the Georgian nation. 
When the Georgian foreign policy is concerned, Shevardnadze’s preferences were 
shifting from a pro-Russian foreign policy to pro-Western. In the beginning of his mandate he 
chose a pro-Russian foreign policy by accessing in the CIS and Russian led Collective 
Security Treaty and by letting the Russian military bases stay on the territory of Georgia. By 
this he hoped that Russia will assist Georgia in securing its territorial integrity and solve the 
conflicts. Under Shevardnadze’s first term the Georgian troubles did not rank high on the 
security agenda in Moscow, Washington and Brussels and thus none of the capitals intervened 
with important tools in solving the secessionist conflicts in Georgia. From the end of 1990’s 
Shevardnadze’s foreign policy interests shifted towards more pro-Western approach. In 2002 
he officially requested NATO to invite Georgia to be member of the alliance. 
M. Saakashvili 
After the Rose Revolution the new government of Georgia sent powerful signals that the 
country will follow democratic path and intends to have good relations with its neighbors, 
primarily with Russia. Moreover, integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures was stated as one 
of the main priorities. The new government stated its commitment to reunification of the 
country and in 2004 achieved some success in finding a peaceful solution to the Ajara 
problem. Furthermore, the government came with a peace plan for the country and initiated 
number of policies in the field of fight against corruption and economic privatization. Thus 
the beginning of Saakashvili’s rule started with a positive political rhetoric, which aimed at 
unifying the country and its people and put the country on the path to democracy, which has 
given hope to the citizens. During this period the government developed a clear organizing 
ideology of the state, which was based on democracy and rule of law and the state 
demonstrated its commitment to reunifying its people, which was widely supported by the 
citizens. The popular support is demonstrated by the convincing victory of Saakashvili in the 
presidential elections in January 2004, where he received an extremely high amount of votes 
counting 96%.   
Moreover, after the Rose Revolution the new government committed itself to 
improving the institutions of the state by anti-corruption activities, its commitment to 
democratic principles, economic and security reforms and structural reforms. In addition, the 
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government approved National Security Concept and National Military Strategy, which 
defined the security threats and showed the orientation of the country towards the Euro-
Atlantic integration. In the result of these policies, the state budget was significantly increased 
and the economic situation in the country was improved. The defense budget was also 
significantly increased in that period, which allowed better salaries for the military staff and 
better military equipment. Moreover, due to the changes in the country, the support of western 
governments to Georgia was increased. 
In relation to the physical base of the state, the new government initiated a number of 
economic activities directed towards improving the infrastructure of the country with the aim 
of strengthening the central control over the territory. Furthermore, the government conducted 
a number of policies aimed at confidence building with the secessionist entities.  
Despite some encouraging results in the latest years in relation to the state institutions 
and defining the organizing ideology of the state, there are still some deficiencies. The nation 
has never been so divided since the independence of Georgia, where the two de facto states do 
not wish to have anything in common with Georgia. Due to the conflicts with the secessionist 
entities and a powerful neighbor - Russia, the miscalculated policies of the government and 
increased anti-Russian sentiment, the state is unable to provide security neither to the overall 
territory of Georgia nor to its peoples. Even though Saakashvili remains the most supported 
leader, he and his government are increasingly challenged by the opposition. The image of 
Saakashvili and his government as progressive and democratic is fading in the eyes of the 
population and the western countries. 
Regardless of the positive rhetoric of the new Georgian government right after the 
Rose Revolution towards the secessionist entities and its commitments to establish a unified 
state, the clearly miscalculated policies of the government reduced the possibility to establish 
good relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The government is losing its credibility due 
to its inability to tackle the conflicts and solve economic issues, and deal with unemployment 
and poverty, and is increasingly criticized for the lack of accountability, increasing corruption 
and more oppressive policies towards the opposition. Constantly changing of staff in the state 
institutions is also a manifestation of the instability of the institutions. Lessening of the power 
of the parliament, the remaining under-representation of the ethnic minorities in it, dominance 
of one political party in the political life of the country are some of the reasons for this distrust 
to the government. Therefore, despite its glorious start in 2003, the government of Georgia is 
failing to keep its promises to the people and remains weak and immature. 
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Under Saakashvili the center-periphery relations have not changed in substance. Even 
though Saakashvili has declared the solution of the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia as 
priority for his presidency, he did not manage to integrate the periphery to the Georgian 
centre. His success in bringing the southern Georgian province of Ajara under Tbilisi’s 
control could not be applied to the two secessionist entities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
Thus recalling the events, after the success of Ajara the new regime confronted the authorities 
of South Ossetia by “combining a policy of force with an extended hand towards the 
population of the South Ossetia” (Coppieters and Legvold, 2005: 363). In this context the 
Georgian government combined a policy of “attacking greed” on the elite level with one of 
“addressing grievance” at the level of population at large (International Crisis Group, 
November 2004). 
The federal solution proposed by the Saakashvili’s government, which was to unite 
Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, stressed on the cooperative features of federal 
arrangements and failed to depict the constitutional mechanisms that guaranteed a separation 
of power. In spite of the center’s initiatives and rhetoric on integrating the peripheries to the 
centre through peace offensive, such as offering pensions and launch of TV and radio 
broadcasts in Ossetian language, there were other policies and actions of the central 
authorities (for instance, the anti-smuggling operation in South Ossetia in 2004), which 
diluted these integration ambitions. Moreover, in many occasions Saakashvili came with 
statements, which undermined the multi-ethnic nature of Georgia and sent dangerous signals, 
where he stated that he will do anything in his power to strengthen the territorial integrity for 
the Georgian nation. 
All in all the relations between Tbilisi and peripheries were confrontational and the 
separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has deepened, and each of the secessionist entities 
have been more thoroughly integrated into Russia and culminated with the recognition of 
these entities by Russia, Nicaragua and Venezuela. The president Saakashvili lost his focus on 
the conflict resolution and instead concentrated too much on Russia. All these policies 
launched by Tbilisi have increased the gap between the peoples of Georgia and the breakaway 
regions and made the secessionists closer to Moscow instead of Tbilisi. The International 
Crisis Group report says that “instead of reaching out to fellow countrymen, Saakashvili and 
his team staged military parades and often used menacing rhetoric” and that “the president 
frequently went out his way to irritate the Russians, and most particularly Vladimir Putin, 
with bellicose talk that turned the dispute with Moscow into one that was bitter and personal” 
(International Crisis Group, August 2008: 7). 
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The center-periphery relations under Saakashvili has to be analyzed also by taking into 
consideration the foreign policy aspirations conducted by Georgian government. Thus, the 
strong pro-Western orientation of Georgian foreign policy and Saakashvili goal for Georgia to 
become a member of NATO and EU worsened the relations with Moscow and consequently 
had an impact on the resolution of the conflicts on the ground. Georgian foreign policy under 
Saakashvili was oriented also towards Ukraine (after “Orange Revolution”) and countries 
ranging from Baltic Sea to the Black and Caspian. It is also important to mention the longer 
term effects of the 2008 war on the Georgian relations with its western centers. Although 
immediately after the war the country received extended assistance from the western states, in 
the longer run, Saakashvili lost his credibility in the eyes of his western allies.
Summing up the above, we draw a following table: 
The basis of the state Z. Gamsakhurdia
1991-1992
E. Shevardnadze
1992-2003
M. Saakashvili
From 2003
Idea of the state Strongly contested/Not 
widely held 
Weak Strongly supported in 
the beginning, but 
getting contested
Nation Highly divided Divided Highly divided
Organizing ideology Well defined. Strongly 
contested, lack of 
popular support
Undefined. Weakly 
held.  
Well defined. More 
widely held 
Institutional 
expression 
Very weak, strongly 
opposed
Very weak, very 
corrupt
Improved, however 
still immature and 
weak
Physical base Divided Divided Divided
Foreign policy Isolation Mixed pro-Russian and 
pro-Western
Pro-Western, anti-
Russian
Sub-state actors Confrontation Indifference Confrontation 
Concluding the domestic level of the analysis we can say that since its independence in 1991 
Georgia has been challenged by the weakness of the state, lack of national unity, unstable 
physical base, where the governments throughout time did not manage to unite and stabilize 
the country. From the very beginning of its existence, the Georgian political elite failed to
come with solutions suitable to all parties, which would have united the country. This is partly 
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due to the lack of time, which didn’t allow the political elites to mature, and partly because of 
the unwillingness or lack of capacity to solve the problems in the country. In relation to 
foreign policy none of the Georgian leaders tried to establish a successful regional 
cooperation with its nearest neighbors in the Caucasus, but instead looked up to Europe, USA 
or Russia. At the same time, instead of using diplomacy, the Saakashvili government has 
concentrated its efforts to antagonize one of its most important neighbors – Russia. Despite of 
some major and positive changes in relation to the domestic political aspirations, the country 
remains a weak state and being a weak state in the region with other weak states, in troubled 
relations with its powerful neighbor makes the Georgian state even more fragile.
4.2 International level
4.2.1 Russia
In order to explain how the changes in the Russian foreign policies impacted the Georgian 
political behavior and the conflict resolution, in this section we are going to look at the 
interests of Russia in Georgia and the evolution of the relationship between Russia and 
Georgia. 
According to realist tradition the states in the international relations act strategically 
according to their interests. The South Caucasus is a region which is strategically important to 
Russia due to a number of reasons. One of the reasons for it is that Russia sees the region as a 
sphere of its influence and therefore it would like to keep the control over the region, which it 
exercised since the Tsarist times. Since the end of the first term of Putin’s presidency, the 
Russian foreign policy has been gradually changing and becoming more new imperialistic 
with more focus on the sphere of influence, and demanding more respect from the western 
actors. One of the main goals has become to regain the superpower status on the world 
politics. This was due to different internal and external factors, among which the shift in 
internal power structures, steady economic growth, as well as disappointment among the 
Russian policy makers that the west is ignoring the importance of Russia. Moreover, the 
eastward expansion of NATO, which is seen by Russia as a threat to their security, 
determined the change in the Russian foreign policy. The Russian politics since the end of the 
Putin’s first period are characterized by a dominant new-imperialistic thinking, which views 
the world politics as a multi-polar with Russia as one of the poles. Thus the Russian politics 
since that time was of re-establishing its superpower status and regaining the former spheres 
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of its influence, which echoes the realist assumption that the greater states strive for more 
power in the international relations. 
National security is one of the main interests of the states in the international anarchy 
and in the Russian case the South Caucasus and particularly Georgia represent one of their 
national security interests, especially in relation to the security challenges in the North 
Caucasus faced by Russia until recently. Russia, not without reasons, suspected that the 
Chechen militias have been crossing border to Georgia in order to gain their strengths to come 
back and continue fighting. Therefore it was important for Russia to have control over the 
border between Russia and Georgia, which was suffering from lack of appropriate control 
until the USA provided support, diminishing the threat for Russia. Moreover, the wish to 
dominate in the region is related to the competition faced from the side of Iran and Turkey. 
Turkey and Iran have been increasingly involving themselves in the region, expressing their 
economic and political interests in the region. Besides that the increasing engagement of USA 
in the region, especially in Georgia has triggered the motivation of Russia to regain its 
dominance in the region. Furthermore, after Russia pulled out its military from the territory of 
Georgia, it did not want to see others coming and occupying their place and thus they have 
protective relation to its former military bases. 
Together with the abovementioned interests Russia has economic stakes in Georgia. 
There is a number of Russian companies operating in Georgia and Russia has a lot of 
investment in the country, therefore it wishes to protect its economic interests in the country. 
Russia was one of the most important countries for Georgia in terms of trade and investment 
(Opdahl, 2008). Moreover, the energy routes are also of interest for Russia. Some state that 
Russia wants to use Georgia to lay its energy pipelines, however, it is also viewed that Russia 
wants to keep its energy dominance in the region and thus limit the Georgian possibilities to 
have pipelines (from other countries), so to make it unattractive for the international 
companies. Moreover, Russia doesn’t want competition to its own gas and oil market. 
Due to all these interests, Russia has been actively involved in the conflicts in Georgia 
from the very beginning. However, this involvement has been of differing nature throughout 
times, and, as we all know, even culminated in an inter-state war in 2008. Therefore, it is 
interesting to see which factors influenced this behavior. 
As we seen in the empirical part of the thesis, Russia has played a multifaceted role in 
the conflicts in Georgia. Since the 1990’s Russia has been playing a role of negotiator, 
mediator between the parties, peacekeeper and protector of Georgian territorial integrity as 
well as of supporter of the secessionist entities’ authorities. The pattern of the Russian 
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involvement in the conflicts depended on different internal and external factors. It widely 
acknowledges that during the war in 1992-1993 Abkhazia won the war over Georgia with 
help from Russia. However, there is also evidence that during that war, Russia was providing 
support to Georgia as well (Guinard, 2002). This is explained by the fact that Moscow’s 
decision on the involvement in Georgia was divided, where the president together with the 
foreign minister and minister of defense were for the territorial integrity of Georgia, while the 
some parts of the military46, regional leaders in the North Caucasus were supporting the 
Abkhazia to be close to Moscow. This can be explained by the fact that after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the Russian identity and its role in the international arena were in a free fall. 
During this time Russia lacked clearly defined policy objectives, the institutions were poorly 
managed, the decisions were uncoordinated and the domestic situation could be characterized 
as chaotic. Moreover, provision of support to both Abkhazia and Georgia can be explained by 
the wish of Russia to keep its influence in both Abkhazia and Georgia, instead of taking sides 
of one or another, as other actors, such as USA, OSCE, NATO, Turkey, the UN, were getting 
closer to the former sphere of Russian influence. It is also therefore, Russia tried to play the 
major roles in settling the Georgian conflicts. 
Acting strategically in the interest of the state, Russia has been supportive for the 
Georgian territorial integrity in the beginning of the 1990’s due to fear for problems with its 
own secessionist, mainly Chechnya. However, with the second Chechen war in 1999, the 
Russians began seeing Georgia as being too supportive to Chechen cause and criticized
Georgian unwillingness to cooperate on cutting external support to Chechnya. Together with 
the critique of Tbilisi’s unwillingness to cooperate with Russia on the Chechen issue, the 
Moscow’s support for the secessionists increased. The increasing Russian support to the 
secessionist entities led to a Georgian doubt in the ability of Russia to be an impartial peace 
broker. The Russian support to the secessionists had political, economic and security 
character, which made the secessionists deeply dependent on Russian support. 
Furthermore, the second Chechen war led to a shift in the Russian security policy. 
This war was not considered by Putin to be a secessionist war, but as a war against Islamic 
fundamentalism. This was in line with the USA’s anti-terrorism policies and has given Russia 
a legitimate basis to use various instruments to fight the terrorism, including a right to 
preemptive strikes across Georgian borders against terrorists for purposes of self-defense.
                                               
46 The military under the presidency of Yeltsin enjoyed a rather high degree of autonomy. However, this was 
changed under Putin. 
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Moreover, the Rose Revolution of 2003 had also impacted on the Russian policy 
towards Georgia. Russia saw this color revolution as being orchestrated by the outside 
powers, who tried to grasp the former Russian sphere of influence. The Georgian commitment 
to democracy was seen by Russia not as a genuine commitment to the democratic principles 
but as increasingly anti-Russian sentiment. Thus this fear for anti-Russian sentiments, as well 
as the fear of losing its former sphere of influence to the other powers led to changes in the 
policies of Russia towards Georgia. 
It can also be argued that Russia tried to extend its influence on the former Soviet 
republics by the passportisation policy. In 2004 the old Soviet passports became invalid, 
resulting in inability of the inhabitants in the two secessionist regions to travel to Russia or 
anywhere. At the same time, in the 1990’s Georgia shot their own foot by refusing to provide 
the UN-passports to them, leading to a situation mentioned above – people getting Russian 
citizenship. Meanwhile, in 2002 Russia adopted a law that all the citizens of the former Soviet 
Union can acquire Russian citizenship if they want to. This is why the South Ossetian and 
Abkhazian people got Russian passports since 2004. It is worth noticing that in South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia 80-90 % of the population have Russian citizenship, acquired in the period of 
2000-2008 (Opdahl, 2008:13; Popescu, 2006: 5). Thus the protection of its citizens in Georgia 
was a reason that Russia used in 2008 war as excuse. 
On the other hand, another external event which triggered the Moscow reaction 
towards the secessionist entities was the declaration of Kosovo’s independence on 17 
February 2008 followed by its recognition by 45 states. Moscow, which was opposing the 
Kosovo independence, stated that this declaration of independence is a fatal mistake of the 
international community which will bring unexpected consequences. After the declaration of 
Kosovo independence Russia increased its support to South Ossetia and Abkhazia and raised
the number of its peacekeepers in Abkhazia. 
The intention of Georgia and Ukraine to acquire NATO membership played a major 
role in determining the Russian policy towards Georgia. Russia has been a major opponent to 
the eastward expansion of NATO, and in a number of occasions stated that this is a threat to 
the national security of Russia. It is argued that Russia was determined to do all in its power
to protect its interests, and the conflict in Georgia came as an opportunity to demonstrate that 
Russia will use all its efforts to protect its fundamental interests, to show NATO that Georgia 
is not worthy of becoming a member of the club and to threaten the NATO with the 
consequences of expanding closer to the border of the Russian Federation.
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4.2.2 United States
In order to examine the impact of the US’s foreign policy on Georgia and conflict resolution, 
we look at the interests of USA in Georgia, changes in the US foreign policy, especially after 
the events of 9/11 and the relations between USA and Georgia.  
From the beginning of the 1990’s USA has been providing various supports to the 
countries of the region, especially to Georgia. This is due to the strategic position of Georgia, 
which has an important position for the development of the region. Moreover, for USA it’s 
important to have a strategic alliance next to Russia, Iran, Turkey and the region of Middle 
East. Since 1992 Georgia was benefiting from the USA aid and was one of the biggest 
beneficiaries of the US assistance. It is a fact that after the collapse of the USSR, there was a 
shift in the USA aid policies, and the aid provided before to the African and Asian countries 
was reallocated to the countries of the former Soviet Union. This is explained by the strategic 
interest of USA to expand its sphere of influence further, to the former sphere of influence of 
Soviet Union. However, it is often argued that the increased interest of USA in the former 
Soviet republics is related to the US’s wish to demonstrate its power in relation to Russia. 
Despite its wide support to Georgia during the 1990’s, USA didn’t have a clearly defined 
strategy towards the country and its contribution to the resolution of the secessionist conflicts 
was limited to more rhetorical statements.
The USA’s involvement in the country was deepened after the events of 9/11. The US 
Security Strategy launched in September 2002 defined the countries with possible terrorist 
networks, regional conflicts, weak states or non-states, countries with weapons of mass 
destruction as threats to the security (US Security Strategy, White House, 2002). In this 
context, Georgia, as a weak state, with possible terrorist networks and regional conflicts, 
attracted the interest of USA. Besides that, the White House sees its policies in the region as a 
part of its anti-terrorism and larger Middle East policies. The support of USA to Georgia 
increased even more with the Rose Revolution, where it is widely believed that USA was one 
of the main supporters or even conductor of this color revolution. 
Moreover, the USA’s interest in Georgia is related to the development and 
transportation of the Caspian Sea hydrocarbon resources to the world market. Therefore USA 
has been supporting the building of natural resources transport routes running through 
Georgia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, for instance, couldn’t have been a reality without 
the US assistance. 
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The US support provided to the country has been not only political and economic but 
also in relation to strengthening the Georgian security sector. Since 2002 USA has been 
implementing a number of programs aimed at strengthening of the Georgian military, mainly 
to prepare them to conduct missions abroad. Moreover, the Russian-Georgian border was 
stabilized and some of the Georgian military bases were renewed with the assistance from the 
USA. The active involvement of USA in Georgia has increased Russian skepticism and 
awakened suspicion in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In relation to the conflict resolution 
USA, on a number of occasions, declared its support towards Georgian territorial integrity and 
called for a peaceful conflict resolution. USA has supported Georgian view that status quo in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia cannot be maintained. 
Since the victory of Barack Obama in the presidential elections, Georgian leadership 
feared that the new administration will not provide as much support to the country as the 
previous US administration did. The previous US administration’s support to Georgia was in 
line with Bush’s ambitions on the “war on terrorism”, while Obama’s administration has 
stipulated new foreign policy priorities, where establishing good relations with Russia became 
one of the main priority areas for the new US administration. Thus in July 2009, when 
meeting with the Russian president D. Medvedev, the US president Barack Obama stated, 
“President Medvedev and I are committed to leaving behind the suspicion and the rivalry of 
the past, so that we can advance the interests that we hold in common…The President and I 
agreed that the relationship between Russia and the United States has suffered from a sense of 
drift…We resolved to reset US-Russian relations so that we can cooperate more effectively in 
areas of common interest.”47 However, despite the fears of Georgia that the changes in the 
foreign policy priorities of the new administration will affect the US relations with Georgia, 
the US policies towards the country remained the same, with the new president expressing his 
support to the territorial integrity of Georgia.  
4.2.3 European Union
By examining the EU’s interests in the South Caucasus and the extent to which the changes in 
European security policy and EU enlargement affected the relationship with Georgia, we 
analyze how the EU’s change in foreign policy had an impact on Georgian domestic political 
realm and the conflict resolution. 
                                               
47 “‘Frank’ Discussions on Georgia in Obama-Medvedev Talks”, 06.07.2009 -
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21204 - Retrieved on 25.10.2009 
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The EU’s involvement in the resolution of the Georgian conflicts needs to be 
addressed within a broader picture of the EU interests in the region. In this context it is of 
importance to point out that the EU has a direct interest in the stability of Georgia due to the 
transit of energy resources from the Caspian See. This was even more pronounced after the 
opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, where Georgia became a significant transit
country for Caspian oil to the European markets. Furthermore, the EU’s interests in Georgia
are related to security issues. Georgia is a direct neighbor to the EU by sea and, in case 
Turkey joins EU, it will be a direct neighbor by land. Therefore, it is in the interest of the EU 
to have secure and stable states at its borders. It is important for the EU that Georgia is not 
becoming a challenge in terms of international organized crime and illegal migration. 
Moreover, after 9/11 the EU following USA, has adopted a new security strategy in 2003, 
which echoed the USA’s security strategy by pointing out the security threats, such as weak 
states, states which can accommodate international terrorists. In this sense, Georgia - a weak 
state with possible terrorist networks functioning on its borders - situated in the neighborhood
of EU became of a direct security interest to the EU. 
In the context of inclusion of Georgia in the European Neighborhood Policy, we argue 
that this process was not only caused by changes of government and domestic policies in 
Georgia, but also due to the new geopolitical situation created by the EU’s enlargement in 
May 2004, which made Georgia closer to the EU. Thus the inclusion of the new member 
states that have been part of the Warsaw Pact increased European interest in the South 
Caucasus. This was first stated in the EU Security Strategy: “We should now take a stronger 
and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course 
also be a neighboring region” (European Security Strategy, 2003: 9). Immediately after 
Saakashvili’s election, the Council stated that “the EU now looks forward to helping Georgia 
and the other countries of the South Caucasus come closer to the European family” and the 
EU is aiming to “assist the new government in its efforts to bring local standards with regard 
to rule of law closer to international and EU standards” as well as to “embed stability in the 
region” (Council Joint Action 2004/ 523/CFSP, 2004).
The EU’s interests in the South Caucasus increased considerably after the Rose 
Revolution, which facilitated the inclusion of Georgia in the ENP, in spite of the fact that 
initially the EU policy makers proposed in 2003 that the countries of the South Caucasus 
could be integrated in the European Neighborhood Policy at a later stage. Therefore the 
abovementioned situation clearly demonstrates that the inclusion of Georgia in the ENP was 
determined by Georgian domestic initiatives and was not an EU proposal.  
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We also need to mention that the limited impact of the EU on the conflict resolution in 
Georgia has to be explained through the internal structure and decision-making procedure of 
the EU. In a Union with 27 members it is difficult to reach a consensus in matters of conflict 
resolution outside its borders, especially when the decisions are taken by the unanimity in the 
Council. Also the lack of political consensus is partially caused by the hesitancy of some 
member states (France, Greece, Italy) to take steps which could antagonize Russia. However, 
one can not disregard the role of the EU in the resolution of the Russo-Georgian conflict in 
August 2008, when the EU managed to negotiate with Medvedev and Saakashvili the 
ceasefire agreement. This successful political action was in contrast to the failure of the 
international community (including UN) to act effectively in order to control and limit the 
outbreak of the armed conflict. Since then, with the exception of deployment of the EU 
ceasefire monitoring mission, no progress has been made in the establishment of peace and 
stability in the region.
Concluding on the role of the Russian, USA and EU foreign policies on the Georgian 
domestic realm and the conflict resolution we can state that the interests and the changes of 
the foreign policies of these actors had an impact on the Georgian domestic political realm 
and the conflict resolution process. The geopolitical dynamics surrounding Georgia played an 
important role on Georgia, as it became an object of competing interests of Russia and USA, 
where both of the powers have a wish to extend their sphere of influence. This, in 
combination with extended reliance of the conflict parties on the external actors in solving the 
conflict, has hindered the conflict settlement in Georgia. The increased US and EU assistance 
to Georgia and declarations of their support to the territorial integrity of Georgia increased 
suspicions of Abkhazia and South Ossetian sides, which pushed them even closer to Russia. 
On the other hand, the Russian policies towards Georgia, its economic blockades against the 
country, passportisation policy and increased support to the secessionist entities raised distrust 
of Georgia towards Russia, to a point that a Georgian official called the Russian policies as 
“creeping annexation” of the two de facto states. Meanwhile, the increased USA’s support to 
the country after the events of 9/11, including its support to the Georgian ambition of 
becoming a NATO member raised Kremlin’s scepticism. The deteriorating relationship 
between Russia and Georgia and the increased US support to Georgia and the EU’s growing
role in the region and its eastern enlargement has given more incentives for Georgia to seek 
more pro-Euro-Atlantic direction in their foreign policy.
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4.3 Conflict analysis
In this section we look at the conflict in Georgia from the conflict analysis perspective by 
examining the nature and dynamics of the conflict, parties to the conflict and involvement of 
the external actors. 
From the conflict analysis perspective the Georgian-Abkhazian/South Ossetian 
conflict evolved from an intra-state to an inter-state conflict. In the 1990’s the conflict was an 
intra-state conflict, which involved domestic actors – Georgia and sub-state actors. The 
secessionist conflicts of the 1990’s are an expression of dissatisfaction with Soviet division of 
territorial units, where the two secessionist entities were integrated into the Georgian Socialist 
Republic. Whereas during the Soviet period, these conflicts were suppressed by the central 
authorities in Moscow, with the fall of the Union a chaotic situation emerged in the former 
Soviet republics, which gave free hand in the escalation of conflicts. Thus with the breakdown 
of the Soviet Union, the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and Autonomous Oblast of South 
Ossetia felt a need to claim their independence. Therefore the existing autonomous structures 
and institutions in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia enabled these two entities to seek 
independence. At the same time, it is important to stress that after the collapse of the USSR, 
the international community recognized only the former Soviet Republics and not the smaller 
units, such as autonomous republics and oblast. 
It is important to make a distinction between the Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
conflicts. In the Abkhazian case, the Abkhaz leaders feared that their cultural and ethnic 
heritage was on the verge of disappearance due to the raise of the Georgian nationalism in the 
1980-1990’s and assimilation policies of the first Georgian president. Thus, the nationalistic 
sentiments of the Georgian leaders combined with minorities’ fear for ethnic cleansing and 
wish for self-determination framed the conflicting attitudes, which led to confrontational 
behavior. In line with Galtung’s approach, these conflicting attitudes and behaviors resulted in 
a major incompatibility between Georgia and Abkhazia over the territory – Georgian claim 
for territorial integrity on one side and the secessionist’s claim for the self-determination on 
the other. Therefore, the nature of the Abkhazian secessionist conflict in the 1990’s can be 
described as intra-state conflict with an ethnic character. The South Ossetian conflict, on the 
other hand, can be characterized as a conflict over the access to political decision-making, 
since the conflict started with a dispute over status and not with wish for self-determination. 
The incompatibility in this case is related to the Georgian constitutional amendment 
downgrading the Autonomous Region status of South Ossetia and exclusion of regional 
parties from participating in the elections. 
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When examining the ceasefire agreements established in the 1990’s between the 
conflict parties through rational calculation approach, we argue that the parties and 
international mediators failed to use the momentum to solve the conflict. Instead, the ceasefire 
slowed down the move towards the resolution and prolonged the conflict. During the period 
of 1992-2006, the negotiation process took place with extended mediation from the UN and 
Russia. However, as empirical evidence shows, little progress has been achieved. This is due 
to the fact that instead of concentrating on mutual confidence-building activities, Georgia, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been heavily relying on the external actors. As Abkhazia
and South Ossetia were getting more detached from Georgia, their relations with Russia were 
getting tighter. Moreover, the Russian support to both Georgian and Abkhazian sides in the 
beginning of the 1990’s has diminished the Russian role as an impartial and reliable mediator 
in the eyes of Georgians and Abkhazians. In addition, the resolution of the Georgian-
Abkhazian/South Ossetian conflicts was hindered by the fact that the Russian interests had to 
be fulfilled at the same time. In relation to the conflict resolution the role of the US was 
limited to statements calling for peaceful resolution of the conflict, and condemnations of 
Russia for its treatment of Georgia. Although the US policies towards Georgia were gradually 
growing over time, the policies are still very inconsistent. Moreover, during the second half of 
the 1990’s the US conducted its political and economic policies often to the disadvantage of 
other states in the region, Iran and Russia. Up to 2008 the EU’s role in the conflict settlement 
in Georgia was limited; the EU has never participated in the conflict resolution as formal 
player, but instead limited its role to the provision of economic aid. One of the weaknesses of 
the peace process can be explained by the fact that some of the peace-making instruments did 
not result from the compromise between domestic parties to the conflict, especially in the case 
of the Boden document. The international actors have failed to launch sufficient mechanisms, 
in which the conflict parties should have confidence. The conflict settlement mechanisms 
provided by the international community in the 1990’s were outdated and weren’t adjusted to 
the new political realities on the ground. The conflict settling was largely led by Russia and 
lacked more involvement from other international actors. 
The war of 2008 has changed the dynamics of the Georgian conflict and its 
dimensions. The character of the conflict was transformed from an intra-state to an inter-state 
war. There were significant changes in the role of the parties to the conflict, where Russia’s 
role as mediator was transformed into a direct party to the conflict. When examining how the 
conflict escalated in 2008 and became an inter-state affair, it is important to look at logic 
behind the behavior of the actors involved. The Georgian aggression against South Ossetia in 
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August 2008 can be explained by the rational calculation approach. According to this 
perspective, the initiator of war makes some calculations, according to which the benefits of 
the war are higher than the losses. Thus the Georgian actions can be explained on the 
background of Bucharest summit decisions in 2008, where the accession of Georgia and 
Ukraine to NATO was denied. Georgia regards the membership in NATO as a main source of 
security of the country from Russian threats. The results of Bucharest summit were a major 
source of dissatisfaction of Saakashvili, who warned the international community that this 
delay will lead to major problems. Therefore, it can be argued that Saakashvili, in order to get 
western attention, especially after the NATO membership delay and in order to demonstrate 
how vital it is for Georgia to be protected from Russia, intentionally provoked the war in 
August. Although Saakashvili succeeded in getting attention from the western countries, he 
did not predict the consequences of this war, the price of which was much higher than the 
gain. 
Regarding Russia’s involvement in the 2008 war, although the Russian official 
explanation of its disproportional response to the Georgian aggression against South Ossetia 
was protection of its peacekeepers on the territory of the de facto state and its citizens, there 
are other factors which need to be mentioned. One of the factors is Russia’s self-perception of 
its geopolitical role in its “near abroad”. Russia sees the former Soviet republics as their 
sphere of influence and thus considers legitimate its actions and interests towards these 
territories. On the other hand, the NATO expansion to the Russian backyard is considered by 
Russia as diminishing their influence in the former Soviet space and consequently as a threat 
to its national security. 
In relation to the change of the role of the actors in the conflict, we have seen that the 
role of Russia has transformed from being a mediator in the peace process to becoming a 
direct part of the conflict. Alongside with this transformation, the EU has changed its position 
in the conflict from being a mere observer to a more active stance by mediating the ceasefire 
agreement in 2008. 
Using the conflict analysis approach, we have shown that the conflict in Georgia has a 
complex and dynamic character, where the nature of the conflict and the role of the actors 
were changing. From the above analysis we conclude that the 2008 war has added a more 
pronounced geopolitical dimension to the ethnic and political nature of the conflicts of the 
1990s.    
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION
The main aim of the thesis was to find out to what extent the Georgian efforts towards the 
resolution of Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts are affected by the Russian, EU and 
US policies and actions. In our attempt to answer our research question we chose to examine 
the Georgian domestic political realm, the role and interests of the international actors in 
Georgia and the dynamics of the conflict. In order to accomplish our research we have applied 
both qualitative and quantitative methods and based our empirical analysis on a case-study on 
the conflict resolution in Georgia. 
For the purpose of answering our research question, we conducted a three-level 
analysis. The first level concerned the Georgian domestic political realm and the way it 
affected the dynamics of the conflicts and their resolution. The dependent variable at the 
domestic level - changes between center and the peripiheries have been induced by the 
transformations at the centre rather than at the periphery - was examined through the 
following independent variables - ethno-federalism, state-building and sub-state actors, 
Georgia’s national project and Georgia’s foreign policy. When analyzing the first independent 
variable, ethno-federalism, we demonstrated that Soviet past has played a major role in 
Georgian nation-building and establishment of de facto entities. By looking at the second 
independent variable – the state-building – we established that the Georgian state-building 
process is still at a relatively early stage and remains immature. By analyzing the state-
building processes during the period of Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze and Saakashvili’s 
presidency, we found out that the authoritarianism and nationalism of Gamsakhurdia 
combined with vague rule of Shevardnadze with ambiguous state-building strategies left 
Georgia as a failed state. In addition the state-building process has been weakened by the 
claim for independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which added a new layer of 
challenges to an already weak state. Although the Rose Revolution in 2003 changed the pace 
of the country towards democracy, the new government suffers from the “revolutionary 
syndrome”, which negatively affects the state-building process. 
Concerning the Georgian national project, during the Gamsakhurdia’s presidency the 
minorities in the country suffered from exclusion and were marginalized, due to the extreme 
nationalistic policies of the president. These nationalistic tendencies were changed during the 
rule of Shevardnadze and his non-policy towards the secessionist entities even had some 
positive results, especially in relation to South Ossetia, where a process of conciliation 
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between the Georgians and Ossetians began. However, the state has failed in establishing a 
proper constitutional status of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia and in developing an 
inclusive civic concept of Georgian citizenship. At his inauguration Saakashvili has 
committed himself to the unification of the country and the new government started a range of 
policies towards this aim. Nevertheless, despite these efforts, the policies have failed and have 
had a negative impact on integration of the secessionists to the centre. This was also due to 
the failure of Saakashvili to establish constitutional mechanisms which guaranteed the 
separation of power between Georgia and the secessionist entities, as he stressed on 
cooperative feature of federal arrangement.  
In relation to the foreign policy independent variable, we found out that the Georgian 
foreign policy orientations were determined mostly by presidents, who led a mutually 
inconsistent foreign policy. This resulted in an unstable course of foreign policy for Georgia. 
Gamsakhurdia’s foreign policies didn’t prioritize neither relations with Russia nor with 
western countries, thus under his rule Georgia was internationally isolated. In contrast to 
Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze pursued a dual-oriented foreign policy. Finding a solution for 
Abkhazia largely determined his foreign policy. Therefore at the beginning of his term he 
supported Russian actions in Chechnya, allowed Russian military bases to remain in Georgia 
and became a member of CIS in a hope that Russia would provide a support in solving the 
Abkhazian issue, while few years later he shifted his preferences to the West, when he 
supported NATO’s war in Kosovo. This change is explained by his hope that the US would
conduct a military action in Abkhazia. Concerning Saakashvili’s foreign policy, he defined a 
clearly western-oriented foreign policy. The change of the foreign policy orientation of the 
country was welcomed by the western states; however, it affected Georgia’s relations with 
Russia. Alongside this development, the growing anti-Russian rhetoric of the Georgian 
leadership provoked Moscow, which led to a further deterioration of the relations between the 
two countries. These increasingly confrontational relations between Moscow and Tbilisi had a 
direct impact on the conflict and its resolution. 
The second level of our research focused on how the changes in Russian, EU and 
USA’s foreign policies impacted the Georgian political behavior and the conflict resolution. 
In this level we addressed our dependent variable through the following independent 
variables: international actors’ change in foreign policy and geopolitics. Examining the 
foreign policies of these actors and the geopolitical dynamics, we have shown that the foreign 
policies of Russia, the EU and USA have impacted on the Georgian political behavior. The 
internal political dynamics in Kremlin had a great impact on its policies towards Georgia. 
94
With the presidency of Putin, the Russian foreign policy acquired a more well-defined 
character and focused on re-establishing Russia as a great power on the international arena. 
Together with these dynamics, the NATO’s eastward expansion and increased involvement of 
USA in the region of South Caucasus changed the Russian policy in the “near abroad”. 
Moreover, the re-defining of the Chechen war to a war against Islamic fundamentalism led to 
a shift of the Russian security policy in the Caucasus, and in its policies towards Georgia as 
well. When the USA’s foreign policies are concerned, one of the most important events which 
directly affected its policies towards Georgia is 9/11. Since this terrorist attack Georgia was 
included in the USA’s wider Middle East policies, which were defined in light of the US 
Security Strategy. The main change in the EU’s foreign policy which affected its policy 
towards Georgia was the Eastern enlargement and inclusion of the South Caucasus in the 
European Security Strategy and European Neighborhood Policy. This has given Georgia more 
incentives to seek pro-western orientation. The changes in the foreign policies of the external 
actors had an effect on the policy makers in Tbilisi, who had to change the parameters of their 
national security agenda. We also argue that that these changes played a role in defining the 
Georgian foreign policy orientation. Despite the efforts of the external actors in the conflict 
settlement process in Georgia, they failed to solve the conflict. 
The third level of the thesis was aimed at examining the dynamics of the conflict in 
Georgia. Using the conflict analysis approach we established that initially the conflict in 
Georgia which had ethnic and political nature and was an intra-state conflict transformed to 
an inter-state conflict. The transformation was caused by a chain of interlinked developments, 
such as the NATO extension, changes in the Georgian domestic foreign policy preferences, 
Russia’s internal political dynamics and changes in its foreign policy as well as the tightening 
of the relationship between Russia and the two de facto states. In relation to the conflict 
settlement, all the actors involved in the conflict as well as in the conflict resolution processes 
missed the opportunity to use the ceasefire for developing conciliation between the parties to 
the conflict. At the same time the parties to the conflict have failed to establish mutual 
confidence-building mechanisms and instead relied on the external salvation. Moreover, the 
geopolitical dynamics had a say in solving the conflict – the interests of the external actors 
have outweighed the genuine aspiration to settle the conflict. Some of the peace-making 
instruments have failed to reflect on the needs of the conflict parties. The events of August 
2008 have added a new element to the ethnic and political nature of the conflict, giving it a 
more pronounced geopolitical dimension.      
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One of our main goals in this study was to look at the interaction between the actors 
and thus link the domestic and international levels through center-periphery model. By 
applying the centre-periphery model at the domestic level our aim was to focus on the 
relationship between Georgia as a center and Abkhazia and South Ossetia as its periphery. As 
our independent variable shows the Georgian center was challenged by the weakness of the 
state, Soviet legacy and the de facto entities’ claim for independence. The center-periphery 
relations between Georgia and Abkhazia/South Ossetia since its independence are 
characterized as confrontational. The center’s nation-building efforts to integrate the 
periphery to the centre were unsuccessful. The differing policies of the three Georgian leaders 
had a profound effect on the relationship between Tbilisi and Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. Thus 
the transformations at the centre affected the relationship between the centre and periphery. In 
this context we can exemplify that the dramatic changes in the center-periphery relations in 
the 1990’s, when Gamsakhurdia’s regime failed to restructure the Georgian state, had 
implications for Tbilisi’s control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The center-periphery 
relations during the period of Shevardnadze’s presidency are characterized by indifference. 
The center-periphery relations didn’t change in substance at the beginning of Saakashvili’s 
presidency; however, the relations were deteriorated after the Tbilisi’s anti-smuggling action 
in South Ossetia, which led to a direct military confrontation. Another implication of this 
operation was that Georgia with its anti-smuggling campaign pushed South Ossetia towards 
Moscow, leading to a shift of centers (from Georgia to Moscow), although initially the aim of 
this operation was to integrate South Ossetia to the Georgian center. Moreover, Saakashvili’s 
reluctance to address the multi-national nature of the country has negatively affected its 
relations with its peripheries. 
Concerning the center-periphery relations at the international level – we looked at 
Georgia as a periphery to Moscow, the EU and USA. In relation to Georgia as periphery to 
Moscow, the EU and USA, one can say that this relationship was changing over time. At the 
beginning of Georgian independence, the new president of Georgia carried anti-Russian 
sentiments and the country was internationally isolated, thus the centre-periphery relations 
here are characterized by indifference. During Shevardnadze’s rule, the Georgian periphery 
started moving from one centre (Moscow) to another (USA), which is demonstrated by the 
shifting preferences of Shevardnadze – once pro-Russian leader changed his sides to more 
pro-western orientation. In this period, Georgia as periphery to Moscow, USA and the EU 
didn’t have an impact on the center. The Russian center however had an impact on the 
Georgia as periphery, as it managed to include Georgia in the CIS, keep its military bases in 
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the country and by intensifying its relations with the two secessionist entities. With the ascent 
of Saakashvili to presidency, Georgia has clearly defined its pro-western approach, which has 
established USA and EU as centers for Georgia. The movement towards USA, NATO and EU 
had an impact on the relations of Georgia with Russia. The Georgian leadership was guided 
by a misperception that orienting their foreign policy towards western centers will be enough 
to change the balance of power with Moscow and that it will lead to resolution of the 
conflicts. 
As the changes in the foreign policies of USA and EU had an impact on the Georgian 
domestic realm, we conclude that the US and EU centers had affected its relations with 
Georgia and its political behavior as their periphery. On the other hand, Georgia as a 
periphery had an impact on the relations with its USA and EU centers, as the Rose Revolution 
and the Georgian commitment to democracy have increased the incentives of the western 
actors to involve in the country, one example of which is the inclusion of Georgia in the 
European Neighborhood Policy. 
Figure 5 shows the center-periphery relations before 2003, where Georgia as periphery 
was closer to the Russian center, rather than to the western centers. The relations between the 
western centers and Georgia as periphery are characterized by indifference. 
Georgia
            Russia
        EU
        USA
Figure 5. The center-periphery 
relations before 2003
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Compared to the previous illustration, Figure 6 shows the change in the center-periphery 
relations since 2003. Here we see that Georgia as periphery has moved towards the western 
centers and away from the Russian center. At the same time the Georgian periphery 
(Abkhazia and South Ossetia) has moved to the opposite direction, towards the Russian center
and away from Georgia as a center.
In conclusion we argue that the center-periphery relations are dynamic relations and 
the peripheries on both the domestic and international levels move from one center to another. 
In our case these movements have happened in two separate but parallel paths. On the 
international level, Tbilisi has moved from Russia as a center to USA and EU, while on the 
domestic level Sukhumi and Tskhinvali were fighting to free themselves from Tbilisi as a 
center and moving towards the Russian center.        
Georgia
     Russia
        USA
         EU 
Figure 6. Center-periphery 
relations after 2003
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CHAPTER VI. PERSPECTIVES
In this section we look at the possible solutions to the conflict in Georgia, including a 
discussion on whether the successful resolution of the Ajara conflict can be applied elsewhere 
in the country. Moreover, the international relations dilemmas between the external actors 
around the Georgian conflict are considered.
In spite of the fact that Ajara’s re-integration to the Georgian centre was a big success 
and it was expected that this would have a spill-over effect in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we 
argue that this success is not applicable. It is important to note that Ajara, as a region, is 
different from South Ossetia and Abkhazia in significant ways. First of all, Ajara’s autonomy 
was much weaker than in the other two entities and the autonomy was initially granted due to 
the population’s Muslim religion. Also compared to Abkhazia and South Ossetia the 
population in Ajara has never had such a strong sense of identity and has never claimed 
publicly for national self-determination. Tbilisi managed to gained control over Ajara but the 
mechanisms and strategies applied could not be applied to the two other entities and the 
events of 2008 diminished this possibility even further. The autonomy, which was given to 
Ajara, was very limited and more of a symbolic nature48. This type of autonomy was not 
attractive to South Ossetia and Abkhazia as they feared that the Georgian government would 
proceed in the same way with their autonomy. The Georgian government has failed to make it 
clear that any type of autonomy offered to South Ossetia and Abkhazia would differ from the 
very weak autonomy offered to Ajara. Thus, the Ajara’s short term success was in reality a 
missed opportunity for decentralization of the state’s internal structures and to reintegrate 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
For the time being the solutions for the Georgian and South Ossetian /Abkhazian 
conflict are very limited. The peaceful reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into the 
Georgian federal framework as recommended by the UN and OSCE has failed and the events 
of 2008 diminished any hopes for this type of solutions. Furthermore, the political 
environment for the resolution of the conflict has become in fact even more difficult after the 
recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia, Nicaragua and 
Venezuela. Therefore, in our opinion, in the new geopolitical context there is only one 
solution left – international recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. 
The international community is, however, reticent towards repeating the Kosovo precedent 
                                               
48 The president of Georgia got more power in relation to Ajara and the citizens in Ajara are not even able to 
elect their governor, as he/she is directly appointed by the Georgian president. 
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elsewhere in the world. It is also important to stress that there is a difference between Kosovo 
and the de facto states in Georgia. The degree of intensity of the violence was higher in 
Kosovo than in the two other entities, where no genocide had taken place in South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. Therefore the extent of international support for recognition is much higher in 
the case of Kosovo, making its international recognition a feasible option for the long-term. 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia are at the time being recognized only by three countries. 
However, it is important to mention that even partial recognition can give them greater 
protection against any integration projects conducted by Georgia. Furthermore the Abkhazian 
and South Ossetian claim for independence can be supported by more than 15 years of their 
de facto states independence, during which Abkhazia and South Ossetia managed to frame 
state institutions, which could provide basic public services to their population. The 
international recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would give them a high degree of 
protection by international law and would create equal relations between them and Georgia 
through their inclusion in international security organizations.    
Setting the events of 2008 into perspective, one can ask whether with its direct involvement in 
the conflict in August 2008 Russia has positioned itself in a dilemma between the two de 
facto entities on one side and Georgia with its western allies on the other. However, as Russia 
already recognized the two de facto states’ independence and began using economic and 
diplomatic means to persuade other members of the international community to join their 
club, it seems that decisions are already made and there is no turning back for Russia. Most 
recently Russia proved itself to be more assertive in relation to its role in the world and the 
former Soviet states, as in November 9, 2009, the president Medvedev approved the law on 
amendment to the Federal law on Defence allowing use of force abroad49, according to which, 
the president will be able to send Russian troops to foreign countries in order to among others 
protect its citizens and combat pirates. However, another dilemma that the events of 2008 
have created is in relation to USA’s position. The war of 2008 raised a predicament for the 
US on whether to continue its support to Georgia and to antagonize Russia even further or to 
find another solution that fits both. Before the 2008 war, the Bush administration was a keen 
supporter of Georgia and its ambitions to join NATO. In many occasions USA criticised 
Russian willingness to re-impose its influence in the region. However, with the new president 
                                               
49 News on the Official site of the President of the Russian Federation: http://news.kremlin.ru/ - Retrieved on 
09.11.2009; “Medvedev signs bill on military force abroad”, 09.11.2009, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/389116.html - Retrieved on 09.11.2009
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in the White House and the new developments on the ground, how will the US make its 
choices? The previous administration took a more pro-Georgian stand and largely ignored the 
interests of Russia, even after Putin’s direct statement to Bush about his dissatisfaction with 
NATO’s eastward expansion. The current administration however, seem to pursue a policy of 
finding a fine balance in its foreign policy, with Obama stating his commitment to the 
establishment of friendly relations with Russia and supporting the territorial integrity and 
NATO membership ambitions of Georgia. Commenting on the European report of September 
on the Conflict in Georgia (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia Report, September 2009) the US stated that all the sides made miscalculations; 
however, now it is important to focus on the future. From this statement and the previous 
steps of the new administration, it can be concluded that obviously the new administration 
started taking a more cautious approach to both Georgia and Russia and in relation to the 
conflict between the two countries.
  
101
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Asbrez News: “Turkey Seeks Mediating Role in Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict”, 08.09.2009, 
http://www.asbarez.com/2009/09/08/turkey-seeks-mediating-role-in-georgian-abkhaz-
conflict/
Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, signed in Moscow, 14 May 1994. From 
http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/geo1.pdf - Retrieved in June 2009
Antonenko Oksana: “Frozen uncertainty: Russia and the Conflict over Abkhazia” in 
Coppieters Bruno & Legvold Robert, eds: Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose 
Revolution, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, 2005
Arts J. Robert & Jervis Robert (eds.): International politics. Enduring concepts and 
contemporary issues. 8th edition, Pearson Longman, 2007 
Ayoob Mohammed: The Third World Security Predicament: State making, regional 
conflict, and international system, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1995
Aves Jonathan: Georgia: from chaos to Stability? The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1996
Azar Edward & Burton John: International Conflict resolution: Theory and Practice, Essex, 
Wheatsheaf, 1986
Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi, 
Paragraph 2 draft of 20 November 2001
Bloomberg.com: “Georgia Claims Military Coup Thwarted; Tank Battalion Mutinies”, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ahCOu3Zd7Uxc#, 05.05.2009
102
Brubaker Rogers: Nationhood and the national question in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet 
Eurasia: An institutionalist account, Theory and Society 23: 47-78, Kliwer Academic 
Publishers, 1994
Buzan Barry: People, states and fear. An agenda for international security studies in the 
post-cold war era, ECPR Press, 2007
Civil.ge: “Putin: No Difference Between Kosovo and Abkhazia or South Ossetia”,
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13529, 12.09.2006
Civil.ge: “Medvedev: ‘I don’t Want to Have Relations with Saakashvili’”,
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20655, 03.04.2009
Coppieters Bruno & Legvold Robert, eds: Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose 
Revolution, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, 2005
Coppieters Bruno: “Locating Georgian Security” in Coppieters Bruno & Legvold Robert, 
eds: Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution, American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, Cambridge, 2005
Cosman Cathy, Denber Rachel & Laber Jeri: Conflict in Georgia. Human rights violations 
by the government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Helsinki Watch, Vol. no. 3, Issue no. 16, 
December 27, 1991 
Council of European Union: Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP of July 7, 2003 
concerning the appointment of an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, 2003
Council of European Union: Council Joint Action 2004/532/CFSP of June 28, 2004 
extending and amending the mandate of the Special Representative of the European Union 
in the South Caucasus, 2004  
Council of European Union: Council Joint Action 2006/121/CFSP of 20 February 2006 
appointing the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus, 2006 
103
Council on foreign relations: “Fuller: Despite Apparent Reelection, Saakashvili’s Popularity 
Not High”, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15185/, 07.01.2009
Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict,        4 
April 1994. From http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/8/1-2/252.pdf - Retrieved in June 
2009
Donnelly Jack: Realism and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 2000 
Eurasia.net: “Georgia: OSCE calls timeout while wrestling with Ossetia Conundrum”
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav051509.shtml, 15.05.2009
European Commission, Country Strategy Paper 2003-2006: Georgia, September 2003
European Commission’s Delegation: Overview of EC assistance to people affected by conflict 
in Georgia, www.delgeo.cec.eu.int/en/programmes/rehabilitation.html
European Commission: European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper, Brussels, 12.5.2004
European Union: European Security Strategy. A secure Europe in a better world, Brussels, 
2003
European Union: European Neighborhood Policy: EU/ Georgia Action Plan, 2006
Galtung Johan: Peace by peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and 
Civilization, London, Sage Publication, 1996 
Georgian Daily: “NATO Plans Military Exercise in Georgia in May; Russia Objects”, 
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11142&Itemid=65, 
16.04.2009
Gerring John: Case study research, Cambridge University press, 2006
104
Guinard Caroline: From war to peace. Lessons learned from achievements and failures in 
peace agreements over the past decade: a strategy for peace process optimization, Non-
violence International Southeast Asia, International Peace Bureau, 2002  
Helly Damien & Gogia Giorgi: “Georgian Security and the Role of the West” in Coppieters 
Bruno & Legvold Robert, eds: Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution, 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, 2005
Herzig Edmund: The new Caucasus. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, The Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, Chatham House Papers, London, 1999
Hill Fiona & Taspinar Omer: Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus: Moving together to 
preserve the status quo? Russie.Nei.Visions no. 8, January 2006, Institut Francais des 
Relations Internationales  
Hofman in Jean Gottman, Centre and Periphery, Spatial variations in politics, Sage 
publications, London, 1980
Human Rights Watch: Up in flames. Humanitarian law violations and civilian victims in the 
conflict over South Ossetia, 2009 
Hunter Shireen T.: The Transcaucasus in transition. Nation building and conflict, The 
Center for Strategic and International studies, Washington DC, 1994 
Høiris Ole & Yurukel Sefa Martin: Contrasts and Solutions in the Caucasus, Aarhus 
University Press, 1998  
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia Report,
Volume I, September 2009
International Crisis Group website: www.crisisgroup.org
International Crisis Group: Saakashvili’s Ajara success: Repeatable elsewhere in Georgia?, 
Europe Briefing, Tbilisi/Brussels, 18 August 2004
105
International Crisis Group: Georgia: Avoiding war in South Ossetia, European Report no. 
159, 26 November 2004
International Crisis Group: Conflict resolution in the South Caucasus: the EU’s role,
European Report No. 173, 20 March, 2006 
International Crisis Group: Abkhazia today, Europe Report no. 176, 15 September 2006
International Crisis Group: Abkhazia: Ways forward, Europe Report no. 179, 18 January 
2007
International Crisis Group: Georgia’s south Ossetia conflict: Make haste slowly, Europe 
report no.183, 7 June 2007
International Crisis Group: Russia vs. Georgia, The Fallout, Europe Report no. 195, August 
22, 2008 
International Crisis Group: Georgia: The Risks of Winter, Europe Briefing no. 51, 26 
November, 2008 
International Crisis Group: Georgia-Russia: Still Insecure and Dangerous, Europe Briefing 
no. 53, 22 June, 2009
James Alan: Sovereignty – a Ground Rule of Gibberish? in Review of International Studies 
10, 1984 
Kanet Roger E. (ed.): Russia. Re-Emerging Great Power, Palgrave, Macmillan, 2007
King Gary, Keohane Robert & Verba Sidney: Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference 
in Qualitative Research, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994 
Lynch Dov: Engaging Eurasia’s Separatists States, Washington D.C, United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 2004  
106
Lynch Dov: Why Georgia Matters, Chaillot Paper No 86, February 2006 
Mearsheimer John, J.: “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power” (2001) in Arts J. Robert & 
Jervis Robert (eds.): International politics. Enduring concepts and contemporary issues. 8th
edition, Pearson Longman, 2007
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: “Russian MFA Information and 
Press Department Commentary Concerning the Situation in South Ossetia”, 
http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/off_news/100708/newen3.htm, 10.07.2008
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933  
Opdahl Ingerid: Georgia og Russland. Et vanskelig naboskap, Norwegian Institute for 
Defence Studies, Oslo files on Security and Defence, 06/2008
Pegg Scott: International Society and the de facto states, Brookfiled , VT Ashgate, 1998 
Popescu Nicu: “Outsourcing” de facto Statehood. Russia in secessionist entities in Georgia 
and Moldova, Centre for European Policy Studies, Policy brief, No. 109, July 2006
Popescu Nicu: Europe’s Unrecognised Neighbours, CEPS Working Document, No.260, 
March 2007
Popper Karl: The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York: Harper and Row, 1968
President of the Russian Federation (Official site) – News, 09.11.2009 
Radio Free Europe: “Shots Fired Near Convoy Of Georgia, Polish Presidents”, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Shots_Fired_Near_Convoy_Of_Georgia_Polish_Presidents_/135
2088.html, 23.11.2008 
Radio Free Europe: “Alleged Shooting Fuels Tensions Between Moscow And Tbilisi”, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Alleged_Shooting_Fuels_Tensions_Between_Moscow_And_Tbi
lisi/1352339.html, 24.11.2008
107
Radio Free Europe: “Abkhazia And The Perils Of 'Independence'”,  
http://www.rferl.org/content/Abkhazia_The_Perils_Of_Independence/1758008.html, 
19.06.2009
Radio Free Europe: “Tensions Rise Over Georgia's Sea Blockade Of Abkhazia”, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Tensions_Rise_Over_Georgias_Sea_Blockade_Of_Abkhazia/18
13300.html, 02.09.2009
Ramsbotham Oliver, Woodhouce Tom and Miall Hugh: Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 
The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts, Polity Press, 2005
Report of the Secretary General: “Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia”, S/1996/284, 
15 April 1996 
RosBusinessConsulting: “В.Путин озвучил главную угрозу для России в XXI веке”
(“V.Putin pointed out the main threats for Russia in 21st century”), 
http://top.rbc.ru/politics/18/12/2003/51114.shtml, 18.12.2003
Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary Concerning the Situation in 
South Ossetia, http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/off_news/100708/newen3.htm, 
July 12, 2008
Staun Jørgen: Ruslands Udenrigspolitik Fra Jeltsins vesternisering til Putins 
nyimperialisme, Danish Institute for International Studies Report 2008: 12 
Svanidze Guram: Concept on the Policy Regarding the Protection and Integration of 
Persons belonging to National Minorities in Georgia, European Centre for Minority Issues 
Georgia Occasional Paper no. 2, June 2006 
The Constitution of Abkhazia, 1994
The Constitution of Georgia, 1995
The Moscow Times: “Medvedev signs bill on military force abroad”, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/389116.html, 09.11.2009
108
The White House: The National Security Strategy of the Unites States of America, 
September 2002
Tocci Nathalie: The EU and Conflict Resolution. Promoting Peace in the backyard, 
Routledge, 2007
Transparency International Georgia: Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia: Issues of 
Concern, Tbilisi, 03.04.2009
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514, Declaration of the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and peoples of December 14, 1960
United Nation’s Observer Mission in Georgia, www.unomig.org
United Nations Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation 
in Abkhazia, S/1996/284, 15 April, 1996
U.S. Department of State: “United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership”, 
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-
english/2009/January/20090109145313eaifas0.2139093.html, 09.01.2009
Wallensteen Peter: Understanding the conflict resolution, Sage publication, 2007  
Waltz Kenneth: “The Anarchic Structures of World Politics” (1979) in Arts J. Robert & 
Jervis Robert (eds.): International politics. Enduring concepts and contemporary issues. 8th
edition, Pearson Longman, 2007 
Wheatley Jonathan: Defusing Conflict in Tsalka District of Georgia: Migration, 
International Intervention and the Role of the State, European Centre for Minority Issues 
Working Paper no. 36, October 2006 
Van Evera Stephen: Guide to methods for students of political science, Cornell University 
Press, 1997
109
Viotti R. Paul & Kauppi V. Mark: International relations and world politics. Security, 
economy, identity. 4th edition, Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009
Yin Robert K.: Case study research, Design and Methods, Sage Publications, 2003 
Zartman I. William: Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and intervention in Africa, New York and 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989 
